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Abstract
We are in the middle of a remarkable paradigm shift in particle physics, a shift of opinion
that occurred so slowly that some even try to deny that they changed their minds at all.
It concerns a very basic question: can we expect to derive the laws of particle physics
from a fundamental theory? The Standard Model of particle physics as well as the 1984
string theory revolution provided ample food for thought about this. The reason this was
ignored for so long can be traced back to an old fallacy: a misguided idea about our own
importance.
1Based on colloquia in DESY, Hamburg, and at the University of Utrecht. This is the extended version
of an invited contribution to “Reports on Progress in Physics” [1].
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1 Introduction
In the last five years, a big debate has erupted concerning a very basic question: are the
laws of physics we observe unique, or are there various distinct possibilities? Understand-
ing this requires a definition of what is meant by “the laws of physics” and what could be
non-unique about them, and we will get to that later. But even before going into detail
it should be obvious that the answer to this question is of fundamental importance. It
would have interested Einstein very much, judging from his famous phrase “I wonder if
God had any choice when he made our universe.” The answer to this question touches on
deep existential questions that have troubled mankind for centuries. If different laws of
physics are possible, we – or anything else of comparable intelligence – might not exist in
some of those different circumstances.
Physicist tend to get nervous about this sort of statement, and not without reason.
Ideas of this kind go by the generic name “anthropic principle”, but there are many
different formulations, ranging from tautological to just plain ridiculous. But advances
in string theory in the past three decades have moved these questions from the area of
philosophy into physics and mathematics. String theory suggests a very concrete answer
to this question: it suggests that the laws of physics (and in particular the properties
of fundamental particles and interactions) are highly non-unique, but in a precise and
quantifiable way. Whether this is indeed a correct statement about string theory can be
decided without invoking philosophy. It is a matter of using the traditional methods of
physics: finding controllable approximations, performing calculations, and making use of
the powerful machinery of mathematics.
While it is more and more widely accepted that string theory does indeed have this
property, it remains to be demonstrated that string theory is indeed the fundamental
theory of all interactions that it is hoped to be, and of course the answer a theory gives
is irrelevant if that theory is wrong. But it already deserves credit for forcing us to ask
the question about uniqueness of the laws of physics in a much more precise way. This
was never done before, because we never had a candidate theory that was so ambitious.
Initially, when string theory was touted as the “theory of everything” around 1984,
there were hopes it would lead to exactly the opposite: a unique derivation of all the
laws of physics. Evidence that quite the opposite was true started emerging almost
immediately after 1984, but most people chose to ignore it. In 2003, after important
additional evidence had been found, Leonard Susskind published a paper [2] entitled “The
Anthropic Landscape of String Theory”, which finally started a debate that should have
started fifteen years earlier. What is at stake in this debate is not only the uniqueness of
our universe, but also the fate of string theory as a fundamental theory of all interactions.
In my opinion string theory gives the right answer, and the fact that it does adds to
the evidence in its favour. I can say this without being accused of trying to put a positive
spin on the recent developments, because I actually wrote in 1998 [3] that I hoped string
theory would ultimately lead to a huge number of possible choices for the laws of physics,
a point of view I have been advocating since the late eighties. I reached that conclusion
after having been involved in one of the first papers [4] pointing out that the number of
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possibilities was humongous. Observing that the number of possibilities was huge, in the
approximation used at the time, was a relatively simple matter. But it was not obvious
what to conclude from that. Most people blamed on our lack of understanding of the
theory. Indeed, there were, and still are, many serious problems to be addressed.
My own conclusion was that we were in the process of uncovering a fundamental
property of nature. String theory suggested a fantastic solution to a deep mystery: why
the laws of physics we observe seem engineered especially for us to exist, even though
theoretically there seem to be many other possibilities. We all hope to live during a time
when big things are happening in our field, and I have never doubted that this is one of
those things. I have spent the last twenty years trying to convey my sense of excitement
to my colleagues, but with little success. But in the last few years I have been delighted to
see more evidence coming in supporting this point of view, so that the mood has started
to change. I hope this is the right time to make one more attempt.
Since I have been defending this point of view for a long time already, I knew it
was controversial. Therefore I was not surprised that many people rejected Susskind’s
conclusion or called it “premature”. This is a reaction I can understand. Scientific
debates about the validity of approximations or of the validity of a theory are normal.
However, there was another kind of reaction to Susskind’s paper that inspired me to
choose the title of this paper. Some string theorists claimed that they had reached the
same conclusion already a long time ago, but did not find it worth mentioning. Apparently
they did not find it worthwhile to point out that many great physicists had the wrong
expectations about fundamental physics. They do no think it is of any interest to know
that our universe is just one of a huge number of theoretically possible ones, and that it is
fundamentally impossible to derive it in full detail from a fundamental theory. They do
not seem to care about the existential consequences of this large number of possibilities.
They do not find it important that a theory they have invested years of their life in has
lead us to such a startling conclusion, and they do not seem to care about the implications
for the correctness of that theory. Or do they secretly hope that the conclusion will turn
out to be wrong after all? Sadly, since nobody found it worthwhile to speak or write
about this, we will never know what they really thought.
String theorists who say that the conclusion is premature could simply be right. String
theorists who claim that they think it is correct, but that they “knew this already” and
did not find it worth mentioning have missed one of the most fundamental scientific
discoveries of the last decades. Unless it is all wrong, but that seems hardly an attractive
alternative for a string theorist.
The inspiration for the title of this paper is the well-known fairy tale about the emperor
and his new clothes, advertised to be invisible only to stupid and incompetent people.
Since nobody wanted to belong to that category, all claimed to be able to see the clothes,
until a small child said “but he is not wearing anything”. Then suddenly everyone claimed
to have noticed this already.
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1.1 Unification versus uniqueness
But there is another moral that fits the recent events. Two concepts that played an
important role in the history of physics are unification and uniqueness. Sometimes these
concepts seem to be inadvertently confused.
Unification means reducing the laws of physics to fewer and fewer fundamental prin-
ciples. This has been a fantastic success. Many breakthroughs in physics can be viewed
in terms of unification. The gravitational force acting on object on the surface of the
earth turned out to be the same as the ones governing the motion of planets; inertial
mass the same as gravitational mass; electricity was found to be related to magnetism,
and the unified theory of both forces is responsible for such diverse phenomena as light
and atomic physics, chemistry and the structure of matter. Furthermore, in the second
half of last century we learned that two other forces of nature, the weak force (responsible
for radioactive decays) and the strong force (binding quarks into nucleons), are based on
the same principles as electromagnetism, the principle of local gauge invariance. If string
theory is correct the success of unification continues in a spectacular way. It unifies all
interactions with gravity, and all matter with interactions.
Uniqueness concerns the question if the laws of physics we observe in our universe are
the only ones possible. Historically, whenever alternatives were imaginable, the hypothesis
of uniqueness has almost systematically been a failure. The origin of this fallacy can often
be traced back to an – explicit or implicit – belief that there is something special about
us, or about our planet, or our solar system. For centuries it was believed that the
entire universe was a unique structure with the earth in its center. This was corrected by
Copernicus, who put the sun in the center of the solar system. But he also put the sun in
the center of the universe, a similar fallacy. The idea that the solar system was something
special is evident in the work of Kepler, who tried to derive the sizes of the planetary
orbits from a mathematical principle. He was even moderately successful in identifying
the ratios of these sizes for the first five planets using nested platonic solids. The fact that
he tried this implies that he was thinking of the solar system in terms of a mathematically
unique system. Giordano Bruno speculated about other solar systems with other kinds of
life in them, and paid dearly for that (although not only for that). This particular issue is
of course still undecided, but it illustrates the strong sentiments that arguments against
our uniqueness evoke. Fortunately they have become a bit less emotional more recently.
In 1920 there was the so-called “Great Debate” (it got the name because it concerned the
scale of the universe) between the astronomers Shapley and Curtis. The former defended
the point of view that our galaxy was the entire universe, but that our solar system was
not in its center, while the latter claimed that the then observed “spiral nebulae” were
actually other galaxies. However, Curtis also defended the point of view that the Milky
Way was centered around our solar system. Each defended an anthropocentric statement,
and was fully aware of that. Each of them later turned out to be wrong on that statement.
The mistaken concept of human uniqueness not only plagues physics and astronomy, but
also biology, and is at least to some extent the origin of the strong resistance against
evolution, which took the human being from the pedestal where it once placed itself.
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The debate that is the subject of this article fits nicely in the foregoing list. Although
it was triggered by string theory, it could and should have started independently. It is
the structure of the Standard Model itself that raises the question. String theory suggest
an answer that would fit perfectly in the brief history presented above.
Of course a historical analogy can never be used as a proof. However, it can be used
to understand the importance of a conclusion, and the resistance against it. In the course
of history, ideas of this kind have never been received with much enthusiasm, as Galileo
and Giordano Bruno found out. Unification sells much better than non-uniqueness.
This is the second moral: the emperor is us, and the beautiful clothes are the strange
ideas we have about our place in the universe. Repeatedly we have been shown to be
naked, and I am convinced that in the last decades this has been happening again.
Let me make it clear that I am not trying to portray great scientists like Ptolemy,
Copernicus, Kepler and others as fools. My point is quite the opposite: to show that
even the greatest minds of their time can make the obvious anthropocentric mistake of
thinking that what we see around us is all there is. I might be making that mistake myself
somewhere in this article, and I will try to point out where that could be the case.
1.2 Contents
This article has two parts, devoted to two essential ingredients of the debate. The first part
follows a “bottom-up” way of thinking. It contains a brief introduction to the Standard
Model of particle physics, which leads us naturally and inevitably to the question how
it might come out of a fundamental theory, and whether we can expect this to happen
in a unique way. I will explain in particular why the Standard Model forces us to think
about that question much more seriously than any of its predecessors. The second part
takes a “top-down” point of view. I will consider string theory as an example of what a
fundamental theory of quantum gravity might have to offer as an answer to this question.
In between these two topics I will discuss a concept that inevitably comes up in connection
with these discussions, and that tends to confuse the issue and stir up strong emotions:
The “anthropic principle”.
The main focus of this article is on the Standard Model of particle physics and the
anthropic implications of its embedding in string theory. Other essential ingredients in
the history of anthropic arguments, in particular from cosmology, will only be mentioned
briefly.
The assumed background knowledge is quantum mechanics, some basic group theory
and some facts about elementary particle physics. A few parts on the latter subject are
perhaps a bit more advanced, but they can be skipped without missing the main points.
This article summarizes twenty years of passionate and vigorous discussions. It con-
tains answers to most of the questions that came up during these debates or afterwards. I
wish to thank everyone who contributed their point of view and thereby influenced mine.
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2 The Standard Model
2.1 Towards the Standard Model
In the beginning of last century, after Einstein formulated his theory of gravity, General
Relativity, it may have been natural to assume that a unique and unified theory might
be emerging. Both Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and General Relativity have
an air of uniqueness about them. Could the laws of physics be anything else than this?
The quest for a unified theory dominated the rest of Einstein’s scientific career, and it is
plausible that he also hoped or expected the result to be unique.
But then the experimental facts started pointing in a different direction. New interac-
tions were discovered that did not seem to have an equally simple and elegant description:
the strong and the weak interaction. New particles were discovered that nobody needed,
such as the muon. And new parameters emerged that did not seem to have a simple ex-
planation, such as the masses of all these particles. The resistance against new particles
was so strong that when Dirac discovered the positron he was so reluctant to introduce
a new particle that he tried to identify it with the proton, even though he knew that the
positron and the proton had totally different masses.
An important theoretical development also put the idea of uniqueness into doubt.
Yang-Mills theory, a generalization of electrodynamics, was discovered. Electrodynamics
is a “gauge theory” based on the group U(1). For readers not familiar with the concept
of a gauge theory the only important point to note is that U(1) is merely an example of a
group that can be used in their construction. But there are many other possibilities that
work equally well from a theoretical point of view: for example SU(N) and SO(N) for any
integer N . It just so happens that the first example of a gauge theory we encountered in
nature was based on U(1), but that does not make it unique (actually, the physics of the
other possibilities is more complicated, making them much harder to observe directly).
Indeed, nature does make use of these other possibilities: SU(3) for the strong in-
teractions and SU(2) for the weak interactions. This result emerged during the sixties
and seventies, and put all the interactions once again on a common conceptual footing:
all turned out to be based on the principle of “local gauge invariance”, which is a close
relative of the concept of general coordinate invariance that underlies General Relativity.
This unification of concepts generated some new dreams of unification and uniqueness,
but on the other hand it was clear that the Standard Model did not really look like
something mathematically unique.
2.2 The Standard Model
Let us have a closer look at the Standard Model. The only feature that I want to emphasis
is the choices involved in its definition. We have already seen that the first choice is a
gauge group, which is SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1). There is no theoretical justification for
this choice. It is just what we observe, albeit rather indirectly and through tremendous
experimental efforts. Each factor implies the existence of an interaction, which may be
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thought of as a kind of generalization of electrodynamics. Indeed, the first factor is
responsible for the theory of the strong interactions, quantum chromodynamics (QCD),
whereas the other two combine to yield the weak and electromagnetic interactions.
Next we must specify matter for these interactions to couple to. This is done simply
by specifying a spin and a set of charges. The charges, more generally “representations”
of the Standard Model gauge group SU(3)×SU(2)×U(1), specify how the corresponding
particle couples to the three fundamental interactions. All fundamental matter particles
observed so far have spin 1
2
. They fall into two classes: those that have QCD interactions
(the quarks) and those that do not (the leptons). Mathematically speaking there are
infinitely many possible choices for the charges/representations, and just one of them
agrees with experimental observation. It is usually written as follows2
(3,2,
1
6
)L + (3,1,
2
3
)R + (3,1,−1
3
)R + (1,2,−1
2
)L + (1,1,−1)R , (1)
where the three entries indicate the coupling to SU(3), SU(2) and U(1) respectively, and
L and R denote left- and right-handed. Although I am showing these representations in
detail, I do not expect all readers to understand what the notation means. I only want
to emphasize that this is just a choice. Indeed many other choices are possible; one may
change all the numbers appearing in (1), subject to a few consistency conditions. These
conditions allow an infinity of possibilities, and there is nothing in the formulation of the
Standard Model that specifies this particular choice. Furthermore, for unknown reasons,
this entire set is repeated three times: the matter particles belong to three “families”.
Each of these families has identical couplings to the Standard Model interactions; each
consists of two quarks and two leptons.
We may add particles of spin 0 (scalar particles), and they may also have all kinds of
charges. So far no such particle has been observed, but one is expected: the famous Higgs
particle. To play the roˆle of the Higgs particle it must have a very definite set of charges,
but mathematically there is once again an infinity of possibilities. The gauge group itself
implies the existence of particles of spin 1; these are completely fixed and correspond to
the photon (responsible for all electromagnetic phenomena), the gluons (particles that
bind quarks together to form protons and neutrons) and the W and Z particles (vector
bosons with a mass of about eighty times the proton mass that are responsible for weak
decays).
There is one final set of ingredients to be specified. The spins and charges of the
particles determine precisely how they can couple to each other, up to some numerical
constants, the so-called coupling constants. These are real numbers, and any value is in
principle allowed. The Standard Model has about3 28 of them. Only a few of them really
play a roˆle in the rest of the story, but for completeness I will list all of them:
2Right-handed neutrinos have been ignored here.
3The precise number depends on assumptions regarding the number of right-handed neutrinos and the
existence of Majorana masses.The most common set of assumptions (three right-handed neutrinos and
the existence of both Dirac and Majorana mass components) gives three masses and six mixing angles
for neutrinos, and a total of 28 parameters.
6
• Three gauge couplings g1, g2 and g3.
• The nine masses of the quarks u, d, c, s, t, b and the charged leptons e,µ,τ .
• Four weak interaction mixing angles of the quarks.
• The Higgs boson mass parameter µ2 and the Higgs self-coupling λ.
• The strong interaction CP-violation parameter θ.
• Neutrino mass and leptonic weak interaction mixing parameters.
Apart from the neutrino sector, where a lot is still unknown, the only parameter that
has not been measured yet is a combination of µ2 and λ. We do know the value of the
combination v = 2
√−µ2/λ, known as the “vacuum expectation value of the Higgs field”.
It has the dimension of a mass, and in the conventional units of particle physics its value
is 246 GeV.4 If and when the Higgs boson is discovered we will know its mass, which is
given by
√−2µ2 (note that µ2 < 0, although the notation might suggest otherwise), and
then of course we also know λ.
The quark and charged leptons owe their masses to their coupling to the Higgs bosons.
These are called “Yukawa couplings” and are in fact dimensionless 3 x 3 matrices mixing
the particles of equal charge in the three families. Not all parameters in these matrices
are observable, but their eigenvalues are. Denoting these as λx we may write the mass
mx of particle x as λxv.
A combination of g1 and g2, e = g1g2/
√
g21 + g
2
2, yields the famous fine-structure
constant α = e
2
4pi
, with a value of about 1
137.04
. Most of the remaining parameters are
responsible (via the Higgs mechanism) for the masses of the quarks and leptons.
It should be emphasized that the number of parameters of the Standard Model is
amazingly small in comparison to its achievements. Most physical systems have an infi-
nite number of parameters (even though in practice only a finite number is relevant). For
example any function specifying the shape of objects has an infinite number of parame-
ters. Nevertheless most people think 28 is too many, although few people have expressed
themselves very explicitly on their ultimate expectations. One often encounters phrases
like the following one from the Wikipedia item on the Standard Model:
However, the Standard Model falls short of being a complete theory of fundamental
interactions, primarily because of its lack of inclusion of gravity, the fourth known funda-
mental interaction, but also because of the large number of numerical parameters (such as
masses and coupling constants) that must be put “by hand” into the theory (rather than
being derived from first principles).
4I will follow the standard conventions of particle physics and express all energies in electron-Volts
(eV). Furthermore all masses and lengths are also converted to eV by inserting appropriate powers of ~
and c. For comparison: the proton mass is about one GeV (938 MeV) in these units.
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No-one would disagree with the first part of that statement.5 Most people would also
agree that it is unacceptable (although not for very concrete reasons) that parameter val-
ues must be put in by hand. But it is the last, parenthetical remark that will be especially
important: should we expect that their values can be “derived from first principles”, and
what exactly would that mean?
Feynman said the following about one of the 28 parameters, the fine-structure constant
α ∼ 1/137.04:
There is a most profound and beautiful question associated with the observed coupling
constant, e, the amplitude for a real electron to emit or absorb a real photon. It is a
simple number that has been experimentally determined [....]. It has been a mystery ever
since it was discovered more than fifty years ago, and all good theoretical physicists put
this number up on their wall and worry about it. Immediately you would like to know
where this number for a coupling comes from: is it related to pi or perhaps to the base of
natural logarithms? Nobody knows. It’s one of the greatest damn mysteries of physics: a
magic number that comes to us with no understanding by man. You might say the “hand
of God” wrote that number, and “we don’t know how He pushed his pencil.”
Indeed, some theorists did put the numerical value of 1
α
on their office door. Others
produced surprisingly accurate formulas for this value. A quick search on the internet
easily produces a handful (the fact that there is more than one undermines the signifi-
cance of each of them). There are similar attempts for other quantities, such as the the
proton/electron mass ratio, or quark or lepton mass ratio’s.
In fact, our current understanding of the Standard Model makes it very unlikely that a
parameter like α (as well as the other Standard Model parameters) has a mathematically
defined numerical value. We know that all these parameters are in fact functions of energy
(see section 2.4). In particle collisions where the incoming particle beams have energies of
order 100 GeV, the value of α is about 1
128
. Towards lower energies, the function α would
tend to zero, except that its decrease is stopped by the lowest value that its argument
can have, the energy corresponding to the electron mass (the lightest charged particle).
It would be very surprising if this value could be written as a simple formula in terms of
e or pi. However, it is still possible that the function is itself unique, and that it has a
nice mathematical value at some special, presumably high, energy.
2.3 Beyond the Standard Model: Two paradigms
After a breathtaking century of discoveries, to which I did insufficient justice above, our
understanding of the fundamental laws of nature has advanced to a remarkable level. We
now have a theory of all known non-gravitational interactions that seems almost perfect.
This theory is called, not very glamorously, the “Standard Model”. One might also call it
“The theory of almost everything” [5]. The story of last century concerned the exploration
5Except that there are other ways in which the Standard Model falls short of being complete, most
notably the absence of particles that can account for the large amount of dark, non-standard-model
matter that appears to be present in our universe.
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of matter at ever shorter distances, from atoms to nuclei, protons and neutrons and finally
quarks. How will this story continue to unfold in the present century?
There are basically two points of view regarding physics at shorter distances. One
is that it is like peeling away the layers of an onion. In this picture new physics should
be expected whenever we go up several orders of magnitude in energy, or down several
orders of magnitude in distance. This is certainly what happened during last century,
and it is a priori not unreasonable to expect the story to continue that way. Most ideas
in this direction focus on the Higgs boson, because it is the least understood part of the
Standard Model, and it is responsible for most of its parameters.
However, during the last decades of last century a different point of view has emerged:
perhaps we can peel off the last layer of the onion in one bold step. If that is the case,
one would expect this bold step to solve also the longstanding problem of consistently
combining General Relativity and quantum mechanics. Assuming that our universe has
three spatial dimension at all lengths scales, this puts the energy scale of the new physics
at an inconceivably large value of 1.2× 1019 GeV, the Planck energy,6 corresponding to a
length scale of 1.6× 10−33 cm.
There are several arguments in favor of this point of view. The first one is purely
practical (and not very convincing). Looking deeper and deeper into the structure of
matter becomes more and more difficult and expensive, and if there are too many onion
shells still ahead of us, the “final theory” may elude us forever. There is, of course, no
scientific reason why we should be able to find such a theory, assuming it exists. It seems
almost ridiculous to believe that we, primitive beings on a speck of dust in the universe,
should be able to figure out all the laws of physics with our severely limited equipment
and mental abilities. There may be crucial information that we are simply unable to get.
However, the structure of the Standard Model itself does give us some reason to hope
that such a final bold step may be possible. It looks like it is more than simply the next
step in a sequence: periodic system, nuclear physics and hadronic physics. I will discuss
this in the next section. There is a third reason. More or less by coincidence we have
stumbled on a theory with magical properties called “string theory”, which looks like a
perfect candidate for the center of the onion, the final theory. This will be the subject of
the second half of this paper.
When one phrases the problem in this way it seems rather natural to expect the
center of the onion to be something unique. One starts dreaming of a “theory of every-
thing” from which all known physics can be derived, at least in principle. Indeed, we
have always been able to move backward in the hierarchy of onion shells. For example
we can derive the spectrum and interactions of protons and neutrons from quarks and
quantum-chromodynamics, the fundamental theory of the strong interactions. We can
derive nuclear physics from the strong force mediated by pions (themselves quark-anti-
6The Planck energy is given by EPlanck =
√
~c5
GN
, where GN is Newton’s constant. For comparison: the
most powerful particle accelerator currently under construction, the LHC (CERN, Geneva), will collide
protons with each other with energies of a mere 7 TeV. I will not consider the possibility of large but
unobservable extra dimensions, which effectively lower the scale of quantum gravity. This does not affect
the main points.
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quark bound states), atomic physics from the electromagnetic force between nuclei and
electrons. In practice we can do these computations only in a few simple cases and with
sometimes brutal approximations, but the principle is not in doubt.
The question regarding uniqueness of the Standard Model becomes unavoidable if one
adopts the second paradigm. This is not really an issue if one just thinks in terms of
moving to the next shell of the onion. But if one is aiming for the “fundamental theory
of all interactions”, this would be the last chance. There is, by definition, nothing beyond
such a theory. Should we really expect that all the parameter values of the Standard
Model can be “derived from from first principles”, as the Wikipedia text suggests?
2.4 Parameters in Quantum Field Theory
A fundamental feature of Quantum Mechanics is that one must sum over all possibilities,
weighted with an exponential factor. Here “all possibilities” includes literally everything,
including physics that we know nothing about. It includes the possibility that particles are
created and annihilate again, at arbitrarily short time and length scales. These particles
may be quarks and leptons, but also any particle we have not yet observed. Even for
a finite set of particles there is an infinite set of possibilities: many particles may be
created and they may interact and recombine in any possible way. How can we possibly
get precise answers out of such a theory?
The reason is that in certain “good” theories, including the Standard Model, all these
unknowns can be lumped together in a finite number of parameters. These parameters
are not specified by the theory, indeed, they are “infinitely unknown”, but that does not
matter. We only have to measure each of them once and we can compute any quantity
of interest.
One can distinguish three kinds of parameters: dimensionless ones, parameters with
a positive mass dimension and parameters with a negative mass dimension. The latter
become more and more relevant at high energies, since they contribute to physical quan-
tities with powers of the dimensionless quantity ξEn, where ξ is a parameter of mass
dimension −n and E the energy of the process of interest. In every quantum field theory
one can write down an infinity of such parameters, and as soon as one is known to be
non-zero, one should expect an infinite number of others to be non-zero as well, because
of incalculable quantum corrections that contribute to them. Consequently, for energies
larger than the lowest mass scale set by the negative dimension parameters the predictive
power of a theory breaks down completely. Positive dimension parameters are irrelevant
at sufficiently high energies, but important at low energies. Dimensionless parameters are
relevant at all energy scales. A given quantum field theory has a finite number of param-
eters of positive or zero dimension. The Standard Model has one parameter of positive
mass dimension (the mass of the still to be discovered Higgs particle) and the remaining
27 are dimensionless. No parameters of negative mass dimension are known.
The feature that unknown quantum corrections can be lumped together in a finite
number of parameters goes by the name of “renormalizability”. It is a theoretical fact
(for which ’t Hooft and Veltman were awarded the Nobel prize in 1999) that the Standard
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Model has this feature, but it will always remain an experimental question whether this
really corresponds to nature. Indeed, it is possible that the next generation of experi-
ments, and in particular the LHC (Large Hadron Collider, currently in the last phase
of construction at CERN, Geneva), finds evidence of new parameters of negative mass
dimension. In this case the Standard Model looses its validity at the corresponding energy
scale, and the extrapolation towards the Planck scale that is required to make contact
with a fundamental theory of quantum gravity is unjustifiable. If such parameter is ever
discovered, it would essentially invalidate the argument presented in the next chapter, or
at best postpone the discussion by many decades.7
There are two important features of renormalizable gauge theories that are important
in the present context. The first is that they retain their consistency for a large range of
parameter choices other than those that we observe in our universe. The second important
feature is the fact that the properties of the theory are independent of the details of short
distance physics.
The meaning of “consistency” in the foregoing paragraph is that we can carry out com-
putations of quantum corrections with unlimited precision without running into infinities
and without needing new information that was not present in the original definition of the
theory. In particular, no new parameters will be needed. This statement is most clearly
correct for strong interaction (SU(3)) part of the Standard Model, Quantum Chromo Dy-
namics (QCD). Paradoxically, this is the part of the Standard Model where computations
are least precise, bur this is due to practical limitations and not matters of principle.
The other two interactions are only slightly more problematic. They are also renormal-
izable, but even for renormalizable theories there is something else that could go wrong. It
turns out that the dimensionless parameters also give rise to energy dependence, although
not by powers of energy but only logarithmically. This is known as “running” of coupling
constants, although “crawling” would perhaps be a better word. The energy dependence
is typically as follows (to lowest order in the expansion in quantum corrections)
gn(E) =
gn(E0)
1− b0 ln(E/E0) . (2)
Here g is some coupling, E the energy, E0 some reference energy scale, an n can be 1 or 2
depending on the kind of coupling considered. The coefficient b0 is a numerical constant
that depends on the particle content of the theory, and that can be straightforwardly
computed. The sign of b0 is important. It turns out to be negative in QCD, and this
implies that the coupling becomes smaller at higher energies, eventually approaching
zero. This phenomenon is called “asymptotic freedom”, and Gross, Wilczek and Politzer
received the 2004 Nobel prize for its discovery. If b0 is positive the corresponding coupling
becomes infinite at the energy E0 if we extrapolate it to higher energy (this is known as a
7This does not mean that any kind of “new physics” at shorter distance scales necessarily undermines
the argument. New phenomena that can be consistently extrapolated to the Planck scale themselves, or
that only affect the Standard Model in a marginal way, or involve entirely new particles are not relevant.
Anything that ruins the extrapolation of gauge couplings or quark and lepton masses would however
seriously weaken the argument.
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“Landau pole”). In the Standard Model this happens for the coupling of the U(1) factor,
and for the self-coupling of the Higgs bosons. The latter can only be determined if and
when the Higgs boson is found experimentally. In both cases, the Landau pole limits the
precision of the theory to effects of order E/E0. For the U(1) coupling the pole is far
beyond the Planck scale, and for the Higgs self-coupling it depends on the still unknown
mass of the Higgs particle: if that mass is less than about 180 GeV the Higgs Landau
pole is also beyond the Planck scale.
Obviously this is therefore another issue where LHC results could change the entire
picture. The entire justification for assuming that we can go directly to a fundamental
theory of all interactions without passing through intermediate “onion shells” would break
down if the Higgs boson were too heavy. This would imply that we will encounter a pole
in the Higgs self-coupling before reaching the Planck scale, and the existence of that pole
would provide strong evidence of an intermediate onion shell.
Because of their Landau poles and the still unknown Higgs sector the other two Stan-
dard Model interactions are on a less strong theoretical footing than QCD, but in reality
neither of the three parts of the Standard Model can be expected to be infinitely precise.
The reason is that they all couple to quantum gravity, which will lead to presently in-
calculable corrections of order E/EPlanck. Quantum gravity is precisely the problem that
the has to be solved anyway by the fundamental theory we are looking for, and therefore
one might say that from this point of view all three Standard Model interactions are on
comparable solid footing.
More importantly, we can write down an infinity of other theories that are on equally
solid footing theoretically. This puts us in a unique situation in the history of quantum
physics. Nobody would make such a statement about the theory of nuclear physics or
hadronic physics. Both of them have plenty of parameters (particle masses, hadronic
for factors, nucleon-nucleon potentials etc.) but it would be foolish to suggest that one
still obtains a consistent theory for arbitrary changes of these parameters. Even for
the parameters we observe in our own universe the concept of high precision quantum
computations is senseless in these theories. Hence they contain no clue about how they
could possibly be modified. We can give a meaning to alternatives to nuclear and hadronic
physics now that we know how to obtain these theories from gauge theories. This tells
us precisely what we can vary (in particular the quark masses and the strength of the
couplings) without affecting their implicit consistency.
This notion of what can be modified in the laws of physics we observe plays an essential
roˆle in the following. Gauge theory defines a huge set of possibilities which I am tempted
to call the “Gauge Theory Landscape”, but this would be an inappropriate name for
two reasons. First of all it may be confused with the “String Theory Landscape” to be
discussed later, and secondly it lacks an essential feature for a true landscape: a height
function. So instead I will refer to it as the “Gauge Theory Plane”. String theory will
provide a height function on that plane to turn it into a landscape.
The fact that thirty-five years ago we seem to have landed in a point of the Gauge
Theory Plane that extrapolates consistently to the Planck scale is remarkable, but not a
guarantee that this is the last onion-shell before the Planck scale. However, the principles
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on which gauge theories are based are so powerful that it seems reasonable to assume
that eventually we will have to land somewhere in that plane. Indeed, practically all new
ideas of physics “beyond the Standard Model” are based on other points in the Gauge
Theory Plane. This also addresses another obvious objection one might have, namely the
fact that it only seems to describe less than a quarter of all the matter in the universe.
The vast majority of matter in the universe does not interact with photons, and a large
fraction of this “Dark Matter” is believed not to consist of the Standard Model particles
we know. We are in obvious danger of making another anthropocentric mistake if we
assume that the matter we have not observed yet has properties similar to the small
percentage of matter that we are made of. Nevertheless, I have enough confidence in the
theoretical underpinnings of gauge theory to assume that those interactions are probably
eventually described by gauge theories as well.
So if we have to land eventually somewhere in the Gauge Theory Plane, we can only
hope that nature is kind to us and puts us directly in the right point, rather than confusing
us with a theory that just mimics a well-behaved gauge theory for no apparent reason.
This is an important point, because it can be tested experimentally, and we do not have
to wait very long for this to happen. Experiments at the LHC (Large Hadron Collider),
which is scheduled to start running this year at CERN, Geneva, may force us to conclude
that indeed nature has been confusing us, and that there is no well-behaved extrapolation
of currently known physics to the Planck scale. Then everything written here is, at best,
premature.
3 Two “gedanken” calculations
So is our beloved Standard Model derivable from first principles, i.e. from pure math-
ematics? I was confronted with that question around 1987, when string theory started
hinting at an answer. I arrived at a conclusion that I started explaining to my colleagues,
scribbling pictures like the one below on napkins in the CERN cafeteria. The gist of the
argument was that for most alternatives we would not exist, and neither would anything
else of interest, but it is worthwhile to make that a bit more precise. Since string theory
will be discussed later, this presentation is not in chronological order. The reason for do-
ing it like this is that I am convinced that someone should have arrived at this conclusion
even before string theory forced us to think about it.
3.1 Physics in the Gauge Theory Plane
Consider all theories we can think about theoretically, with different kinds of interactions,
quarks and leptons, and arbitrary masses for all these particles, in other words the “Gauge
Theory Plane” mentioned above. This is a huge space, with discrete and continuous
parameters. The important point is that all of these make as much sense theoretically
as the Standard Model. We are going to consider two “gedanken calculations”. These
are calculations we cannot really do, but that we can at least think about without being
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accused of transcending the boundaries of science.
The first computation is the possible existence of observers, or intelligent life, in a
universe governed by a given gauge theory. This is a “gedanken” calculation because
we are technically unable to do it. We certainly would not be able at present to derive
the existence of observers from the fundamental properties and interactions of particles
in our own universe. Even the definition of life or observers is a problem. However, we
can certainly imagine quantities that are computable in principle and that are almost
certainly necessary for the existence of observers.
The definition of such quantities is tricky because of the risk of making precisely the
kind of anthropocentric mistakes I warned against in section (1.1). It is the danger of
assuming too quickly that what we see in our own environment must be necessary for
life in general. Indeed, arguments of this kind tend to be based on assumptions such as
the necessity of Carbon, galaxies and stars, and some go as far as assuming the special
physical properties of water as essential.
However, it seems reasonable to assume, for example, that some level of complexity
of the spectrum is necessary for life, and on the other hand complexity is something that
can be defined and computed, at least in principle. Furthermore it seems plausible that
the building blocks of this complexity should be sufficiently abundant, at least locally,
and that there should be sources of energy available.
So one can at least imagine drawing contours of some appropriately defined “observer
function” on the space of all gauge theories. Ideally such a function might specify the
average total number of observers that exist in a universe during its entire lifetime, and
the contour may be drawn at the value 1. I will insist on working exclusively in the
Gauge Theory Plane, because that is where parameter changes are certain to make sense.
Any other variables, in particular cosmological ones, may simply be put at their optimal
values. If it turns out that those values can never by attained, the contours in the Gauge
Theory Plane can only be smaller than we first thought they were. The same is true if
we use too liberal a definition of what constitutes an “observer”.
Each such contour divides the space into two regions, one where observers might exist,
and one where they most definitely do not exist. Both regions are non-empty: it is not
hard to construct gauge theories that have completely uninteresting and hence “lifeless”
spectra, and obviously the Standard Model provides an example within the contour. The
computation would involve nuclear physics and chemistry for gauge theories that are
different from ours, with different interactions, coupling to different kinds of particles. It
is not doable in practice, but well-defined in principle. The figure below illustrates what
such contours might look like in some slice of the Gauge Theory Plane. On the axes one
may put some of the Standard Model parameters, such as quark or lepton masses. The
small circle indicate the current experimental data. It lies entirely within an observer
contour, because our own existence is a piece of experimental data. These contours are
not based on real computations (one could in fact do a lot better than this), but are drawn
like this to illustrate some important points and address a few common misconceptions
that I will discuss later.
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3.2 A unique gauge theory?
Now consider the second gedanken computation. It would be to compute the unique
gauge theory resulting from some fundamental theory. This is a gedanken computation
because no such theory is known. String theory was once hoped to be such a theory, but
does not seem to have this “uniqueness” property. But let us imagine that one day we
find some theory that does give a unique answer. Deriving that answer would involve
some computation involving properties of new physical phenomena relevant to distances
much shorter than what can be observed today, for example the Planck distance.
The problem is now that the unique result of the second computation has to fall within
the narrow contour of the first, even though these are completely unrelated computations.
The two gedanken computations are unrelated precisely because gauge theories, as ex-
plained above, are insensitive to the physics of very short distances. So even if the second
gedanken computation picks only one point as the only theory that is consistent for arbi-
trarily short distances, this does not invalidate the first gedanken computation. Nobody
would doubt that we could repeat all the computations in nuclear and atomic physics and
chemistry with different values of the electron and quark masses or the strength of the
electromagnetic coupling, and that all the results are correct, even if such a theory would
turn out to be inconsistent at distances the size of the Planck length.
There is an obvious way out of this puzzle. There would be no mystery about the
special features of our own universe if the fundamental theory had a huge number of
“solutions”. I am using the world “solution” because I am thinking of some set of equations
derived from the hypothetical fundamental theory. Equations can of course have more
than on solution, even if the equations themselves are unique. In order to demystify the
apparent fine-tunings we see in our environment, the fundamental theory should have,
in addition to our own universe, a huge number of other solutions, densely covering the
Gauge Theory Plane (or at least a large neighbourhood around us) with points.
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3.3 Our own neighbourhood
Although the complete computation of the contours in fig 1. is far beyond our technical
capabilities, part of our own neighbourhood has been mapped out already. There exist
several arguments showing that small modifications in some of the parameters of the
Standard Model would be fatal for our kind of life and most likely any kind of life. There
are many arguments of this kind, see for example [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] and [11]. A rather
obvious one is the fact that the proton is slightly lighter than the neutron. If you turn
that around, the proton would be unstable against decay to a neutron, a positron and
a neutrino. In the Standard Model, we can tune that mass difference by increasing the
mass of the up quark (a proton consist of two up quarks and a down quark, a neutron
of two down quarks and an up quark; up and down quarks are also denoted as u and d,
and have charges 2
3
and −1
3
respectively), keeping everything else fixed. There is a small
range in parameter space where a free proton would be unstable, but where it is stable in
certain nuclei, just as the neutron in our universe. But if we continue to increase the up
quark mass a bit more, we loose all charged stable nuclei.
If we increase the electron mass from its observed value of .511 MeV, keeping every-
thing else fixed, pretty soon it becomes larger than the proton-neutron mass difference of
1.293 MeV. This would make the neutron stable. Then the hydrogen atom becomes un-
stable against electron capture and we get to a universe dominated by neutrons, with few
protons and electrons. Another remarkable fact is the lightness of the up and the down
quark. If we increase their masses, the pion become heavier. This in its turn reduces the
range of the strong interactions, which fall off exponentially with the a length scale set by
the inverse pion mass. Soon we start loosing the stable heavier nuclei,8 until eventually
Carbon is not stable anymore. Similarly, if we increase the electromagnetic fine structure
constant α, we increase the repulsion of protons in nuclei, and this would also destabilize
heavier nuclei.
Opponents of this kind of argument will say that the burden of proof is on me to show
that beyond these thresholds nothing resembling intelligent life could possibly exist. But
instead of arguing about the precise position of the contours in the gauge theory plane,
one should consider the opposite question: is it plausible that intelligent life is a dominant
feature over most of the Gauge Theory Plane? If one looks at the entire picture, rather
than zooming in on a particular part of the contour, it seems difficult to argue that life
is generic. There may well be life elsewhere in the Gauge Theory plane, equally intrigued
about the friendly features of their own environment as we are about ours. But on the
other hand, one cannot simply dismiss the entire bulk of evidence in this way.
8This assertion is too simplistic, as it relies on the popular, but incorrect idea that the interactions
between protons and neutrons in a nucleus can be largely attributed to single pion exchange. The correct
statement is that our understanding of nuclear physics from the point of view of QCD is surprisingly
limited, and that even for a nucleus as simple as the deuteron it is not known how the binding energy
depends on the quark masses. I am grateful to E. Witten for pointing this out to me, as well as for other,
appreciative remarks about this paper. For a recent discussion on the dependence of nuclear physics on
quark masses see R. Jaffe, A. Jenkins, and I. Kimchi, Phys. Rev. D 79, 065014 (2009). This footnote
was added in July 2010. The original text has not been modified.
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Scales
The most obvious peculiarity of the Standard Model that seems relevant for the existence
of life is its mass scale. In fact, the Standard Model has two mass scales that are – to
the best of our knowledge – independent. The first one is the QCD scale. It is the mass
scale E0 where the running QCD coupling constant, given by (2) with b0 < 0, has a
pole. This scale is a few hundred MeV, and it determines the masses of most hadrons, in
particular the proton. An important exception is the pion, whose mass – unlike that of the
proton an neutron – goes to zero with the up and down quark masses: it is proportional to√
mu +md. The second mass scale we know of is the weak interaction scale v = 246 GeV.
It determines the masses of the W and Z bosons as well as those of all the quarks and
leptons, with the exception of the neutrino masses, which may well require a third mass-
scale (this is usually regarded as “beyond the Standard Model physics” and hence not
counted among the Standard Model mass scales). Both the QCD and the weak scale
are much smaller than the Planck scale, and in both cases this is clearly essential for
the existence of observers: If the proton or the electron had Planckian masses, gravity
would be much too strong in comparison with the electromagnetic or hadronic and nuclear
forces. Most people consider the problem of the smallness of the QCD scale “solved”. I
will comment on this in appendix C.
Discrete choices
The discrete choices in defining the Standard Model, the gauge groups and representations,
are undoubtedly important for the existence of life. This quickly gets us into uncharted
territory, because most cases are to complicated to work out. But if a few things are
fairly obvious. Removing either the SU(3) factor or the U(1) factor removes the strong
or electromagnetic interactions, which both seem essential, not just for our life but for
any kind of complexity. The SU(2) factor responsible for the weak force is less essential.
Indeed, it has been argued that life could still exist if we remove it altogether [12], provided
we make some other changes. However, in such a universe our world would look even more
fine-tuned. The quark and lepton masses are dimensionless numbers time a natural scale of
about 246 GeV, the weak interaction scale. Removing SU(2) amounts to send the natural
mass scale towards the Planck mass which replaces the miracle of a small weak scale by
the bigger miracle of small up-quark, down-quark and electron masses. Nevertheless, the
computations in [12] are a very nice example of a computation of part of the contours in
the Gauge Theory Plane, slightly away from our own place. Although it is argued in [13]
that in these weak-less parts of the Gauge Theory Plane we would be starved of oxygen,
that argument strikes me as perhaps a little too anthropomorphic. Perhaps other kinds
of life could exist in such a universe. If true, it would simply yield another contour in the
Gauge Theory Plane.
I have drawn some examples of other contours in the figure. Their existence does not
undermine the argument in any way. It does not even matter if there is another contour
that looks “larger” than ours, because it does not make it less surprising that a unique
solution managed to hit precisely our own, locally narrow, contour.
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There are other changes in the discrete choices that have drastic consequences. Chang-
ing the number of colors from three to any even number turns the analog of protons and
neutrons into bosons, eliminating the roˆle of the Pauli exclusion principle in nuclear
physics. Changing the choice of representations by choosing instead of Eqn. (1) some-
thing else from the myriad of possibilities has consequences that are hard to analyse, but
most of them would undoubtedly yield something pretty boring.
Quark and lepton masses
Let us take a closer look at the quark and charged lepton masses. Measuring quark masses
is a tricky business, because they cannot be liberated from their bound states. To first
approximation the mass of the proton has nothing to do with the quark masses. The
proton mass is determined mainly by the intrinsic energy scale of QCD. To observe the
actual quark masses we have to probe the proton at high energies, where the quarks start
approaching a free particle behaviour. I will use here the official estimate of the “Particle
Data Group” [14]. For the lightest quark, the u-quark, they give 1.5 to 3 MeV. The next
quark with the same electric charge 2
3
, the c quark, weighs 1.25 GeV, or at least 400 times
more. The mass of the next quark of charge 2
3
, the top (t) quark is about 173 GeV, larger
by a factor of 138. For the three quarks of charge −1
3
these masses are respectively 5
MeV, 95 MeV and 4.5 GeV. For the charged leptons we find .511, 105, and 1800 MeV,
with ratios of 200 and 17 respectively.
In the Standard Model all quark and lepton masses are given by the Higgs vacuum
expectation value of 246 GeV, multiplied by a dimensionless number, the Yukawa coupling.
In the following I will keep the Higgs vacuum expectation value fixed, as well as the
strength of the electromagnetic and strong interactions, and vary the Yukawa couplings;
see the subsection “determining parameter values” below for a justification.
In terms of their natural units of 246 GeV, the up and down masses as well as the
electron mass look ridiculously small; the electron mass is smaller by a factor half a
million. Note that the mass-ratios of the charge 2/3 and charge -1/3 quark are inverted
in the two heavier families, which makes especially the lightness of the up quark rather
peculiar. The lightness of the up-quark is important for at least two reasons: to keep
the pion light, and to make the proton lighter than the neutron. The mass difference
between the latter is not only determined by the differences of the quark masses that
they are made of, but also by electromagnetic effects. Although this is hard to compute,
looking at the charges of the quarks it is easy to see that the electromagnetic contribution
tends to make the neutron lighter than the proton. The pion mass is proportional to√
mu +md, whereas the neutron-proton mass difference contains a term md −mu and a
negative electromagnetic contribution.
The optimal way to deal with these constraints would be to make the up-quark nearly
massless, to make the down quark mass large enough to overcome the electromagnetic
contribution, to hope that then the pion is still light enough, and then to choose the
electron mass smaller than the neutron proton mass difference. To make this quantitative
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would require a lot more work.9 because we need to know precisely how heavy we can
make the pion without destabilizing too many heavy nuclei. But qualitatively, it is hard
to avoid the conclusion that the light quark and lepton masses have been pushed precisely
to this corner of parameter space, away from any imaginable natural distribution.
What would such a “natural distribution” look like? If we were to assume that the
Yukawa couplings are number of order 1, the amount of tuning required to get the right
up-, down-quark and electron masses looks enormous. But the distribution of the other
masses does not suggest that they are “randomly” chosen numbers of order 246 GeV.
Indeed, there is a clear hierarchy, with masses of quarks and leptons going up by one or
two orders of magnitude each time we move to the next family. This hierarchy (the ratios
of subsequent quark masses of the same charge) is not very sharply defined, and does not
look universal: it is considerably larger for the up quarks than for the down quarks. If
we assume that such a hierarchical distribution of Yukawa couplings is fundamental, the
amount of tuning is of course reduced. But even taking that into account, It is hard to
feel comfortable with the idea that this entire structure, including the hierarchy itself, its
non-universality and the large deviations from it, could be the unique solution to some
mathematical equation, if our existence depends so crucially on it.
Not all continuous parameters of the Standard Model have serious implications for our
existence. The most obvious ones are the up and down quark mass, the electron mass,
and the strong and electromagnetic coupling constant. Other parameters may not be as
irrelevant as they seem. Consider the top quark mass. The top quark is about 180 times
heavier than the proton and has an extremely short life-time. It may nevertheless be
important since the large mass implies a large Yukawa coupling, which in its turn implies
that it makes important contributions to the running of all other couplings. In particular
the Higgs self-coupling is strongly affected, and since all quarks and leptons owe their
mass to the Higgs boson, one may expect drastic consequences if we modify the top-quark
mass while keeping everything else fixed. Indeed, in the supersymmetric10 extension of the
Standard Model the large top quark coupling drives the symmetry breaking mechanism
that produces the quark masses. We do not know enough yet about the Higgs boson to
make general statements about the roˆle of the top quark, but is remarkable that its mass
of about 173 GeV is close to the theoretical upper limit for quark masses, about 230 GeV:
if we push the mass beyond that point its Yukawa coupling will have a Landau pole below
the Planck mass. Neutrino masses are also relevant for various features of our universe
that are important for the existence of life, but that is a much more complicated story.
9There are other bounds one may take into account. For example Hogan [9] takes into account that
the conversion of two protons to deuterium, p + p → d + e+ + νe should be exothermic; Weinberg [16]
points out that this may not be necessary, because the reaction p + p + e− → d + νe can take its place.
It may not be easy to pin down the exact boundary of the inhabitable island in parameter space, but in
any case it is true that the parameter values we observe are remarkably close to thresholds beyond which
the necessary conditions for life change drastically, and need to be re-examined carefully.
10Supersymmetry is a hypothetical and at best approximate symmetry between fermions and bosons.
Because fermions and bosons contribute with opposite signs to quantum corrections, it greatly helps in
controlling those corrections. The upcoming LHC experiment may tell us whether it is merely a powerful
theoretical tool, or if nature makes use of its power as well.
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Secondary effects
The first gedanken computation would include not only the effect of direct variations of
the gauge theory parameters, but also the secondary effect these variations have on the
parameters of nuclear physics and chemistry. A good example is an excited state of the
Carbon nucleus, correctly predicted by Fred Hoyle. He was worried how stars could have
produced as much Carbon as we observe. The obvious way to produce Carbon is that
two α-particles fuse to form Beryllium, which in its turn fuses with another α particle to
form Carbon. The trouble is that the first step fails, because Beryllium-8 is not stable.
Hoyle then conjectured that there should exist an excited state of Carbon appearing as
a resonance in the triple-α channel, so that the normally suppressed process fusing three
α-particles to Carbon is strongly enhanced. He urged experimentalists to look for that
excited state, and they found it. The energy of the excited Carbon state he conjectured
is of course not a variable. But nuclear physics itself varies over the Gauge Theory Plane,
mainly as a function of the up and down quark masses and the strength of the QCD
coupling. These variations would affect the abundance contour, and end up reducing the
size of the region where life can exist. According to Weinberg [16] the Hoyle resonance is
not as remarkable as it may seem. He argues that it has the same origin as the instability
of Beryllium, and can be understood entirely in terms of unstable bound states of α-
particles. If Weinberg is right this would imply that the Hoyle resonance would persist
over a large part of the Gauge Theory Plane, and hence does not contribute much to the
reduction of the contours. But either way, it can be taken into account.
There are many other secondary effects. In particular [6] is a treasure trove of remark-
able facts about nuclear physics and chemistry, relevant for our existence, such as the
properties of water (the fact that ice is lighter than water) or the properties of the DNA
molecule (supposedly very sensitive to the electron/proton mass ratio, a claim attributed
in [6] to T. Regge). Many of these arguments are not terribly convincing since they focus
on our kind of life instead of observers in general. For example, even if our DNA repli-
cation fails for a different proton/electron mass ratio, it would still be extremely hard
to argue that no life could possibly exist for another value. The essential complexity of
chemistry is unchanged if we change this ratio, and there may well exist entirely different
molecules playing a similar roˆle if the parameter values are different. We should not be
too surprised to find that nuclear physics and chemistry are remarkably suitable to our
kind of life, but that does not exclude the possibility of entirely different kinds of life,
presumably equally puzzled about their own environment. This kind of remark is often
used to dismiss any argument concerning apparent fine-tuning of the laws of physics. But
that is not reasonable either. If we look at all the evidence without prejudice, it does look
plausible that we live in a privileged place in the Gauge Theory Plane, but there is no
reason to assume it is the only one. Indeed, if it were, that would raise another disturbing
puzzle.
These secondary effects are a favorite target for critics. After all, we can compute them!
We can compute the resonances of carbon, the properties of water, and the properties of
DNA, at least in principle. Does this not show that it is senseless to worry about such
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apparent coincidences in our environment?
Although we can indeed compute them, the result depends on the parameters of the
Standard Model, and as such contributes to the shape of the contours. If these secondary
arguments turn out to be correct (i.e. if they hold for generic observers, rather than just
us) the contours might become very small indeed. In some cases there is even a risk of
over-determination, in the sense that several unrelated arguments constrain the same set
of Standard Model parameters. If we could really do these computations, it seems more
likely to me that the contours would decrease is size in comparison to current guesses,
than that they would increase.
Determining parameter values
To which extent do these arguments determine or explain the values of some of the Stan-
dard Model parameters? One has to be very careful in drawing such a conclusion. A
common, and valid, criticism of arguments of this kind is that one cannot simply vary a
parameter while keeping all others fixed. Consider the example of the electron mass. Can
we conclude that it is so small because if it where three times heavier the neutron would
be stable? Even in our own neighbourhood, one would first have to examine if there are
ways to increase the up and down quark mass difference. The range is limited by the
pion mass, which in its turn is limited by the required range of the strong interactions,
which compete in nuclei with the electromagnetic interaction. So one would really have to
consider the full variation of all these parameters to see if the electron mass can be pushed
up significantly. But if we go further away from our own neighbourhood, there are other
possibilities. For example in the “weakless universe” proposed in [12] the neutron is sta-
ble and the problem of a neutron dominated universe is avoided by having stable charged
pions, which produce protons when colliding with neutrons. So then this particular limit
on the electron mass disappears altogether.
Obviously the correct way of obtaining a true observer window for a single variable is
to project the contours on a single axis (including contours for different discrete choices of
groups and representations, as long as one can identify quarks and leptons). In practice,
this will be very difficult.
But this is not what I am trying to do. I merely wish to argue that our own contour
is remarkably narrow in certain directions. To show that, it suffices to scan it along a few
axes, where an axis is defined by keeping all but one variable fixed. As fig 1. suggests, our
own region can be narrow, but obviously its projection on the two axes can be large. If our
contour is narrow in certain directions (essentially a lower-dimensional sub-manifold), it
would indeed by a puzzle if a unique answer from a fundamental theory ended up precisely
in that narrow strip, regardless of the fact that the strip might be very elongated in other
directions.
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3.4 Two questions
The advantage of presenting the arguments in terms of contours in the Gauge Theory
Plane is that it cleanly separates the issue into two fundamental questions, one that we
may be able to answer, and one for which more information is required.
The first is why non-empty contours exist at all: why is there life anywhere in the
Gauge Theory Plane? The second question is how a first principle computation could
ever end up within the contour, instead of in one of the far more abundant boring places
in the Gauge Theory Plane. This is the question addressed here.
I do not have much to say about the first question. The problem becomes more
worrisome if our island turned out to be the only one. If all the arguments based solely
on our own existence are taken seriously, one might be tempted to conclude that. But
such an conclusion would fit perfectly in the series of anthropocentric mistakes listed in
the first chapter. In any case, the answer to this question is clearly out of reach. Even in
our own universe we have no idea what other forms of life might exist.
The most attractive way out would be if the contours themselves were abundant, so
that also in this respect we are not unique. The most attractive way out of both questions
would be that some form of life is generic in all gauge theories. But that seems very
implausible, and would still leave us with the question why it was realized in such a
complicated way in our own environment.
3.5 Boundaries and measures
In order to make all the foregoing mathematically precise, one would like to compute
the relative size of the region in the Gauge Theory Plane that can support the existence
of observers. If we could prove that this is true only in a portion of relative size , it
would require the existence of at least 1

“solutions” in a fundamental theory in order to
demystify our existence. Unfortunately such a computation requires the definition of a
boundary and of a measure, and the Gauge Theory Plane is not naturally equipped with
such quantities. Indeed, it is of infinite size in many directions, although the requirement
that a theory should remain consistent until the Planck scale cuts it down. There is also
no natural measure, and this concept becomes even harder to define if we consider the
discrete choices. For example, what is the relative weight of SU(3)× SU(2)× U(1) with
respect to other possible gauge groups?
On the other hand, if we choose any boundary and measure without prior knowledge
of the Standard Model, we would undoubtedly find that the window for the existence
of observers is small. Mathematically speaking, one can always deform any measure in
such a way that the relative size gets arbitrarily close to 1, but only if the location of the
observer window is already known.
A fundamental theory with a large number of discrete “solutions” would define a
measure for us, namely the continuum limit of the distribution of those solutions. But once
the correctness of such a theory has been established, there is no need anymore to argue
against uniqueness. On the other hand, if a fundamental theory with a unique solution is
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found, we will undoubtedly be immensely puzzled how it could ever land precisely within
the observer contour, but there is no way to make that puzzlement quantitative. This
is not significantly different if we consider our planet or our solar system. Undoubtedly
in that case nearly everyone would agree that our understanding of their very fortunate
features is greatly enhanced by the fact that we know that there are huge numbers of other
possibilities. But there is no way to quantify how fortunate we are without a theory of the
formation of solar systems and planets (the analog of the “fundamental theory” above),
and even then it is very hard. In the time of Kepler such a theory was not available, so
if he had chosen to think of the analog of observer contours on the space of all possible
solar systems or planets, he would have faced a similar measure problem.
To illustrate this, assume that some fundamental theory has solutions with a flat
distribution between 0 and 1, for all dimensionless parameters and ratios of mass scales
with the Planck scale. Under this assumption we can compute how many solutions it
must have in order that, statistically, there is one within our contour. From the ratio of
the QCD scale over the Planck scale we get 10−19, the weak scale over the Planck scale
gives an additional 10−17. The u, d quark masses and the electron mass give a factors of
about 10−4 to 10−5 each, when expressed in terms of their natural scale, the weak scale:
v = 246 GeV. This does not yet include the value of the fine structure constant or the
discrete choices of gauge groups and representations. It seems that we would need at
least 1050 solutions. However, in at least one case it is not likely that the distribution
will be as assumed here: instead of the ratio of the QCD scale over the Planck scale it
would perhaps be more natural to use the strength of the QCD coupling constant g3. The
relation between these two is logarithmic, as in (2), with g = g3 and n = 2. Clearly, if we
assume a flat distribution for g3 instead of the value of the pole, E0, the relative size of
the observer contour is not reduced by a factor 10−19 but by a factor of order 10−1. Note
that this argument does not by itself explain the small ratio, nor determine the measure,
but it does illustrate the importance of understanding the correct parametrization of
the variables (see also Appendix C). There may be other cases where Standard Model
variables can be reparametrized in order to blow up the observer contour. The weak
scale is a candidate, although no convincing mechanism exists in this case. The quark
and lepton masses also do not look as if they originated from a flat distribution. Indeed,
as discussed above, they display a clear, though not very precise hierarchy. All of these
effects may conspire to make the Standard Model look less rare than 1 in 1050. But on
the other hand, the number 1

is just a lower limit that would statistically give rise to
just one point within our own contour. It would be yet another example of a potential
anthropocentric mistake to assume that our universe is the only fundamentally allowed
one within our contour. Furthermore, if the parameters that are relevant to us can take
many values, it is reasonable that all the others can do so as well. It is not easy to scatter
just a few hundreds of points over a a multi-dimensional space so that they are nicely
spread around our neigbourhood without prior knowledge of its existence. We cannot
expect the fundamental theory to produce a distribution that is just barely dense enough
and just scattered in the minimal way to meet the requirement that we exist. That would
be another serious puzzle, although a slightly less severe one.
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3.6 Against uniqueness
One may look at the problem in the following way. We have at our disposal a discretely
and continuously infinite set of possible theories, all making as much sense theoretically
as any other: the Gauge Theory Plane. In our own universe we observe only one of those.
Let us assume the existence of some fundamental theory that selects a number N of points
in this infinite set. We would like to know the value of N .
I have presented above arguments indicating that we should expect N to be large.
These arguments cannot, and will never be, mathematically rigorous. Even if we were
technically able to do all relevant gauge theory computations, we are still faced with the
problem of the precise measure on this space, something that can only be determined
once we already know the fundamental theory. So this is the best that can be done: a
plausibility argument, not a mathematical proof.
But now let us look at the other side of the issue. What are the arguments for
believing that N = 1? Well, there aren’t any. There are a few empirical arguments in
favor of relations among some Standard Model features, but on closer examination (see
appendix B) even these do not really point towards uniqueness. In fact, the argument
for uniqueness of the Standard Model is not better than Kepler’s belief that the ratios of
planetary orbits should be computable.
At this point some people will say that they never really believed in uniqueness anyway,
but just hope that there will be “very few”. But this reveals the true nature of their
argument: it is nothing else than wishful thinking. The concept of “very-few-ness”,
unlike uniqueness, has no mathematical definition. All this says is that it would be nice if
we could enumerate all the solutions. Indeed, that would be nice. But there is no reason
to believe that it will be true.
Believers in uniqueness might appeal to a hope for some underlying, yet to be discov-
ered principle of nature. Indeed, I admit that I am hoping for a principle of nature that
fixes the underlying theory (as opposed to the “solutions” of that theory) uniquely. But
as soon as one gives up on absolute uniqueness, there is no way of telling what the total
number will be. In our universe we observe 1, and that is the maximum we are able to
observe with foreseeable technology. All this says about the total is that it is larger than
or equal to 1.
3.7 Entropic selection?
Let us assume that we find a fundamental theory that has a large, discrete set of solutions.
Then we end up with some kind of statistical distribution, perhaps peaked in somewhere
in the Gauge Theory Plane. There are two obvious ingredients to such distributions: the
density of points in a certain region of interest, and the probability of ending up at a
particular point. The former can at least in principle be obtained from the underlying
fundamental theory. The second contribution depends on details of the model for popu-
lating the distribution, and may depend on initial conditions beyond our control. It is not
even clear if the notion of probability makes any sense in the context, or how to define it.
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But let us assume for the sake of the argument that this can all be defined and
computed. Some people may hope that this will restore what seemed to be lost, namely
the possibility to derive the Standard Model. Could it be the maximum of the probability
distribution?
To me, that would seem to be even less attractive than a unique solution. The com-
putation of the maximum of a statistical distribution is analogous to the second gedanken
computation of section 3. It would be an equally incomprehensible mystery why such a
computation would end up in the observer contour.
Furthermore, unlike a unique vacuum, this cannot even be called an explanation for
the parameter values we observe. If only one value is allowed by fundamental physics,
there is nothing else to discuss. But if an ensemble of values is allowed, some of which are
outside the observer window, statistics does not help. If the majority of values is within
the observer window, do we find ourselves there because it is more likely, or because no
observers can exist outside that window? On the other hand, if the distribution has a
huge peak outside the observer window, would that be a reason for concern?
This should not be confused with a different application of statistical arguments, which
try to determine our place within an observer window. If there is a well-defined notion
of probability, we may hope that our universe is the most likely one, within the set of
inhabitable ones. In particular, if there is a multitude of observer contours, one may hope
that there is no other that is far more densely covered than our own. This would cast
doubt on the correctness of the fundamental theory producing such a distribution.
3.8 Discrete or continuous?
In the previous discussion I was assuming that the second gedanken calculation will ei-
ther yield a unique solution, or else produce a discrete set of solutions. Obviously the
demystification works equally well if there are solutions with continuous parameters that
cover part of the observer contour. One could even ask if we need a fundamental theory
at all? If indeed we need a large ensemble of theories to explain why there exist theory
within the contour, perhaps the Standard Model itself, with its 28 parameters, is just
what we need. Perhaps we were wrong in regarding the existence of this relative small
set of parameters as a problem. Perhaps the “theory of everything” we are looking for is
simply the Standard Model, combined with a (hypothetical) theory of Quantum Gravity
that is completely insensitive to the Standard Model and its parameters.
The trouble is not only that this is esthetically unappealing, but more importantly it
does not allow for the possibility of moving to other points in the parameter space. The
Standard Model with its observed value of the fine-structure constant, α = 1/137.04, has
nothing to do with a similar theory with a different value of α. It is of course imaginable
that the parameter values are simply fixed to random values at the initial moment of our
universe, but this would be highly unsatisfactory, to say the least.
Therefore the parameters must become, in some way “dynamical”. Once the parame-
ters are dynamical, it makes sense to compare theories with different values for parameters
like α. In particular one would expect their ground state energies to depend on the param-
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eter values, if we can make sense of them. Ground state energy in quantum field theory
is a highly divergent quantity, which furthermore is not physically relevant for Standard
Model physics. It starts being important if one includes gravity, because only gravity cou-
ples to it. In theories of gravity, the Standard Model contribution to the vacuum energy
is part of a long-standing problem, the cosmological constant problem, which looks even
more serious if one attempts to quantize gravity. I will say more about this below. If α
and other parameters are just constants, one may postpone discussing this issue until it
is understood in a consistent theory of quantum gravity, and simply set the ground state
energy to zero in the meantime. But if we allow α to vary, we cannot expect to be able
to set it to zero for all values of α. If we assume that ultimately a theory of quantum
gravity turns vacuum energies into meaningful quantities, they would seem to produce
a kind of potential, and what are called “solutions” above would actually correspond to
minima of this potential. These may just be local minima. They need not be absolutely
stable with respect to quantum tunneling, as long as they live long enough. This obvious
fact has been understood for many years already, but the full implication has only been
appreciated in recent years.
Such a potential picture would almost inevitably imply the possibility of fluctuations
around the minima. The description of these fluctuations in quantum field theory neces-
sitates the introduction of new fields, which can take constant values in one of the minima
without breaking Lorentz invariance. Such fields are called scalar fields. Nothing I have
said so far requires the minima to be fully discrete. There might exist elongated valleys
along which the parameters could vary. But it is not likely that we find ourselves in one
of those elongated valleys, for at least three reasons. First of all for observational reasons:
such a valley would imply the existence of massless scalar fields (the mass corresponds to
the second derivative of the bottom of the valley), which would mediate a “fifth force”
with has not been observed. Secondly, a scalar field is not expected to be massless unless
there is a symmetry that requires it; in other words, generically one would not expect a
valley connecting physically distinct values of α to be absolutely flat. This would only
be possible if there were miraculous cancellations between various quantum contributions
to the vacuum energy.11 Finally, our kind of life would not develop if crucial parameters
could vary significantly over space or time.
The previous paragraphs were written with string theory hindsight, and perhaps there
are different ways in which an ensemble of special parameter values in the Gauge Theory
Plane could be selected by a fundamental theory, but it seems unlikely that any theory
would produce a continuum. In chapter (5) I will discuss how precisely such a picture
emerges from string theory. It is called the “String Theory Landscape”.
3.9 The danger of circularity
In this section I want to compare this kind of arguments for the standard mode parameters
with those for the cosmological constant. First I will briefly summarize some basic facts
11Such cancellation do occur in supersymmetric theories, but supersymmetry is at best an approximate
symmetry in nature.
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about the latter. For more details see e.g. [15].
The Cosmological Constant
The vacuum energy discussed above may be thought of as an additional axis orthogonal
to the Gauge Theory Plane. One can extend the contours into this additional parameter
dimension, and work out where life is possible. It turns out that, at least in our own
neighbourhood, the contour is an incredibly tiny strip around zero. The reason vacuum
energy affects the existence of life at all is that gravity couples to it. It enters into
the Einstein equations for gravity via the cosmological constant Λ, that appears in the
following way
Rµν − 1
2
gµνR + Λgµν = 8piGNTµν , (3)
where GN is Newton’s constant and Tµν the energy momentum tensor of matter. The left-
hand side contains the Ricci tensor Rµν and the curvature scalar R, both related to the
curvature tensor Rµνρσ. The physical principle behind the precise form of the left-hand
side is general coordinate invariance. If one arbitrarily imposes an additional requirement,
namely that the left-hand side should be linear in R, one gets the standard form of the
Einstein equations, with Λ = 0. But there is no physical reason for such a constraint,
and on general grounds one should therefore expect the left-hand side to contain terms
of higher order in R (which are irrelevant in normal circumstances) as well as a term of
zeroth order, Λ.
Precisely such a term is generated by the the energy density ρΛ of the empty universe,
namely Λ = 8piGNρΛ. This is a quantity of no relevance in the absence of gravity, which
is why it is legitimate to adjust the zero-point of the energy scale in non-gravitational
physics. But gravity sees everything.
The coefficient Λ, if present, has important implications for the fate of the universe.
If it is negative, the universe collapses, whereas if it is positive the universe undergoes
accelerated expansion. The energy density ρΛ has dimension [length]
−4, which in the
standard units of particle physics (with ~ = c = 1) is equivalent to [mass]4. In a theory of
quantum gravity, where the only fundamental mass scale is the Planck mass, its natural
value would seem to be of order M4Planck. More precisely, ρΛ receives quantum corrections
due to virtual particle creation and annihilation which diverge with the energy of the
virtual particles. If we assume that quantum gravity provides a natural cut-off for these
divergences, one would indeed expect a result of order M4Planck. But even if we plead
ignorance about the cutoff mechanism and the scale at which they occur, we cannot put
that scale lower than the energy scale we have explored experimentally, because then we
would have discovered the mechanism already. Known physics, cut off just above the
Standard Model scale still contributes about 10−56M4Planck (see [15], [16] and [17], and
references therein for recent discussions of this issue).
Furthermore, as noted above, ρΛ receives contributions from any re-adjustment of the
zero-point of the energy scale. The most notorious example is the Higgs mechanism. In
the standard classical picture, this involves a shift in the value of a scalar field from a
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local maximum to a local minimum of a potential density. The difference of the values
of the potential density at the maximum and the minimum is a contribution to ρΛ. This
contribution is also of order 10−60M4Planck.The problem is that the observed value is about
+10−123M4Planck. The first way in which this was observed, around 1998, was from the fact
that we appear to be accelerating away from distant supernovae.
CC versus SM
It goes without saying that if ρΛ were 60 or even 120 order of magnitude larger we would
have noticed this long before 1998. In fact, if it were just a few orders of magnitude larger
there would have been nobody to notice it. The universe would have collapsed before
we even existed (if Λ were negative), or would have been ripped apart in a catastrophic
acceleration, if Λ were positive.
These bounds where made more precise by Barrow and Tipler [6] and by Weinberg
[18]. The former authors assumed that main sequence stars are essential for our existence,
and required that the universe would not collapse before they were formed. This gives
a negative lower bound. Weinberg assumed that galaxies (as star factories) are crucial,
and from the fact that they cannot form if the universe expands too rapidly obtained a
positive upper bound. Both of these bounds have an order of magnitude of about 10−120
(the precise factor depends on various assumptions), and leave an allowed region that is
considerably smaller on the negative axis then on the positive one.
Although both bounds can be criticized for possibly be too anthropocentric(are stars
and galaxies just essential for life in our universe, or in any imaginable universe?), it
is quite clear that an observer window exists which is many order of magnitude smaller
than the natural value of the cosmological constant. This window is the analog of the first
gedanken calculation in section 3. In this case the word “gedanken” can safely be omitted.
It is also clear that the amount of tuning required is far larger than what is needed for the
Standard Model. For this reason this argument convinces some people more of the need
for a large ensemble than the analogous argument for the Standard Model parameters.
But there are two other issues to worry about that look more convincing for the
Standard Model case. The first is the risk of circularity. It is important to know that
physics continues to make sense if we consider different values for a parameter than those
observed in our Universe. In the case of the cosmological constant the problem is that it
becomes relevant only if we couple it to gravity, which is precisely the theory we are still
struggling to understand. Suppose some alternative theory of gravity does not couple to
Λ, or that Λ=0. If that theory were correct, we had no right to consider Λ 6= 0 in the first
place. The observer window becomes meaningless, and only the value Λ = 0 would be
acceptable. This is not the case for observer windows in the Gauge Theory Plane. This is
because we can discuss gauge theories at the quantum level without understanding gravity.
Let us imagine that some fundamental theory of gravity singled out one particular value
of the electron mass or the fine-structure constant, by being consistent or finite only
for those particular values. We could still do meaningful chemistry computations with
different values different values of those parameters. All computations that produce the
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observer contours in the Gauge Theory Plane remain valid. Hence the puzzle produced if
a unique fundamental set of values landed precisely within the observer contour remains
genuine.
Furthermore it would not be equally surprising if a fundamental theory managed to
land exactly within the ridiculously small observer contour along the cosmological constant
axis, since this contour contains the mathematically special number zero. Of course, this
would require an alternative explanation of the apparently observed non-zero value for
Λ, but this possibility will continue to attract those that have strong objections to an
explanation in terms of a large ensemble. For these reasons I am more strongly convinced
of the need for a large ensemble covering the Gauge Theory Plane than of the need for
such an ensemble for the cosmological constant, even if the degree of apparent fine-tuning
in the latter case is much larger.
4 The Anthropic Principle
The term “Anthropic Principle” was coined by Brandon Carter in 1973, and for a long
time it received limited attention, and mainly from cosmologists and relativists whose
aim was to understand certain “large number problems”, such as the age of the universe
in Planck units.
The basic idea is that we cannot possibly observe any other universe than a universe
which allows us to exist. Therefore our observations are necessarily biased by our own
existence. Depending on the interpretation one gives this to these phrases this can be
turned either into a meaningless tautology or a disturbing form of anthropocentrism.
Indeed, initially the anthropic principle was presented as a reaction to the Copernican
Principle.
Anthropic principles
There seem to be as many anthropic principles (called WAP, SAP, FAP, etc) as there
are letters in the alphabet, but two main classes can be distinguished: one where the
existence of humans, intelligent life or observers is considered essential for the existence
of physics and/or the cosmos, and one where human beings, from a cosmic point of view,
are a minor chemical perturbation, of no special significance, except to ourselves. The
first is profoundly anthropocentric, the other just the opposite. Remarkably, many of the
early discussions of the “anthropic principle” discuss both of these extreme possibilities
as viable alternatives. I will not attempt here to describe the various forms of the an-
thropic principle in detail because it is often hard to understand what people really mean.
Language is an extremely limited tool for expressing ideas. Consider for example the
following definition of the “Strong Anthropic Principle” by Barrow and Tipler [6]: “The
Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in
its history.” What is the meaning of “must”? And what is “The Universe”? Our Universe,
or any possible Universe? Why would anyone even want to formulate such a “principle”?
Reading the context of such statements usually does not help much either. Occasionally,
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however, one finds a formulation that leaves no room for misinterpretation, such as Barrow
and Tipler’s “Final Anthropic Principle”: “Intelligent information-processing must come
into existence in the Universe, and once it comes into existence, it will never die out”.
Perhaps this should be understood as the extreme limit of anthropocentric thinking: if
the universe exists just for us, why would we die out?
When I first started discussing the point of view explained in section (3), around 1987
or 1988, I had a vague awareness about something called the “Anthropic Principle”, but
because I did not know exactly what people meant by that, I usually avoided that term.
I am still not sure that what I am talking about here is what other people call “the
anthropic principle”. But in any case I hope I made it clear that for me it does not mean
that human beings have some sort of essential roˆle in the cosmos.
Disgust, Denial, Derision
Some of the versions of the anthropic principle may sound preposterous, but so are some
of the reactions it has received.
During the many discussions I have had on this subject, I learned that it is against some
unwritten rule of particle physics to think like this. Someone even called it “religion”,
a word some physicists use as the superlative of “disgusting”. This strong resistance
exists until today. Just last year (2006) a respected colleague vowed to quit his job if
the anthropic principle would ever play a roˆle, and he was not the first to make such a
statement. In Physics Today Nobel prize winner B. Richter refers to people thinking in
this way as “creationists” [19]. I could fill an entire section with similar remarks.
What is even more remarkable than the emotional language used in these criticisms
is the fact that – in the area of Particle Physics – nearly all of them date from the last
few years. Before that time, particle physicist and string theorists tried to ignore the
issue altogether. An interesting example is [7] by R. Cahn from 1996, containing a very
nice discussion about the contours of our region in the Gauge Theory Plane, pointing out
that many aspects are crucial for our existence, all without any mention of the anthropic
principle (by then a well-known subject, at least in cosmology), not even to reject it.
It is still not uncommon, even now, to hear an entire talk about the cosmological
constant (usually described as one of the deepest mysteries of physics), in which several
solutions are suggested that even by the speaker’s own admission don’t make any sense,
without even any mention of the possibility of an anthropic explanation, and when it is
mentioned at all it is usually with some sarcasm, as in “The situation is so desperate that
anthropic arguments have been advanced” [20].
As far as I know, the first particle physics paper openly discussing anthropic arguments
for Standard Model parameters is Agrawal et. al. [8] from 1997, almost twenty-five years
after Carter’s talk, and more than ten years after Linde and Vilenkin advocated it in
the context of inflation. In string theory, it took even longer. Although string theory
clearly pointed towards an “anthropic ensemble” of solutions since 1985, mentioning this
in public was “not done”. Even nowadays, one can attend an entire conference on “string
phenomenology” without any mention of anthropic arguments, except occasionally in a
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derogatory way. Remarkably, the aforementioned paper by Agrawal et. al. does not even
mention string theory! I know of just three papers before the year 2000 that contain both
the terms “anthropic” and “string theory”.12 The first, by Gibbons and Townsend in 1993
[21], mentions anthropic selection or chance as options in the introduction; the second,
a review of string phenomenology by Quevedo from 1996 [22] discusses it in a footnote
as a possibility we may have to face if the quest for uniqueness fails. My own text from
1998 [3] advocates a huge ensemble as the most desirable outcome, but was written in
Dutch and not translated until 2006 [23] . The attitude of denial is nicely illustrated by
the title of [24] from January 2000, the first paper on the preprint archives to confront
the issue directly: “The beginning of the end of the anthropic principle”. But contrary
to what the title may suggest, the authors talk about the possibility of many solutions,
and conclude the following: Then life would actually arise in those minima that were
approximately “just so”. Thus the “just so” issue is resolved by having a large number
of possible vacua in which universes can end up. That statement is precisely what some
people would call the anthropic principle. Another ironic twist of history is that three
months later a seminal paper by Bousso and Polchinski [25] appeared, that marked the
“beginning of the beginning” of the anthropic principle in string theory.
So what is new?
Much of what there is to say about the “anthropic principle” can already be found in the
classic book on the subject by Barrow and Tipler [6]. If nothing had changed since then,
my reaction might be similar to those described above. But a few things have changed in
an essential way. They include:
• Focus on non-uniqueness as the main principle, instead of considering various philo-
sophical options more or less on equal footing. The fact that our observations are
necessarily biased by our own existence is of interest only if there could be some-
thing else: the essential issue is non-uniqueness of the laws of physics. If the laws of
physics are really unique, there is not much left to discuss, as far as I am concerned.
• The Standard Model. Many of the “anthropic coincidences” described in [6] are
based on nuclear physics or chemistry, without a clear notion of what can be varied.
The Standard Model, viewed as a point in the Gauge Theory Plane changes all that.
• The Cosmological Constant, which by Weinberg’s argument is bounded from above,
and from observations appears to have a non-zero value.
• String Theory. This offers a concrete example of a fundamental theory that fixes
the possible parameter values, and seems to do so in exactly the right way. One
could try to discuss such a theory purely hypothetically, as I did in the last section,
but I doubt that it would be as convincing if we did not have this explicit example.
12LINDE
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An (anti)-anthropic check list
Perhaps it is useful to divide the argument in steps, so that everyone can identify their
exact point of disagreement. This is a list of statements in decreasing order of acceptability
in the particle physic community:
• The Standard Model may not be the unique mathematical solution of any funda-
mental theory.
• Not all alternative solutions allow observers.
• The total number of solutions should be sufficiently large to make the existence of
a solution with observers plausible.
• We live in the most probable universe which allows observers.
Some people already see the first statement as something close to an act of treason
against the goals of physics. We are supposed to assume that every number we encounter
can be computed from first principles. One does not have to go back very far in history to
encounter statements indicating this. For example in Randall’s book “Warped passages”
from 2005 [26] the author states with obvious disapproval: Some String Theorists no
longer try to find a unique theory. The phrase suggests that most string theorists are still
trying, but I am not sure if this is true.
Accepting point one but rejecting point two is an interesting way out of anthropic
reasoning, but not a popular one. If all alternatives allow observers anyway, there is not
much reason to reject uniqueness. People who accept the first two points have already ac-
cepted a form of the anthropic principle. If there exist (at least mathematically) universes
different from ours in which no life is possible, it is obvious why we don’t live there.
Point four is the most controversial one. It is not clear how probabilities are defined
and if we can compute them, and even if we can, our Standard Model is just one sample
out of an ensemble, a nightmare scenario for statistics. This is another favorite line of
attack against anthropic arguments. However, it is useful to distinguish two frontiers in
the current debate: one that concerns point four, and one that concerns point three (or
even just one and two). Some people are still hoping for a unique outcome, while others
take non-uniqueness for granted, and are marching ahead trying to master probabilities.
Even if they fail, it does not bring us back to the unique outcome many people hoped for
two decades ago. In this article I am just advocating point three. I do not really care
whether that is properly called “the anthropic principle”. That is what others called it
in discussions (usually as an accusation).
Another way of stating this is to distinguish two kinds of anthropic arguments: an-
thropic window arguments and anthropic probability arguments. The first just states
that parameter values have to lie within certain ranges to allow observers, and the second
kind of argument tries to derive our precise position within such a window. The first is
non-tautological only in the context of a fundamental theory with an ensemble of param-
eter values in- and outside the window. In that context it really explains why we find
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ourselves within that window, whereas otherwise it explains nothing. Once a fundamental
theory with such an ensemble is established beyond any doubt, the anthropic principle
as defined in point three is only of secondary relevance. It is obviously true that the an-
thropic principle explains why the size of the orbit of the earth is neither extremely large
or extremely small, but this is usually not worth more than a footnote in a treatise on
planetary orbits. We have not reached the same level of understanding of a fundamental
theory of all interactions as of the theory of planetary orbits. Anthropic arguments tell
us something about the properties such a theory should have.
The cosmological constant provides a nice illustration of this point. If the fundamental
theory just has one solution, or only solutions within the anthropic window, the anthropic
argument explains nothing. If it has many solutions spread in and outside the window,
one can indeed claim that the anthropic argument explains why we measure a value inside
the window. This fact becomes less miraculous as the density of the solutions increases.
If the solutions have a known distribution one can move to point 4, and try to derive
where we should expect to be within that window.
Note that I am implicitly assuming discrete solutions here, for reasons explained ear-
lier. Apparently some people (in particular the authors of [24]) have reserved the term
“anthropic principle” for the continuous case only. Their logic is that if the distribution is
discrete, we will eventually be able to determine experimentally which one describes our
universe. Indeed, the tiny circle in fig. 1 is monotonically decreasing with time, as long
as we continue to do experiments, and eventually will contain only a single point. But
does not take anything away from the anthropic argument I am advocating here.
Throwing in the towel?
An often-heard objection to anthropic thinking is that it is like “giving up” or “throwing
in the towel”. But what are we giving up? These statements are based on the assumption
that the ideal outcome would be that everything is derived from an underlying theory.
As I tried to argue above, that would be a disastrous result. This is not a battle I would
like to pursue.
The objection would be valid if someone just declared that we live in a point in the
Gauge Theory plane where life is apparently possible, and that there is nothing left to
understand. Perhaps this is what some supporters of anthropic principles have been
advocating in the past. But this is not what I a advocating here. The crucial difference is
the requirement of finding a fundamental theory that produces the required distribution
of solutions in the Gauge Theory Plane. This goal is actually more ambitious than many
ideas just aiming at partial understanding, in the form of relations between gauge theory
parameters.
Superintellects?
When Fred Hoyle saw his prediction of a resonance in Carbon confirmed he was so im-
pressed that he stated “A common sense interpretation of the facts suggests that a su-
perintellect has monkeyed with physics, as well as with chemistry and biology”. After
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surrendering the solar system and loosing the battle concerning the origin of species,
people seeking scientific evidence for their favorite superintellect hold on to anthropic
coincidences as their next straw. While it is logically possible that in the course of science
we discover that the only possible explanation of some phenomenon is the involvement of
some sort of superintellect, it is not what most scientists would aim for, because almost
by definition that would be the end of the road towards a deeper understanding.
But the question I am addressing here does not hold much promise for evidence for su-
perintellects. A fundamental theory with a huge number of solutions solves the anthropic
coincidence problem without any need to monkey with the laws of physics. After many
frustrating debates with physicists, I was delighted to see that biologist Richard Dawkins
understood that point immediately [27] (among physicist there are notable exceptions,
including Weinberg, Linde and Susskind).
But even if the other side in the debate is right, there is not much left for a superin-
tellect to do. Even though a unique solution creates a deep mystery, and even though the
hope for such a solution smells like medieval anthropocentric thinking, a unique solution
would be mathematically fully determined, just as the value of pi. Even a superintellect
cannot change mathematics.
The Multiverse
If the fundamental theory has a huge number of solutions we avoid the anthropic fine-
tuning problem in the mathematical sense. It would not be surprising anymore that the
two gedanken computations of the previous section overlap. Our universe would be based
on one of those solutions. The others would just be possibilities that are not realized in
our universe.
But could the others be realized in other universes? Whatever that statement might
mean, something like it is an almost inevitable consequence of the foregoing. If our
universe were unique (as opposed to its laws of physics being unique), we would be faced
with another puzzle: how was our particular set of laws of physics selected from the huge
set of possibilities? Here there would still appear to be a potential for involvement of
superintellects.
But there is an obvious way out: that our universe is not unique, but it is created
multiple times by some process that samples the set of possibilities. I have always taken
something like that for granted, without focusing on a specific mechanism. The whole
idea of non-uniqueness of the laws of physics just does not make any sense without it.
Fortunately other people did focus on specific mechanism, which led them to the same
conclusion from a different direction. The concept of a “multiverse” goes back a long
time, and originated from a variety of ideas in cosmology. In the early eighties, the
idea of cosmic inflation was proposed, and naturally led to the possibility of separate
patches of space-time blowing up into distinct universes, a notion that was especially
emphasized by Andrei Linde and Alexander Vilenkin. This leads to a concept known as
“eternal inflation”. Linde and Vilenkin concluded that such a multiverse would offer a
scientifically acceptable realization of the “anthropic principle”.
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The multiverse idea is close to, but not exactly the same as the main topic of this
paper. One could have a multiverse consisting of universes with identical fundamental
laws of physics (gauge theory choices), and one could even imagine a single universe where
the laws of physics were chosen randomly from a set of mathematically allowed possibil-
ities. But clearly the last option would not suit my goal, as it replaces a mathematical
coincidence (the matching of the two gedanken computations) by a statistical miracle.
Obviously, both ingredients are essential: the multiverse and eternal inflation on the one
hand and a plethora of solutions of a fundamental theory on the other hand. Cosmology
and inflation will not be discussed here in detail since I wish to focus on two other ingre-
dients whose importance has been somewhat underrated: the Standard Model and string
theory. For more information and references I refer the reader to [28].
The multiverse raises some obvious questions. Do these other universes “exist”? Can
we observe them, even in principle? If not, have we left the boundaries of science? For
me, a sufficient answer would be that they exist as solutions to some fundamental theory
that also contains our own universe as a solution. Our task is to gather evidence for the
correctness of that fundamental theory from the only universe we are likely to have access
to: our own. This evidence may be experimental, but it can also be based on consistency
of the theory itself. The best one can hope for is that this fundamental theory makes a
prediction about our own universe that is so convincing that we also have confidence in
the extrapolation to other universes. But it is logically possible that our own universe
does not contain enough information to crack this problem. We may be left with a
huge number of unrelated candidates for a fundamental theory, each (of course!) with a
huge number of solutions, without being able to distinguish between these fundamental
theories. Fortunately, at this moment there is only one candidate.
5 String Theory
Even a basic introduction into string theory would be too long for this article, and there
are many available elsewhere. I will limit myself to a few points that are relevant in this
context. Let me begin by stating the most important unsolved problem.
We are used to specifying a physical theory by writing down, for example a Hamil-
tonian. In most problems of interest in physics this Hamiltonian is too complicated to
deal with. Then we may resort to perturbation theory. We write the Hamiltonian H as
H = H0 + H1, where H0 is a manageable part that gives the dominant contribution, and
 is small. Then we expand in .
In string theory we are in the bizarre situation that we know the perturbative expan-
sion, but we do not know what H is. That this can happen is easy to understand, since
there are functions that do not have a Taylor expansion, for example exp (1

). Such a
contribution can never be detected perturbatively.
String theory got its name because H0 describes the propagation through space-time
of string-like objects, and H1 describes splitting of such objects into other strings, or the
joining of two strings into one string.
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Quantum mechanics imposes severe restrictions on the space-times in which strings
can propagate consistently. The simplest theories can only exist in ten dimensions. There
are in fact five such theories, with different H0 and H1, apparently defining five distinct
fundamental Hamiltonians H. However, there are reasons to believe that in fact all five
are different perturbative expansions of the same theory. This is expected because we
know that all five ten-dimensional are closely related. These relations typically involve
replacing one or more expansion parameters  by its inverse 1

. Such relations are known
as dualities and caused a great deal of excitement around 1995, because they pointed
towards a possible uniqueness: instead of five theories there seemed to be just one, with
different perturbative expansions. Furthermore, to most people’s surprise, there turned
out to be a sixth perturbative expansion of H that is not described by string propagation
at all, and that corresponds to a theory in 11 dimensions.
The proper definition of string theory would be to specify H. At present, nobody
knows how to do that, or even if it is possible. This is not a new problem and also not one
that string theorists have overlooked or tried to hide. Indeed, the problem is mentioned
prominently on page 27 of the classic string theory book from 1987 by Green, Schwarz
and Witten [29], where it appears as a big question mark in a figure. The fact that twenty
years later this question mark is still there is worrisome. At this point one may see this
either as a challenge or a fatal flaw. It may mean that some of the ingredients we are using
are just wrong: this is undoubtedly true for the concept of a Hamiltonian which I used
for simplicity above, but may also be true for the idea of an action, quantum mechanics,
the continuity of space-time or the very concept of space-time or. Indeed, the fact that in
different limits it gives expansions with distinct space-time dimensions may give a hint:
it is not even clear in how many space-time dimensions H should be formulated. In fact,
many people think that the definition of H should not involve space-time at all, and the
space and time are “emergent” concepts, in a sense that remains to be made precise.
Hence the name “string theory” is misleading in two respects: it is not yet a theory, and
it is only described by propagating strings in some special limits. Sometimes one uses the
name “M-theory” for this entire connected ensemble, but I will simple continue to call it
string theory despite these caveats.
Every statement we make about this would-be theory is based on results in one of the
perturbative regions, with additional insights from some non-perturbative effects that can
be taken into account, and symmetries such as duality and supersymmetry. Attempts to
make these insights mathematically rigorous tend to be hampered by the fact that at some
point full control of all non-perturbative effects is required. However, what we have learned
by studying string theory using the limited tools at our disposal is amazing. The spin-
offs alone (various results in mathematics and quantum field theory, and especially the
so-called AdS/CFT correspondence) have made the effort worthwhile so far. Remarkable
results in quantum gravity, in particular an understanding – in certain cases – of the
microscopic origin of black hole entropy suggest that something is right about string
theory.
Even without explicitly knowing H, we can deduce which answers the theory will
give to fundamental questions, such as the one that is the main topic of this article, the
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uniqueness of the laws of physics formulated in terms of gauge theories. The answers
it gives to questions like this one will tell us whether it is worthwhile to try and unveil
the mysteries hidden in H. Two decades ago that was clearly true, and the pursuit of
this goal has led to a bounty of beautiful results that all by themselves made the effort
worthwhile. Let us see what it says about the central theme of this article, and decide if
the answer is sufficiently encouraging to continue.
5.1 Quantum Gravity and Particle Physics
String theory may – and must – provide the solution to many outstanding problems, but
there is one problem that it addresses directly: Quantum Gravity. Basically, the goal is
to put Quantum Gravity on equal footing with the other three interactions we know: to
turn it into an unlimited precision theory. When one tries to quantize gravity naively,
one is confronted with exactly the same problem we encountered in the quantization
of the Standard Model: quantum contributions that depend on unknown short distance
physics. The difference is that in the case of quantum gravity these unknown contributions
do not “decouple”: they are proportional to powers of E/MPlanck, and since MPlanck
itself is expressed in terms of Newton’s constant, one cannot send it to infinity if one
discusses gravity. In the case of the Standard Model, such contributions, should they
exist, are proportional to E/MX , where MX is an unknown scale which is not linked to
the parameters of the Standard Model itself.13 Hence we can, at least formally, consider
the limit MX →∞. At present, we do not know of any such corrections to the Standard
Model, but if we couple it to gravity, corrections proportional to powers of E/MPlanck may
be expected to the Standard Model parameters as well. To make matters worse, there are
infinitely many independent corrections of this kind.
One could consider various options. Perhaps some principle of nature prohibits unlim-
ited precision, in the spirit of the uncertainty principle. Or perhaps there simple exists
an infinity of parameters, and the goal of unlimited precision can only be reached if we
measure all of them (for practical purposes a finite number would suffice to reach some
definite degree of precision). In the latter case, perhaps some unknown new theory at a
scale beyond the Planck scale fixes these parameters. It is hard to dismiss these alterna-
tives rigorously, but it is clear that they are less attractive than the obvious one: that
all of these problems are caused by naive quantization of gravity, and that they should
be solved by a correct theory of quantum gravity. Since we already achieved the goal
of unlimited precision for three of the four forces we know, it does not seem a priori
unreasonable to expect the fourth to be manageable as well.
To achieve the goal of unlimited precision, we need to control these corrections. How-
ever, controlling these corrections is not merely a problem limited to gravitational inter-
actions. All other particles and interactions inevitable couple to gravity, and contribute
quantum corrections of the same order of magnitude as purely gravitational contributions.
This insight predates the new string era, which started in 1984. Very illustrative is the
13The only exception are the Landau poles described in section (2.4), which however are beyond the
Planck scale, if the Higgs boson is not too heavy.
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following quote of Howard Georgi, which appeared on Jacques Distler’s blog “musings”
[30], and dates from 1982 or 1983:
“There’s no decoupling limit in which it is sensible to consider quantum gravity effects,
while neglecting other interactions. Unless you know particle physics all the way up to the
Planck scale, you can never hope to say anything predictive about quantum gravity”.
One might hope that this can be turned around, and that when we understand quan-
tum gravity, we will know particle physics all the way up to the Planck scale. Perhaps a
theory of quantum gravity will then uniquely determine the Standard Model?
Let us now see what string theory has to say about these matters. First of all, what we
learn from the perturbative expansions described in the previous subsection suggests that
the quantum corrections are indeed under control. Infinite (and hence indeterminable)
integrals in quantum gravity perturbation theory turn into finite integrals yielding definite
numbers. Furthermore the reason why this happens is precisely the one stated above:
in string theory we know all particle physics all the way up to the Planck scale. The
infinities of quantum field theory and naive quantum gravity are identified as being due
to an infinite over-counting of a finite contribution. In the best understood case, theories
of closed strings, this is related to a property known as “modular invariance”. At lowest
order, the relevant integral (an expression for the simplest quantity that displays the
problem) takes the form (a few irrelevant details have been ignored here)∫
d2τ
(Im τ)2
(Im τ)(2−D)/2 Tr e2ipiτH0 , (4)
where D is the number of space-time dimensions and H0 the perturbative Hamiltonian.
The trace is over all states in the spectrum of H0. The integral in quantum field theory
would be over the entire complex upper half plane, and is clearly divergent near τ = 0.
But in string theory some contributions to this integral can be shown to be identical copies
of each other, and we they would be over-counted if we were to integrate over the entire
upper half plane. These identical copies are related by the following transformation
τ → aτ + b
cτ + d
, a, b, c, d ∈ Z, ad− bc = 1. (5)
It is an amusing exercise to work out how this divides the complex upper half plane
into an infinite number of copies. For this to be relevant the integrand must be invariant
under this transformation, which implies strong constraints on the spectrum of H0. These
constraints are known as “modular invariance”. To avoid the over-counting we can then
limit ourselves to one region, and in particular we may choose one that excludes τ = 0,
thereby explicitly avoiding the field theory divergence. The spectrum of string theory
consists of an infinite “tower” of excited states, corresponding to quantized energy levels
of the various modes of the string. Any change in the spectrum of such a tower destroys
the crucial property of modular invariance.
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5.2 Non-Uniqueness in String Theory
It is understandable that this rigidity of the spectrum fueled the hope that string theory
might lead us to a unique gauge theory, and perhaps a completely unambiguous derivation
of the Standard Model from first principles. This hope is very well described by the
following paragraph from the book “The Problems of Physics” by A.J. Legget, which
dates from 1987 [31].14 The author is not a string theorist (he received the Nobel Prize in
2003 for his work on superfluidity) but echoes very accurately the atmosphere in part of
the string community around that time:
The hope is that the constraints imposed on such theories solely by the need for mathe-
matical consistency are so strong that they essentially determine a single possible theory
uniquely, and that by working out the consequences of the theory in detail one might even-
tually be able to show that there must be particles with precisely the masses, interactions,
and so on, of the known elementary particles: in other words, that the world we live in is
the only possible one.
If this had been true, this would have led us to straight to the anthropic dilemma
explained in section (3). So how does string theory avoid this?
The answer to that question emerged during two periods of revolutionary change in
our understanding, one occurring around 1986, and the the other during the first years of
this century. I will refer to these periods as the first and second string vacuum revolution.
Although string theorists love revolutions, these two are usually not on their list.
It is important to distinguish two concepts of uniqueness: uniqueness of the theory
itself, or uniqueness of its “ground states” or “vacua”. I will use these notions in a loose
sense here, because one of the issues under dispute is even how they are defined (which is
especially problematic in a universe with a positive cosmological constant, as ours seems
to have). By “vacuum” I will simply mean anything that is suitable to describe our
universe, and anything that merely differs from it by being located in a different point
in the Gauge Theory Plane. I am not trying to argue that such vacua exist, but merely
that if they do exist there are likely to exist in huge quantities. The picture that seems to
emerge is that of a perhaps unique theory, but with a huge number of vacua. Although
this picture has started emerging more than twenty years ago, most people refused to
accept it as the final outcome, and instead were (and in surprisingly many cases still are)
hoping that one of the many candidate vacua would be singled out by some still to be
discovered mathematical principle.
The first string vacuum revolution
String theory was originally discovered in 1969 in an attempt to understand certain fea-
tures of the strong interactions. Around 1975 it was realized that it always contains
14This book also contains a remarkably prescient description of what might be called an “anthropic
landscape”, even with references to an important roˆle for higher-dimensional theories, a notion that also
appeared in equally prescient work by Andrei Sakharov from 1984 [32] about a possible anthropic solution
to the cosmological constant problem. However, precisely because of the cited text about string theory,
this remained an overlooked link in the idea for more than a decade.
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graviton-like particles and hence was an interesting candidate for a theory of gravity. It
has been under serious consideration as a theory of all interactions since 1984, when a
new kind of string theory (called the “heterotic string”) was discovered. This became the
arena for the first string vacuum revolution.
Heterotic strings are fundamentally ten-dimensional theories, and six of the ten di-
mensions must be “compactified” in order to make them macroscopically unobservable. A
rather trivial way to achieve that is to roll them up almost literally on a six-dimensional
torus. This leads to a set of four-dimensional string theories with continuous parameters
that specify the shape and size of the torus. Note that already at this point the unique-
ness of the outcome is in doubt. Clearly this construction would work for any number of
space-time dimensions less than ten, and furthermore it leaves us with a set of undeter-
mined continuous parameters. It is hard to dismiss torus compactifications on theoretical
grounds, but at least they are ruled out for phenomenological reasons.
These theories do contain matter and gauge interactions in four dimensions, in addition
to Einstein gravity, but they suffer from a fatal flaw that makes them unsuitable for
describing the Standard Model interactions that we observe: they are unable to produce
different couplings for left- and right handed particles, a feature known as “chirality”,
and which is experimentally observed in the Weak interactions. This may seem like a
minor point in view of many other unsolved problems, but it is in fact a crucial feature of
the Standard Model. Indeed, progress in string theory was severely hampered until 1984,
precisely because of the problem of obtaining chiral interactions. This problem could
be solved by using instead of a torus a special kind of six-dimensional manifold called a
“Calabi-Yau manifold”. In 1984 this subject had barely been studied by mathematicians,
and hence the preprint version of the first paper [33] using them could state with confidence
that “very few are known”. This remark was removed in the published version of the
paper, because by then it was clear that there were many possibilities.
Others tried to construct Heterotic Strings directly in four dimensions, by modifying
the ten-dimensional construction (this is now believed to be equivalent to space-time
compactification). One of the first papers following this strategy was by Narain in 1985
[34]. He found in fact a continuous infinity of solutions, a result that was initially received
with scepticism by some people, but was soon realized to be absolutely correct. Most
people comforted themselves with the fact that Narain’s theories were unsuitable for
describing the observed Standard Model interactions for a rather basic reason: they could
be identified as generalized torus compactifications, suffering the same chirality problem
mentioned above.
In subsequent years this explosion of possibilities continued. In particular in 1986 Andy
Strominger [35] studied a generalization called “Calabi-Yau manifolds with torsion”, and
he found so many possibilities that he remarked in desperation that “all predictive power
seems to have been lost”. The last phrase of his paper reflects the attitude at that time:
“All this points to the overwhelming need to find a dynamical principle for determining
the ground state, which now appears more imperative than ever”. The need for this
elusive dynamical principle was mentioned in many papers in subsequent years.
Other papers in 1986 generalized the direct construction of String Theories in four
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dimensions further, to overcome the lack of chiral interactions of Narain’s theories. These
approaches also suggested huge numbers of solutions, which could not be dismissed so
easily anymore. The authors of these papers commented on their results in interestingly
different ways, but they essentially all took a phenomenological attitude: there are many
possibilities, but it is sufficient if just one of them matches the experimental data. The
authors of [36] conclude with “We believe [...] a complete classification is a tractable
problem and that the relevance of string theory to nature can be tested”. In [37] one
finds the statement “The number of consistent four-dimensional string theories is so huge
that classifying them all would be both impractical and not very illuminating”. At CERN
I was involved, with Wolfgang Lerche and Dieter Lu¨st, in another paper [4] from that year,
in which we made an attempt to quantify the meaning of “huge”. We quoted the number
101500 as a precisely defined, but not saturated upper bound on the kind of theories we
were constructing. We also stated “Even if all that string theory could achieve would be a
completely finite theory of all interactions including gravity [...] it would be a considerable
success”.
By that time everyone understood that at the level of approximation of the time,
there were going to be huge numbers of solutions, which could not be dismissed straight-
forwardly. The first vacuum revolution continued for many more years after 1986, and was
not limited to Heterotic strings. This just made the number of possibilities even larger.
However, there were (and still are) plenty of unsolved problems, and at least two of
those are relevant to the problem of defining the ground state. The first is that most
results relied on a symmetry between fermions and bosons that is not observed in nature:
supersymmetry. Supersymmetry leads to a cancellation of quantum corrections between
fermions and bosons, and makes certain computations possible (well-defined and finite)
that are otherwise undoable. It is a great computational tool, but it is still not clear
whether it is a symmetry humans need in order to deal with quantum field theory, or
whether nature itself makes use of it, at least approximately. A popular idea, testable at
the LHC, is that it will emerge as an approximate symmetry, valid for energy scales larger
than about a TeV. Whether that is true or not, in any case the supersymmetric solutions
are at best approximately relevant for our universe.
The second problem is the so-called moduli problem. Just as torus compactifications,
Calabi-Yau compactifications turn out to have continuous parameters called “moduli”.
The same is true for all the other four-dimensional string constructions, although the
geometric interpretation of their moduli may be more complicated.
Essentially, what the first string vacuum revolution brought us was a huge (but still
incomplete) list of topologically distinct supersymmetric moduli spaces: four-dimensional
string theories, that are not connected to each other by continuous changes of their mod-
uli. The topological distinctions arise from various discrete choices one can make when
construction a four-dimensional string theory: the choice of the Calabi-Yau manifold, and
a variety of fields that wrap non-contractible cycles on such a manifold. These choices
give rise to distinct gauge theories in four dimensions: distinct gauge groups, coupling
to distinct sets of particles. These particles usually come out organized in “families” oc-
curring with a topologically determined multiplicity. Each of these topologically distinct
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choices comes with a certain number of moduli.
The number of such topologically distinct moduli spaces is huge indeed. We do not
know how many, but just to get an idea, let us consider Calabi-Yau manifolds. The
topology of these spaces is characterized in part by two integers called Hodge numbers.
An extensive list of Calabi-Yau spaces is available [38], containing 30.000 distinct pairs
of Hodge numbers. Since spaces with identical Hodge numbers may still be topologically
different, the actual number is much larger. If we consider more general topological
possibilities, it becomes much larger still.
On top of these topological choices one gets the continuous parameters, the moduli.
A typical four-dimensional string vacuum may have hundreds of them. The physical
parameters of the resulting four-dimensional theory depend on these moduli. This includes
in particular the strength of the gauge couplings and the Yukawa coupling parameters,
and hence ultimately the masses of all quarks and leptons, in those cases where quarks
and leptons can be identified.
Dynamical Parameters
In the supersymmetric approximation all values the moduli can take are equally good.
We might be able to get the Standard Model, but essentially have no theoretical control
over any of its parameters. They are functions of the moduli.
This may seem to disagree with the expectation expressed in section (5.1) that Quan-
tum Gravity would be restrictive enough to fix the entire spectrum. But there is no
disagreement. The way out is that the spectrum consists of infinite “towers” of particles,
which themselves are rigid. All that can be changed is a finite number of parameters that
determine the infinite number of coupling constants of the particles within the towers. In
other words, the set of variables is of measure zero in the space of all possible couplings
of all particles in the string spectrum. It appears that the infinite number of excitations
of the string spectrum is an essential feature to satisfy on the one hand the rigidity of
Quantum Gravity, and allow on the other hand enough variability to end up with an
interesting gauge theory. At the moment, however, this is merely an observation about
string theory, and not a general theorem about Quantum Gravity.
If the moduli were merely parameters, we would now be facing the problem mentioned
in section (3.8): how can we move around in parameter space, so that we can end up in
different points in the parameter space when new universes get started?
Fortunately string theory provides a natural solution to this problem: all parameters
are dynamical. In string theory all parameters are functions of scalar fields, that obey
field equations. Classically, a scalar field is just a functions of space and time without
a preferred direction, and whose dynamics is governed by a field equation. There is
such a scalar field for each modulus. Since scalar fields do not have preferred space-time
directions, they can take constant values in space-time patches without violating Lorentz
invariance locally. The classical values of these fields determine the values of the gauge
theory parameters in each patch. These classical values correspond to vacuum expectation
values of the scalar fields in a quantum theory.
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This feature has often been heralded as one of the greatest triumphs of string theory:
“string theory has no free parameters” was a popular slogan. However, what used to
be parameters had now become vacuum expectation values of scalar fields. Nowadays,
one sometimes hears the objection that the anthropic principle is turning physics into an
environmental science: some parameters are claimed to be a feature of our environment,
and not derived from first principles. But how different is “environmental variable” from
“vacuum expectation value”? Turning the Standard Model parameters into functions of
scalar fields opens the door for the possibility that they may be different in different parts
of the universe/multiverse, and hence makes it immediately a lot more plausible that their
values depend on the observer (or the presence of observers).
The second string vacuum revolution
If the parameters of the Standard Model are dynamical some obvious questions are: how
do they get fixed, and why would they remain constant over large ranges of space and
time? Indeed, in the supersymmetric limit one can change their values without any cost
in energy. In fact, this energy is always exactly zero (in the absence of gravity). But this
turns out to be an artifact of supersymmetry. This causes an exact cancellation between
bosonic and fermionic contributions to the vacuum energy which leads to a rather counter-
intuitive result: physically distinct systems can have identical vacuum energies. As soon
as supersymmetry is broken this degeneracy is lifted, and the result is as one would expect:
any change in the values of one of the parameters of the gauge theory leads to a change
of the vacuum energy.
If we take into account the values of these energy densities, we get something like
a potential for the values of the scalar fields, the moduli. This is a function of tens or
hundreds of such moduli. If we plot the energy density as a function of the values of the
scalar fields, one may hope to get a curve with some minima. To obtain a more or less
stable universe, one would have to end up in one of the minima. Such a universe may not
be exactly stable: it may decay by quantum tunneling. But to fit the experimental data
of our universe it just has to live at least 13.7× 109 years.
However, it is by no means guaranteed that a minimum exists. What may happen
(and indeed does often happen in simple models) is there are directions in moduli space
where the potential just gradually decreases, reaching its true minimum at infinity. In
this situation the moduli run away to physically unacceptable values. This is known as
the “moduli stabilization problem”.
We encounter an even more serious problem if we couple the system to gravity. Then
not only the existence of minimum is relevant, but also the value of the potential at the
minimum. This is the famous cosmological constant, discussed earlier.
In a given string theory vacuum the cosmological constant is a finite and calculable
number. But since the natural scale of string theory is the Planck scale, the result of such
a calculation is some dimensionless constant x times M4Planck. Somehow this dimensionless
number x has to get a value of about 10−120.
It is impossible to say how many non-supersymmetric vacua string theory could have
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been expected to have, based on the information available before the end of last century,
but I think most people would have put this number between 1 and 1020 or so, had they
been forced to mention a number. If that had been correct, it seems extremely improbable
that a value x = 10−120 could come out.
Indeed, most people took the attitude that presumably x was exactly zero even in non-
supersymmetric string theories, due to some mechanism that was still to be discovered.
If such a mechanism had been found, the observation of a non-vanishing x would have
falsified string theory. But even with a distribution of 1020 non-zero values x, string theory
would have been falsified at an enormous confidence level, simply because the distribution
is not dense enough.
But a discovery by Bousso and Polchinski [25] in the year 2000 made string theory
survive this potential falsification. They identified a new topological feature that has the
potential to solve this problem at the expensive of an explosive growth in the number of
string vacua.
The Bousso-Polchinski mechanism
We have seen that scalar fields can take constant values without breaking Lorentz or
translation invariance. Electric and magnetic fields cannot do that, because they must
point in a certain direction. But there is one other kind of field that can also play this roˆle.
Electromagnetic fields are given by field strength tensors Fµν , which are anti-symmetric in
µ and ν. Such tensors have natural generalizations to tensors with an arbitrary number of
anti-symmetrized indices. The one of interest here is the one with the maximum number
of indices in four space-time dimensions, Fµνρσ. The reason we do not usually hear much
about such fields is that they are non-dynamical in four dimensions; they do not have any
propagating modes, and hence there are no “photons” associated with them. In higher
dimensions such fields are conceptually on equal footing with electromagnetic fields, and
they do occur abundantly in string theory. They appear as field strengths of three index
anti-symmetric tensor fields Aµνρ, obvious generalizations of the electromagnetic vector
potential Aµ, and the possible existence of fields of this kind is limited only by the number
of space-time dimensions.
Such four-index fields can get constant values without breaking Lorentz invariance,
namely Fµνρσ = cµνρσ, where µνρσ is the Lorentz-invariant completely anti-symmetric
four-index tensor; it is unique up to normalization, which is fixed in the standard way
as µνρσ
µνρσ = −24. The presence of such a classical field strength in our universe is
unobservable unless we couple the theory to gravity. If we do, it turns out to gives
a contribution similar to the cosmological constant Λ, in such a way that the latter is
replaced by Λphys = Λ− 148FµνρσF µνρσ = Λ + 12c2.
One might think that this solves the problem, since we can now choose c in order
to tune Λphys to any desirable value (provided Λ is negative, which it always is in a
supersymmetric theory coupled to gravity). However, it turns out that in string theory
c is not an arbitrary real number: it is quantized. So the formula for the cosmological
44
constant now looks something like this
Λphys = Λ +
1
2
n2f 2 , (6)
where f is some number derived from the string theory under consideration. If instead of
Fµνρσ we were to consider an electromagnetic field, the quantization of c is akin the charge
quantization, and f would be something like the strength of the electromagnetic coupling
e: some number of order 1. This looks like bad news. For generic negative values of Λ we
would only be able to tune Λphys to an extremely small value if f is ridiculously small.
However, it turns out that string theory typically contains more than one field Fµνρσ
Usually it contains tens or hundreds. Taking N such fields into account, the result now
becomes
Λphys = Λ +
1
2
N∑
i=1
n2i f
2
i . (7)
One would expect the values for the real numbers fi to be different. Again an analogy
with electromagnetic fields is useful. Although for the Standard Model we need just one
such vector field, string theory may contain more than one. Generically, these will all have
different fine-structure constants, or in other words different values for the electromagnetic
couplings ei.
If indeed the values of fi are distinct, and in fact incommensurate, then Eqn. (7)
defines a dense set of values. Bousso and Polchinski called it a “discretuum”, a very
descriptive though linguistically awkward name. It is an easy exercise to show that with
N equal to a few hundred, values for fi of the order of electromagnetic couplings and
small integers ni, one can indeed obtain the required small value of Λphys, given some
negative Λ. It is clear that in addition to the correct value for Λphys one will find a huge
number of wrong values. This is the price one pays if the cosmological constant is to be
neutralized in this way.
I should emphasize one important point. All the ingredients used in the foregoing
discussion are already present in string theory; nothing was added by hand. In particular
the fields Fµνρσ are present, and the quantization of the field strengths follows using
standard arguments. The fact that there are so many of these fields is closely related to
what used to be viewed as an embarrassment: the large number of moduli. Furthermore
the mechanism could not even have worked by having a single, extremely small f . This
would allow the same fine-tuning of Λ, but one would end up in an empty universe [39].
Although the Bousso-Polchinski mechanism can be derived in string theory, this does
not mean that no assumptions or approximations were made. In reality, everything is quite
a bit more complicated than explained above. In addition to the field strengths Fµνρσ there
are analogous fields that live in the six (or seven) compactified dimensions. They play a
roˆle in the quantization of the field strengths, in a way analogous to the old argument due
to Dirac that relates the existence of magnetic monopoles to charge quantization. Those
fields are analogous to electromagnetic flux lines that are wrapped around cycles in the
internal space, like rubber bands around a doughnut. The arguments of [25] are done
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in an idealized situation, and ignore the back-reaction of the non-zero values of these
“flux fields” on the compactification manifold. They treated the manifold as rigid, so
that around any of its cycles an unlimited number of “fluxes” could be wound, without
affecting the shape (i.e the values of the moduli). But in the supersymmetric limit, the
manifold is certainly not rigid. Quite the contrary, its shape can be changed without cost
in energy by changing the moduli. The mechanism can therefore not be made to work
without solving at the same time the problem of stabilizing those moduli. Furthermore,
one cannot simply add arbitrary fluxes to a given string theory compactification. If we
start with an exact solution to the equations of motion, we cannot simply add fields and
and expect that we still have a solution after doing that. One has to reconsider the
full set of equations of motion for every set of choices ni. It turns out that those flux
lines contribute to the stabilization of the internal space, in other words to the moduli
stabilization problem explained earlier. In practice, Bousso-Polchinski fluxes only stabilize
part of the moduli. In addition we have to get rid of the symmetry that made the entire
discussion technically possible, but that is not observed in nature: supersymmetry. Other
mechanisms are needed (and available [40]) to achieve these goals.
The description of this full stabilization mechanism combined with supersymmetry
breaking takes us to (or even beyond) the edge of the current knowledge of string theory,
and there is a lot of debate about the validity of the approximation used. The skeptics
often express their doubts with the phrase “no example of this is known in a controlled
approximation”. This statement would probably hold up in court, at present, but I think
it is used mainly as a last straw by people who are still hoping for uniqueness.
The cosmological constant problem finally solved?
The cosmological constant problem has been viewed during several decades as one of the
most difficult and profound problems in fundamental physics. Can we now declare it
“solved”? Well, not yet. As I have emphasized earlier, string theory is not yet properly
a “theory”. And even if that problem is solved, we still do not know if it is a theory of
our universe. It is not enough to know that a Bousso-Polchinski discretuum of sufficient
density can exist, but it must exist in combination with a realization of the Standard
Model. The difficulty with string theory is that these two issues cannot be decoupled.
However, within the context of string theory the cosmological constant problem has lost
its status as the most profound problem we have to worry about. It is truly remarkable
that string theory guided us to this potential solution of the problem, despite the fact
that this is not the kind of solution most people hoped for.
5.3 The String Theory Landscape
The combination of the results of the two string vacuum revolutions was called the “String
Theory Landscape” by Susskind [2] [41]. It yields some distribution of points in the huge
space formed by the Gauge Theory Plane combined with a cosmological constant axis.
One of those points should correspond to our universe. To find out if that is true, we need
46
a map of the landscape.
Naively, one might think that these two revolutions could be combined in the following
way. The 1986 revolution produced a huge number of topologically distinct supersymmet-
ric moduli spaces, each with tens or hundreds of moduli. Each defines some piece of the
Gauge Theory Plane: a choice of particles and gauge symmetries, and a set of continuous
parameters. Let us assume that we can work out the vacuum energy as a function of
the moduli, after having solved the moduli stabilization problem and the supersymmetry
breaking problem. This then defines a kind of potential on the Gauge Theory Plane. Let
us furthermore assume that this potential has some discrete local minima. These local
minima fix the values of the moduli, and thereby the values of all couplings and masses.
Now we add the Bousso-Polchinski fields. The local minimum also fixes the numbers Λ
and fi in formula (7). We can add a cosmological constant axis orthogonally to the Gauge
Theory Plane, and all the Bousso Polchinski mechanism would do is to generate a infinite
number of points along that axis, all projecting down to the same point in the Gauge
Theory Plane. If this were correct, all we have to do is match the couplings and masses
of one local minimum to the experimental data, and then use the Bousso-Polchinski in-
tegers ni to make the physical cosmological constant as small as 10
−123 times its natural,
Planckian size. Ideally we might also hope to determine the integers ni that achieve this,
but in order to do this we would have to compute Λ and all the fi with 123 digit precision,
which is clearly impossible in practice.
But this is far too naive, as it completely ignores the back-reaction of the fluxes, as
explained above. Indeed, the potential postulated above may not even have any local
minima in the absence of fluxes. Furthermore, the local minima themselves will start
moving in the Gauge Theory Plane when we change the integers ni, and the range of
allowed values for each ni becomes finite. So adding fluxes is not like wrapping rubber
bands around a rigid doughnut, but more like wrapping them around a balloon with many
handles, which change shape when we increase the wrapping number, until they finally
snap.
Consequently the total number of choices for the set of integers ni is finite. Their
range and their total number depends on the string compactification under consideration.
For one particular one, the total number of possibilities was estimated to be around 10500
[42], an often quoted number that started leading a life of its own and is often quoted as
an estimate for the total number of string vacua.15 To get the total number of string vacua
one would have to sum such numbers over all possible compactifications, i.e. the results
of the first string vacuum revolution. It is impossible to estimate at this moment how
many of those there are. It is know that the number of topologically distinct Calabi-Yau
spaces is at least 30.000, but this is a very conservative lower limit, and furthermore a
straightforward compactification on a Calabi-Yau manifold is only a very small fraction
of the possibilities discovered since 1984.
15Most likely the actual number is not even finite, but there are arguments [44] suggesting that it is
finite after imposing bounds on the parameter space. In particular, the total number that would agree
with all current experimental data would then be finite. In the following, I will continue to use the
number 10500 as a guess for the number of vacua, but this should not be taken too literally.
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So there will not be a clean separation between the results of the two string vacuum
revolutions. The picture where the first gives a scattering of points in the Gauge Theory
Plane and the second a distribution of points on lines orthogonal to that plane is too naive.
But it it might happen that all the points originating from the same moduli space, but
with different values of ni cluster around a certain central value when we projected them
on the Gauge Theory Plane. In [43] it was argued that this would happen for statistical
reasons: there are many more ways to get a value close to the central value than to get a
point far away, for which all contributions would have to add up coherently. Under the
assumptions of this paper, only dimensionful quantities (namely the cosmological constant
and the scale of the weak interactions) would have a huge spread, whereas all others would
form dense clusters of points, something like the interference points in the spot of a laser
pointer.
If this is indeed true in the string theory landscape, we might still be able to discover
features of the underlying topological moduli space in the parameter values, although
only with limited precision. We might be able to find out which of the laser spots we
live in. In order to get unlimited precision we would have to determine precisely which
of the separate, distinct points within the laser spot corresponds to our world, and this
is probably an impossible task.
Is the Standard Model contained in this huge and extremely complicated ensemble?
This will be discussed in a little more detail in the next chapter. At present we know
enough to say that the very rough topological features of the Standard Model (i.e. the
gauge groups and the quarks and lepton representations, including the number of families)
can indeed be reproduced. Despite the size of the landscape, this is non-trivial: infinitely
many gauge theories are not realized. The exploration of more detailed features, masses
and couplings, is still in its infancy. Furthermore a very small piece of the Landscape is
accessible with currently available methods: we are only scratching the surface.
Neither the gauge group, nor the structure of a particle family, nor the number of
families follow uniquely from string theory. The same will be true for all the remaining
details, in particular the couplings. There will not be a simple formula for α expressing
it in terms of e or pi, as Feynman may have hoped. Instead we should expect a dense set
of possible values, correlated in complicated ways with dense set of values of the other
parameters. In some sense the second string vacuum revolution smears out the results of
the first, making it harder to discover the Planckian topological origin of the Standard
Model. But in the friendly landscape of [43] enough of the underlying topological structure
may be preserved to allow us to solve that puzzle nevertheless.
6 Our place in the Landscape
6.1 Possible Landscapes
Without committing ourselves to one particular fundamental theory, let us compare some
scenarios for the way the Standard Model might emerge from such a theory. No matter
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what the fundamental theory is, it will have a “landscape”: the points in the Gauge
Theory Plane it allows. One may distinguish several possibilities.
Scenario A: The Standard Model comes out uniquely. We can compute the gauge
group, the type and number of families, all masses and couplings, and they all agree with
experiment. There is a unique prediction for the value of the cosmological constant, or
some effect that mimics it. Let us furthermore assume that there are good indications
that this value is as small as it should be; a precise calculation might be too much to ask
for.
Scenario B: The fundamental theory has a large, but still manageable number of
vacua, let us say about 1030 in some finite region R of the Gauge Theory Plane near the
Standard Model. Within the Gauge Theory Plane we can draw a region E that constitutes
the current experimental information, with a size determined by the experimental error
bars. It is represented by the small circle in the figure in section 3. If we assume that the
1030 points are smeared out more or less equally in a large region around the Standard
Model (thus defining a measure), then 1030 is too small a number to expect one of them to
land in the experimental region E just by chance. One estimate, due to Michael Douglas,
implies that about 1080 vacua would be needed (the number 80 is the number of digits
of information in the masses and couplings of the Standard Model particles, expressed in
natural units, plus a guess about the likelihood for the discrete data, i.e. the gauge group
and representations). Therefore, if we do find a solution within E (and with only 1030
to check we might just be able to find it), there would be 50 digits worth of predictions
left over. This is less that the 80 digits we would have in scenario A, but still more than
enough to convince ourselves that we had found the correct theory. This would at the
same time prove, beyond any doubt, the mathematical existence of the other 1030 vacua.
Furthermore, such a result would prove the version of the anthropic principle advocated
here. The relative size of the anthropic window (assuming the same measure) might
be anywhere from 10−5 to 10−25 (depending mainly on the physical mechanism that
determines the weak scale). If it is, for example, 10−10, we may expect to find 1020 out of
the 1030 vacua to lie within the anthropic region, but still the vast majority lies outside.
Nobody would dispute the statement that some of the parameters of the Standard Model
are anthropically determined. Furthermore in scenario B (as well as in A) there would an
unlimited amount of falsifiable information available, since after determining the vacuum
corresponding to our environment, everything would be fixed: we would be able to predict
the properties of all particles and all interaction all the way up to the Planck scale, with
unlimited precision.
After achieving this tremendous success, some people would start discussing the ques-
tion why we find ourselves in one of the 1020 vacua that allow life, rather than any other.
Perhaps we would be able to argue that among the vacua that allow life, ours is among
the most probable ones, but this would not be a major issue anymore. It would be a bit
like worrying if our planet is the most common one in the set of all planets that allow life.
That is not a major issue anymore because no-one doubts the existence of a landscape of
possible planets: we can see more than a single sample with our own eyes.
In my opinion, scenario B is much more desirable than scenario A. Both would give
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us a huge amount of confidence in the correctness of the underlying theory, but scenario
B has the advantage that it also explains why we ended up in such an apparently fine
tuned universe, something that scenario A converts into an eternal mystery.
However, there is no theoretical upper limit on the number of vacua the fundamental
theory may have. In this situation, hoping for not more than 1030 vacua is wishful
thinking, just as hoping for just one. Furthermore, scenario B is unlikely to work if we
include the cosmological constant into the discussion. After having determined which
of the 1030 vacua we live in, this becomes a computable number, and it has to have a
value of about 10−120, although it is naturally of order 1. This computation requires an
unachievable amount of precision, but no-one would expect it to work just by chance, and
even if it did we would once again be left with an eternal mystery.
The only way out would be to hope for a fundamental theory that by some mechanism
dramatically reduces the natural range of the cosmological constant. That might be
acceptable: as I argued in section (3.9), it does not produce the same kind of troublesome
conflict between unrelated ‘gedanken’ computations as a derivation of the Standard Model
would. However, no such theory is in sight.
In string theory, it seems that we end up with scenario C: The actual number of
vacua is too large to allow enumeration, let us say 10500 for definiteness. If they are
spread around evenly over the relevant region, this would nicely explain all anthropic
coincidences, including the cosmological constant, but there is no way to determine exactly
which one is realized in our universe. Indeed, in case of a structureless distribution, if we
include the 80 digits of the Standard Model data and the 120 of the cosmological constant,
then there are still 10300 vacua left that fit all the current data. Unfortunately those 120
digits are not even of any practical value. In order to use them we would have to compute
each of the two terms on the right hand side of Eqn. (7) with a precision of 120 digits.
In this scenario there are not only more vacua than current experimental data, but in
addition they may be spread over the parameter space in such a way that, statistically
speaking, there is no way the Standard Model could be absent. In fact, it could be
present so abundantly that no predictions can be made. In this case, it seems that we
are back where we started: we end up with the Standard Model with all its parameters
taking practically any possible value. But even if this were the final result, it would still
be tremendous progress. First of all we would have succeeded in coupling the Standard
Model to a consistent theory of quantum gravity. Secondly, all parameters of the Standard
Model are now dynamical, allowing them to change in the very early universe, or during
the birth of new ones, providing a mechanism to move around in the landscape. And last,
but certainly not least, we would have gained a profound understanding of why we live
in such a special universe, apparently finely tuned to allow our existence. In this case we
would not gain any insight in the Standard Model itself, nor would we be able to use it to
learn something about the theory of quantum gravity. But this was neither guaranteed
nor required.
But the amount of experimental data is monotonically increasing, so for any finite
number of (relevant) vacua, scenario C will eventually turn into scenario B. Even if the
landscape densely covers the parameter space of the Standard Model, this may not be the
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case for extensions of the Standard Model we may discover experimentally. Undoubtedly
the 10300 vacua would make entire different predictions about such extensions. One pop-
ular extension of the Standard Model, low energy supersymmetry, adds 105 parameters.
Measuring each of them with three digit precision would bring us to the highly desirable
scenario B. Obviously this is far beyond our present horizon.
The extreme limit of this might be called scenario D. This is a featureless landscape
obtained by covering the entire gauge theory plane densely (or even continuously) with
points according to some smooth distribution. The string theory landscape is probably
not like this at all. The little bit we know about the string theory landscape does not
suggest that, and what we know about the Standard Model does not suggest that it lives
in such a landscape.
6.2 String Spectra
Before discussing how the Standard Model fits (or might not fit) in the string theory
landscape, let us consider what we know about the kind of spectra string theory produces.
A string spectrum consists of a few massless particles plus an infinite “tower” of
particles with Planckian masses. The latter cannot be observed, because they are out
of range of any imaginable accelerator. The Standard Model particles are of course not
exactly massless. In Planckian units, there masses are of order 10−19, so if they come out
massless in a string spectrum, that is the correct answer to an excellent approximation,
but not what we ultimately want.
Such spectra can be computed rather easily in a huge number of cases. It is usually
an algebraic exercise that can be done by hand in a few cases, but is normally done by
means of a computer. The result is described in terms of some Lie-group (called the
“gauge group”) and a set of representations of that group. The Lie group gives us a set of
vector bosons, like the photon or the gluon (the vector bosons that bind quarks together
in a proton or neutron), and the representations tell us how the massless particles couple
to these vector bosons. They are essentially the charges of the particles.
In nearly all published results the spectra are obtained in supersymmetric string theory.
This means that every particle is part of a boson/fermion pair with identical masses.
In particular, all the Standard Model particles have massless supersymmetric partners,
because it turns out that the already know particles cannot be supersymmetrically paired.
The reason for computing supersymmetric spectra is that non-supersymmetric spectra
are much more difficult to control in exact string theory. They tend to have instabilities
which are automatically absent or easily avoided in the presence of supersymmetry. In
the absence of supersymmetry, these instabilities (“tachyons” and “tadpoles”) can all be
avoided at the lowest order in perturbation theory in exact string theory, but at the price if
a huge loss in statistics (the conditions for the absence of instabilities are very restrictive)
and even then one still has to worry about stability at higher orders in perturbation theory.
For this reason, the most common approach is to compute supersymmetric spectra in
exact string theory, and make further assumptions about low energy physics from there
on. Ultimately, all these extra assumptions will have to be derived from string theory.
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These exact supersymmetric string spectra are not really points in the string land-
scape yet. They are points in flat planes in the landscape, the moduli spaces. After
supersymmetry is broken and the moduli are stabilized, a true landscape of mountains
and valleys is expected to rise up on these planes, and we hope to live in one of those
valleys. Ideally, we would prefer to compute the bottom of one of these valleys exactly in
string theory, but just as anywhere else in physics, the only available way is to get as close
as possible with exact methods, and then approach the point of interest using a variety
of approximations.
In this process of landscape formation, the masses of all particles are expected to shift.
In order for the particles in a supersymmetric spectrum to get a realistic mass two things
have to happen: supersymmetry has to be broken, and the weak interaction symmetry
(the SU(2) of the Standard Model) has to be broken. In both cases this is believed to
happen because the true vacuum of the theory, the valley of the landscape where we end
up, violates these symmetries by a tiny amount: they are symmetries of the Hamiltonian
but not of the ground state. In the case of the weak interactions this goes by the name
“Higgs mechanism”, and leads to the prediction that a neutral scalar particle should exist,
the famous Higgs boson.
When supersymmetry is broken, the fermionic and bosonic partners of the Standard
Model particles acquire a mass. There is indeed an excellent reason why the as yet
unobserved superpartners acquire a mass at this stage, and not the Standard Model
particles themselves. The reason is that the Standard Model particles can only get a mass
once the weak interaction symmetries are broken as well. Because we have not observed
any of the supersymmetric particles yet, the scale associated with supersymmetry breaking
(the mass splitting among the supersymmetric particles) is apparently larger than the scale
of weak interaction symmetry breaking (related the masses of the W and Z bosons and
the heaviest quarks). Usually one takes something of order 1 TeV for the former, whereas
the latter is of order 100 GeV. There are no convincing fundamental physics arguments
for the values of these scales, and in a landscape a large range of values is likely to exist,
with an unknown distribution.
Once one of these supersymmetric string spectra comes out of the computer, the first
criterion we can impose is that the set of vector bosons must include the ones of the
Standard Model, in other words that the gauge group contains SU(3)×SU(2)×U(1). It
may contain more than that; there may exist vector bosons we have not seen yet, either
because in our valley they have acquired a mass out of reach of current accelerators, or
because they do not couple to any known matter. The next thing to check is that there
are other particles (supersymmetric multiplets of fermions and bosons) that couple to the
SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1) vector bosons precisely as three families of quarks and leptons,
i.e. three times Eqn. (1). Also in this case there may exist additional particles, called
“exotics”, which may be a blessing or a curse, depending on their coupling to the Standard
Model. Just as superfluous vector bosons, exotics may acquire a mass when we move out
of the supersymmetry plane into our own valley.
Supersymmetric spectra containing (at least) the Standard Model with three families
of quarks and leptons exist in abundance in many regions of the string landscape. There
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are examples with just the Standard Model gauge group and nothing else, and there are
examples without exotics, but as far as I know there is not yet an exact string theory
example which has the exact supersymmetric Standard Model spectrum without anything
else. This seems just a matter of statistics: if we work out enough examples, eventually we
will find this. But it may well be that this is not what we should be looking for anyway:
there appears to exist dark matter that does not belong in the Standard Model. Many
people hope that this dark matter is made up of some supersymmetric partners of the
Standard Model particles, but it could well be something entirely different.
The next step is to compute the coupling constants between the various particles.
In particular the Yukawa couplings between fermions and the Higgs boson are of great
interest. Knowing them, we can work out the mass ratios of quarks and leptons, and
compare with observations. However, this is considerably harder than working out groups
and representations. It is not just harder because the computation of coupling constants
is technically more complicated; the more important problem is that these quantities
(unlike groups and representations) depend on the moduli, in other words they vary over
the supersymmetric plane. This implies that they will also take distinct values in the
various valleys of the landscape the rises up on top of that plane. This is good, because
it is precisely this variation that will be needed to end up in one of the small anthropic
regions. Coupling constants have been computed in a few cases, but little is known about
the distribution of their values over the landscape.
6.3 String Phenomenology
The field that deals with the way the Standard Model is realized in string theory is called
“String Phenomenology”. It is an essential activity: all matter, including the Standard
Model has to fit into string theory, or else this theory has nothing to do with our universe.
One may think that the explosion of string vacua should have had a major impact on
this field. I have been active in this are around 1987 (which led me to the conclusions
presented here) and again in the last few years, and to me the similarities are more striking
than the differences. There has certainly been progress: we can obtain string solutions
that are more similar to the Standard Model than twenty years ago, and we have more
methods to construct them. There has been major progress in moduli stabilization and
supersymmetry breaking. There is more interest in “landscape statistics”. But very little
seems to have changed in the way many people view the problem we are facing. Although
many of my string phenomology colleagues claim that it was clear to them a long time
ago that there are many solutions, I cannot help noticing that they still talk about their
most recent “model”16 as if it would actually have a chance to be the Standard Model.
And even nowadays one still hears the occasional expression of hope for the unknown and
16The way particle physicists use the world “model” may be confusing to outsiders. In this context it
simply means some string theory spectrum, which is not really modelling anything else. The use of this
word dates back to the days the Standard Model was constructed as an approximate, idealized description
(model) of the forces of nature. Attempts to build something with similar properties were called “model
building”. In string theory one does not really build anything; one simply finds what is there.
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elusive dynamical principle that will select the vacuum. The most common way of dealing
with the large vacuum degeneracy is to say “I do not care about the other 10500 vacua,
I only care about the one that describes our universe”. That may sound reasonable, and
fact it may sound like the very definition of phenomenology, but it is actually an escape
from reality.
First of all, if indeed there are 10500 vacua, it is highly unlikely that anyone will find
“the Standard Model” in string theory. One should expect to find a huge number that
satisfy all current experimental constraints. In addition, although we now have many
techniques at our disposal to construct string theories in four dimensions, it is quite clear
that we are just scratching the surface. Statistically speaking, our chances of finding
even one of the expected huge number of Standard Model realizations is essentially zero.
Furthermore, even if we do find one, we can only make predictions about novel phenomena
if we know all the other solutions and their predictions for the same phenomena. This
is a crucial change in comparison to the state of the art about ten years ago: with 1020
solutions (the largest number anyone may have expected), if one is found that agrees with
all current data, the probability that there is a second one is extremely small. With 10500,
the same probability is astronomical. So we should forget about the idea of finding the
Standard Model and then making predictions based on it.
The second reason why the aforementioned “phenomenological” point of view is un-
reasonable is that the phenomenological wish list has always included the so called “why”
problems: why SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1), why three families, etc. If the Standard Model
is part of a huge ensemble, the only way to answer such questions is to understand the
distribution of that ensemble. We have to care about more than just our own universe.
An inevitable consequence of a huge ensemble is that anthropic arguments will play a part
in answering some of the “why” questions. But in the field of string phenomenology this
is still nearly equally unmentionable as twenty years ago. There is even more attention
to anthropic arguments in traditional phenomenology (i.e. not based on string theory)
than there is in the field that cries out for it, string phenomenology. On the other hand,
I often hear talks containing statements like “property X is observed in our universe, but
occurs rarely in string theory. Here we (proudly) present an example with property X”.
Examples of property X are the absence of exotics (see below) or the presence of exactly
three families. In this situation I ask myself the question: “if property X is so rare in
string theory, why do we observe it in our universe?”, but few other people seem to worry
about that.
Of course most of the 10500 vacua are utterly irrelevant to us. It may be possible to
identify regions in the landscape where Standard-Model-like spectra occur more abun-
dantly, and other regions that are essentially barren. It may well be that most of the huge
number of vacua are in such barren regions. However, we cannot expect that to reduce
the number that really matters to something extremely small. If that were true, the cos-
mological constant problem is still not solved, nor are the anthropic fine-tunings of the
Standard Model explained. If the Standard Model were an essentially isolated point, the
anthropic reason of existence of the landscape would lose its meaning. We must expect
to find ourselves in a dense region of the landscape. There is no reason why the densest
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region of the landscape should coincide with the anthropic region – in fact, if it would that
would itself be a mystery – but within the anthropic region most universes with observers
obviously occur in the densest regions.
So what can realistically be achieved in string phenomenology? A fairly modest goal
is to use string theory as a guide to new ideas in phenomenology beyond the Standard
Model, which keep their validity outside that context; there are already plenty of examples
of that, but this is not my main interest here. A goal that seems within reach is to arrive
at a statistical proof that what we are looking for, a string vacuum that agrees with all
current data, must exist, even if we cannot find a single explicit example. It may be
possible to identify features of the Standard Model with those of certain classes of string
vacua, and extract generic predictions for that class. But the most important point I am
trying to make here is that we should not focus too strongly on the observed Standard
Model, but explore the region around it. Even if we have convinced ourselves that the
Standard Model is present in the landscape, there are serious challenges left, and I will
discuss some of them in the next section.
6.4 Challenges and worries
The Standard Model may look complicated, but it does not look like someone was throwing
darts at random into in the Gauge Theory Plane until an observer window was hit.
In section (3.3) those aspects of Standard Model structure having to do with our own
existence were sketched. Here I will focus on the rest. The anthropic features of the
Standard model need not be typical in the full ensemble of possibilities; some parameters
may be outliers, taking some rather extreme values in our universe. However, the non-
anthropic structure has to be understood in terms of a landscape of a fundamental theory.
The denser the string theory landscape, the less information we will get from the
necessary condition that it must contain the Standard Model. In this limit the more
pressing question becomes: it is really plausible that the Standard Model structure we see
comes from the string theory landscape? Ultimately, this would involve computing relative
probabilities of various features, which may be beyond our present capabilities. However,
if some clearly non-anthropic feature is dominant in the accessible part of the landscape,
and is not seen in the Standard Model, this is a reason for concern. An accumulation
of such concerns will end up removing our confidence in the hypothesis that the string
theory landscape is the right one. Here “dominant” means that the number of vacua
with a given property vastly outnumbers the number of vacua without that property. In
ensembles as large as the string theory landscape, such relative multiplicities can easily
be huge. Of course the multiplicity of vacua is not the final answer. One has to combine
this with the probability that we end up in a particular vacuum when a new universe
is created. Such probabilities are notoriously hard to define, not to mention compute.
One could still try to argue that such an initial probability might compensate for the
dominance of a wrong feature, but it seems implausible that cosmic probabilities have
large variations over the gauge theory parameter space, and even less plausible that such
a variation would precisely compensate an undesirable surplus or absence of vacua.
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We are assuming here that the Standard Model is directly embedded in this funda-
mental theory, without layers of unknown physics in between. Otherwise it is simply to
early to ask the question. A bit of intermediate structure may be acceptable, provided it
is a sufficiently transparent layer. However, it is certainly necessary that the quarks and
leptons are fundamental degrees of freedom, and not some sort of composites. All of the
following features are serious challenges for any landscape, and most of them will come
out wrong in a featureless landscape.
The θ-parameter
Perhaps the most obvious challenge is the so-called θ-parameter of QCD, one if the 28
parameters of the Standard Model. This is an angular parameter that is experimentally
consistent with zero, for no known reason. If non-zero, it would generate an electric dipole
moment for the neutron, which is not observed.17 The current limit on θ is about 10−9.
Unlike the cosmological constant, there is no anthropic constraint on this number. Even
if a non-zero value were measured in one of the ongoing efforts to measure the neutron
electric dipole moment, it would still be unacceptable that we live in a universe with
θ ≈ 10−9 purely by non-anthropic coincidence. It is noteworthy that there does exist a
mechanism in which θ = 0 automatically. This mechanism requires the existence of a new
particle, the “axion” which may have anthropic implications [45]. So then the challenge
is to demonstrate that this mechanism is realized naturally in a candidate landscape, or
that we are forced into it by a chain of indirect anthropic requirements.
Gauge groups and representations
The Standard Model gauge group, SU(3)× SU(2)×U(1) with its family structure looks
like one of the simplest gauge theories with a sufficiently interesting spectrum (although
one can argue about the need for the SU(2) factor [12]). Since in the string theory
landscape large gauge groups are statistically suppressed, and smaller ones may not allow
life, the Standard Model looks like a reasonable choice: perhaps among all the anthropic
ones it is the most abundant one.
One may distinguish string theories in which all strings are closed, and string theories
in which both open strings (strings with two end-points) and closed strings occur (this dis-
tinction is valid if we are in the neighbourhood of one of the perturbative regions). In both
cases, gravity is described by closed strings. In the former case, all other interactions are
described by closed strings as well, but in the latter case all non-gravitational interactions
are described by open strings. There seems to be nothing fundamentally wrong with either
approach. Indeed, the existence of both is required by a complicated network of “duali-
ties”, amazing relations between apparently totally different string theories. It is easy to
get the basic standard model structure to come out right in either case. Historically this
17The parameter θ also violates CP-invariance (which is essentially the same as invariance under time-
reversal), but since this symmetry is violated in the weak interactions, it is not a symmetry of nature,
and hence not a valid argument for the vanishing of θ.
56
was first achieved in 1985 [33] in closed string theories, in particular the heterotic string.
One can say without exaggeration that the Standard Model comes out rather naturally
in these theories. By simply imposing the condition that space-time should have four flat
dimensions one gets a theory with a certain number of families, although not directly with
the group SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1) but rather with one of the unified gauge groups (see
below) that were first proposed in the mid-seventies. Around the turn of the century [46]
it was shown that the same feat could be achieved with open strings as well. The fact
that this took so much longer is due only to the fact that open strings are technically a
bit more difficult to deal with. Both Standard Model realizations, closed as well as open,
are among the simplest constructions one can make in either case. It is straightforward
to write down examples of gauge theories and matter that would be essentially impossible
to obtain from string theory, and that at the very least would require some extremely
contrived and unnatural tricks. It is perhaps even slightly disturbing that one can get the
Standard Model so easily in two totally different ways. To some people, this may smell
like a consequence of the aforementioned duality. If one could make that precise, it would
be additional circumstantial evidence that the structure of the Standard Model suggests
a string theory origin.
The structure of a single family is also one of the simplest non-trivial choices. It is
strongly restricted by consistency conditions called “anomaly cancellation”, leading to
cubic sum rules for charges.
The number of families
But why do we observe three families of quarks and leptons? For our existence, one family
might seem all that is needed: we are made of up-quarks, down-quarks and electrons. The
top quark may play an essential roˆle in triggering weak symmetry breaking, which might
justify the existence of two families. Why there are three families is somewhat of a mystery.
Already for a long time there exists a qualitative argument: with three families one can
construct couplings that violate CP symmetry in the quark sector [47]. CP violation is
one of the famous three necessary conditions formulated by the Russian physicist Andrei
Sakharov for generating a surplus of baryons over anti-baryons in the universe. Such a
surplus is, at least locally, clearly necessary for our existence. But using CP-violation in
the quark sector does not appear to work quantitatively, and even if it did, it would work
just as well with four or more families. One can also generate a surplus of baryons using
CP violation in the lepton sector, by first generating a surplus of leptons (“leptogenesis”)
[48] [49]. However, this uses the so-called Majorana masses of neutrinos, a feature that
has no analog in the quark sector. This in its turn introduces new possibilities for CP
violation which would allow leptogenesis with just two families.
The number of families affects the physics of our universe in other ways. One of them
is neutrino processes, for example Big Bang nucleosynthesis (see below). All families enter
in the running of coupling constants through the coefficients b0 in Eqn. (2). If we simply
add a family or remove one while keeping everything else fixed at the Planck scale (while
making some choices for the masses of the families to be added or removed), the strong
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and electromagnetic coupling constant will move far enough from their observed values
to endanger our anthropic environment. To some extent this can still be compensated
by changing the initial values at the Planck scale. But if there are more than 16 quark
flavors (i.e. eight families) in a non-supersymmetric version of the Standard Model even
that does not work anymore: in that case the QCD coupling constant decreases towards
lower energies, and hence the strong force becomes a weak force. If one considers other
couplings and higher order quantum corrections even stronger limits may emerge. In [50]
it is shown that with four families the Standard Model couplings cannot be extrapolated
consistently to the Planck scale anymore. If we turn that around, it would imply that a
four family analog of the Standard Model (keeping everything else as much as possible
fixed) cannot be obtained from a fundamental theory at the Planck scale. To turn any
of these statements into true anthropic bounds requires a careful and systematic study
of possible initial conditions at the Planck scale, to see exactly under which modified
conditions we can still reach our current anthropic island in parameter space.
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In string theory, the fact that there is a repetition of families is easily reproduced. In
the simplest heterotic models, one obtains a number of families equal to the Euler number
of some six-dimensional compactification manifold. This allows many possibilities, up to
hundreds of families. The distribution of the number of families has been studied in certain
cases for open strings. (e.g. [51], [52]). Some care is needed in drawing conclusions
from these results: they are obtained for samples of supersymmetric models, and not
for true landscape distributions. Furthermore they only cover a very limited region of
the landscape. It turns out that vacua with larger number of families are exponentially
suppressed. This is clearly visible in the figure above, which is from the first of these
papers (the colors represent different ways of realizing the Standard Model; the vertical
scale represent the number of models found with a given number of families within a
certain sample; the absence of five families is simply a result of having a small enough
sample size to keep the number of two-family models reasonably small). Note that odd
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numbers are suppressed with respect to even ones, and as a result four families are one
or two orders of magnitude more common than three.
We may conclude that it is a minor puzzle why there are three families in our universe:
cases with two families are more common by a factor of a hundred to a thousand, while
there is no convincing anthropic argument against having just two families.
Quark and lepton masses
Although they are poorly understood, quark and charged lepton masses certainly do not
look structureless, and are not fully determined by anthropic considerations either. The
distribution of their values must tell us something about the nature of the underlying
theory. Donoghue [10] has suggested that they are more or less randomly distributed
on a logarithmic scale, a feature that is indeed produced in a class of string models. If
the masses were more or less random on a linear scale, one would expect most of them
to be distributed around some natural scale for quark or lepton masses, which is clearly
not the case. On the other hand, the masses may be hierarchical, expressible in powers
of some small parameter. These hierarchies may be anthropically tuned, as they help in
pushing down the up and down quark masses and the electron masses to small values.
It is quite common in string models that some of the quark or lepton masses vanish to
first order in some perturbative expansion parameter, and appear in higher order or by
non-perturbative effects. Too little is known about masses and their distributions in the
string theory landscape to see quark and lepton masses as a serious worry at the moment.
Neutrinos
Every Standard Model family contains two quarks, with charges differing by one unit (the
charges are 2
3
and −1
3
), and two leptons, also with charges differing by one unit. If we
order the families by mass, the quark masses within a family differ by less than two orders
of magnitude. But for the leptons this is radically different. Leptons can have charge −1
or 0. The charged leptons (electron, muon and tau) have masses ranging from .511 MeV
to about 1888 MeV. Neutrinos are so light that for a long time they were thought to be
massless. The experimental upper bound on the mass of the electron neutrino is about
2 eV, at least five orders of magnitude below the lightest charged lepton. Since about a
decade we know that the differences of the squares of the neutrinos masses are non-zero.
This is a consequence of the observation that a quantum-mechanical linear combination
of distinct mass eigenstates changes its composition periodically with time (“neutrino
oscillations”), a process that vanishes if the masses are the same. These differences are
tiny: the two that have been measured are of order 10−4 and 10−2 eV2 respectively. If we
make the assumption that the actual masses are of the same order as the differences, we
get masses of order .01eV to .1eV, about 6 to 10 orders of magnitude smaller than typical
charged lepton masses (depending on which charged lepton one considers “typical”).
This extreme lightness of neutrinos might appear to be a deep mystery, but a potential
way out is suggested by the fact that neutrinos, unlike all other quarks and leptons, have
zero charge. This means that they have the same charge as their anti-particle. This in its
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turn implies that there might exist a possibility of quantum-mechanical mixing between
neutrinos and anti-neutrinos. For a single family, this mixing results in a two-by-two mass
matrix with two parameters, of the form(
0 m
m M
)
(8)
Here m (called the Dirac mass parameter) is generated in the same way as all other quark
and lepton masses (i.e. by means of the Higgs mechanism). Therefore it may be expected
to be of the same order of magnitude as those masses (which still leaves a huge range from
.511 MeV for the electron to 174 GeV for the top quark). The parameter M (called the
Majorana mass parameter) is special for neutrinos and does not occur for charged leptons
and quarks. For M = 0 a neutrino behaves like any other lepton, and has mass m. For
M  m there are two neutrino mass eigenstates per family, one with a large mass M ,
and one with a tiny mass m2/M (this is know as the “see-saw mechanism”).
There is a priori no reason to expect any particular value for M . In other words, its
natural value, without any theoretical prejudice, would be a number of order 1 times the
Planck mass, about 1019 GeV. Even for the largest acceptable values for m, about 200
GeV, this would give neutrino masses that are too small to yield the observed differences.
Although some people are advocating using the unification scale (see below) of about 1016
GeV for M , this also seems uncomfortably large. This would just barely give reasonable
neutrino masses if we assume m to be of order the top quark mass, whereas it seems to
be more plausible that m is like a typical charged lepton mass, i.e. at least two orders
of magnitude below the top quark mass. This implies that M must have a value at some
intermediate scale between the weak scale and the unification scale.
Although the neutrino interacts so weakly that it cannot have any relevance for our
everyday life, it does affect our existence in many ways. It plays an essential roˆle in Big
Bang Nucleosynthesis (the creation of the light elements). Indeed, this led to a rather
tight upper limit on the total number of neutrino species (which is meanwhile superseded
by the result of the LEP experiments, 2.994 ± .012 neutrino species). Neutrinos are
important in the functioning of the sun, in supernova explosions (which liberate the
heavy elements made in stars), in the decay of the neutron (which would be stable if the
electron neutrino had a typical leptonic mass), and they contribute to the mass density of
the universe, just to name a few examples. The latter fact leads to an anthropic bound on
neutrino masses: if the sum of their masses exceeds about 40 eV they would “over-close”
the universe. This means that the mass density of the universe is so large that it collapses.
The anthropic window might be even smaller if neutrinos are involved in generating the
matter-antimatter asymmetry in our universe through a process called “leptogenesis”.
This works only if all neutrinos are lighter than 0.1 eV [48][49]. The anthropic nature
of this bound requires more discussion: they are derived under the assumption that only
the neutrino mass is varied, while everything else is kept fixed and one would have to
systematically investigate all alternative mechanisms before claiming that without light
neutrinos we cannot exist.
Neutrinos provide thus an interesting battle ground between fundamental and an-
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thropic explanations. The string theory landscape will certainly provide a wide range
of possible values for both m and M . There is a tendency to say that their values will
be “generically non-zero”. This would be true in the Gauge Theory Plane: if we pick
a random point we will find non-zero values. But is that also true in the string theory
landscape? One might hope that string theory is not generic in all respects. If string
theory only produces generic points in the Gauge Theory Plane, there is little hope left
to extract a prediction from it that could not have been made just as well without string
theory.
In explicit examples one often finds that m or M vanish. Perhaps this is because
we only have access to rather simple examples, which might be atypical. There is no
anthropic lower limit on neutrino masses; if there were it would have been possible a
long time ago to predict that they would be massive. This means that the anthropic
requirements are fulfilled if all neutrino masses vanish. If vanishing neutrino mass turns
out to be a dominant feature in the string theory landscape, this would be sign that
something is seriously wrong. Unfortunately the attitude of most string phenomenologist
is to simply reject models without a mechanism to generate neutrino masses; they do not
agree with experiment, so they are of no interest. Likewise, in explicit models it is not
easy to get non-zero values for M . If M vanishes, but m does not, neutrinos have typical
leptonic masses. If M = 0 turns out to be dominant in the string theory landscape, this
would be a smaller problem, as long as no direct evidence for Majorana masses exists.
One could then argue that the small masses we observe are Dirac masses, which are just
exceptionally small for anthropic reasons.
In [57] an anthropic probability argument was presented in favor of neutrino masses
of the observed order of magnitude. This argument is based on the effect of neutrinos on
galaxy formation. However, a prerequisite for applying such an argument to the string
theory landscape is a better understanding of mass distributions.
Another interesting issue is the mass hierarchy we observe for the charged quarks
and leptons. In the Standard Model this hierarchy helps in pushing the anthropically
important electron, up-quark and down-quarks masses to small values. For neutrinos,
this is not needed. It would therefore be very interesting to know if there is a hierarchy
in the values of the neutrino Dirac masses m. And from a theoretical point of view it is
obviously extremely important to find out if mass hierarchies for standard model particles
of different charges are correlated.
There are many other issues that could be discussed here, but I just want to re-
emphasize the main point: we should not just aim at finding “the Standard Model” in
string theory, but explore all its variations, and ask if we live in the most plausible one.
Apparent unification
There are two remarkable facts about the Standard Model whose precise roˆle in the story
is not yet clear.
One family of Standard Model particles, Eqn. (1), fits precisely in a single represen-
tation of a larger gauge group, namely SO(10), provided that we extend it with just one
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particle: a right-handed neutrino. This amounts to adding (1,1, 0) to Eqn. (1), a particle
that does not couple to any of three Standard Model interactions, not even the weak
one. Nothing we know excludes the existence of such a particle, and the observation of
neutrino masses even makes its existence plausible.
Another remarkable fact is the apparent convergence of the three Standard Model
couplings, if we extrapolate these couplings to higher energies. Such a extrapolation
can only be done if we know the exact particle spectrum, all the way up to the energy
scale of interest. This includes particles with masses much larger than are currently
experimentally accessible. All these particles contribute to the coefficients b0 in Eqn. (2).
If one assumes that, in addition to the know particles, the only ones that contribute are
their supersymmetric partners (a new boson for every known fermion and vice-versa) plus
the Higgs and its partner, then it is found that the three lines go roughly through one
point at an energy of about 1016 GeV, with a precision of about one percent.18
This will be subject to experimental verification at the LHC. If the LHC experiments
do not find these supersymmetric partners as well as the Higgs, we must conclude that
the seeming convergence of these three lines was indeed nothing but a coincidence, based
on an invalid extrapolation. On the other hand, if these particles are found and if there
are no surprises, then the three lines may go through one point at even higher precision,
making it harder to dismiss as a mere coincidence. It is then natural to assume that the
coupling constants do not just go through one point, but that at energies larger than
their meeting point there is a single theory with a single coupling constant. This is called
“Grand Unification”. This new theory could have a gauge group SO(10) (although there
are other possibilities), which would nicely explain why one family of quarks and leptons
looks like it fits in SO(10).
The idea of Grand Unification goes back more than thirty years [53] and has had
several ups and downs. It is partly responsible for the hope for uniqueness of the laws of
physics. I will comment on that in Appendix B.
If the convergence of coupling constants survives the LHC, we have two new kinds
of Standard Model structures to wonder about, namely not only Grand Unification but
also supersymmetry. Most string theorists are very excited about that possibility, but
is that excitement justified? If we did not know about string theory the answer would
obviously be positive. We could say that we had discovered new symmetries that point
to the existence of a beautiful new theory. But string theorists already know what that
theory is supposed to be, and it seems to me that they have to look at these discoveries
(if indeed they are made) in a totally different way.
String theory does not really need Grand Unification. It already unifies all interactions
with gravity, and there is no particular reason why the three gauge interactions should
unify first, at an energy scale of about 1016 GeV, three orders of magnitude below the
Planck scale.
18This result depends on the masses of the supersymmetric partners. This is because the coefficients b0
are actually functions of energy. To first approximation they are step functions that receive contributions
from all particles with a mass smaller than a given energy. The convergence works if we assume that the
supersymmetric partners start contribution to b0 for energies larger than about a TeV.
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Certainly there exist string constructions that produce supersymmetric Grand Unifi-
cation. This occurs most naturally in the case of fully closed string models (in particular
the Heterotic String). There are some difficulties with understanding the relative low
scale of 1016 GeV, since a Planckian theory like string theory naturally favors a higher
scale (slightly below the Planck scale, in fact). But even in Heterotic string theories, and
certainly in theories based on open strings, it is at least as easy to get the Standard Model
without any intermediate step of Grand Unification.
But then why, if the string theory landscape is correct, would we observe Grand
Unification in our universe? Would it not be easier to end up in an observer region if one
could tune all three couplings separately and independently, rather then being constrained
by a relation between them?
One possibility would be that Grand Unified solutions numerically dominate the string
theory landscape, if we impose the condition that we should get the Standard Model at
low energies. They were certainly the first kind of solution to be found around 1984, but
the first type of needle found in a haystack is not necessarily the most common one. A
proper discussion would require an actual counting of the valleys in the landscape. If it
can be shown that heterotic models dominate the subset of the landscape that contains
the Standard Model, it would still seem most plausible that the distribution peaks at a
value of the unification scale that is a bit closer to the Planck scale than 1016 GeV. But
perhaps here the anthropic principle can help. Perhaps this is what pushes the unification
scale to slightly smaller values in the tail of the distribution, since otherwise the strong
interactions would end up being too strong.
If Grand Unified solutions do not dominate the Standard Model part of the string
theory landscape, we may have to look for anthropic reasons why we see evidence for
it in our universe (if indeed such evidence emerges). Most anthropic arguments in the
Gauge Theory Plane have to do with chemistry and nuclear physics. They depend on
the properties if quarks and leptons at very low energies, less than a GeV. If we consider
the three Standard Model interactions, the strength of two of them (the electromagnetic
and strong interactions) at those low energies is important, but the strength of the weak
interactions seems less crucial. The fact that the three coupling constants are identical
at a very short distance scale (corresponding to 1016 GeV) has no direct relevance for our
existence. But Grand Unification may affect the cosmology of the very early universe.
Depending on how its realized, it may imply a phase transition, when we move from
the symmetric phase with a unified symmetry to the broken phase corresponding to the
Standard Model. This phase transition may have some relevance for the early evolution
of our universe. In addition, Grand Unification adds a mechanism for violating the con-
servation of baryon number. Indeed, in these theories protons decay with a lifetime of
about 1036 years. Stability of the proton has obvious anthropic implications, but that
is not at stake here. Life can easily exist even when the proton lives much shorter than
1036 years. However, the baryon number violation itself may play a crucial roˆle in gen-
erating the surplus of baryons over anti-baryons we observe (“baryogenesis”), and which
does have anthropic implications. One of the three aforementioned Sakharov conditions
for generating this surplus is – not surprisingly – violation of baryon number. However,
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baryogenesis related to grand unified theories has fallen out of favor as a plausible mecha-
nism, for reasons to complicated to explain here. So even though Grand Unified Theories
have potentially anthropic ingredients, I don’t think anybody has put these ingredients
together in a convincing way so far.
The discovery of low-energy supersymmetry, which would go hand-in-hand with the
discovery of grand unification, poses even more questions. Low-energy supersymmetry
means that the not yet observed bosonic and fermionic partners of the Standard Model
particles have a small mass (in Planckian units), say about 1000 GeV. Some people claim
that string theory predicts supersymmetry.19 In presently known string theories super-
symmetry plays an important roˆle in controlling the gravitational quantum corrections
at high energies (although in my opinion the purely string theoretic concept of modular
invariance, mentioned in section (5.1), is even more important). The fact that we seem
to need supersymmetry may simply be due to our limited abilities in dealing with any
problem in quantum field theory, but let us assume that it is true. There is a convincing
anthropic argument that supersymmetry cannot remain unbroken, i.e. that it cannot be
an exact symmetry of nature: electrons would be degenerate with their bosonic partners,
and all electrons in excited states of atoms could decay to their bosonic partners in the
ground state; being bosons, they are not subject to the Pauli principle. Then there would
be no atoms of any interest. So supersymmetry cannot be an exact symmetry of nature.
This is of course also what we observe, but if there did not exist any anthropic argument
against exact supersymmetry, its absence in our universe could be a serious worry for
any theory – such as string theory – that seems to have exact supersymmetry built in. If
supersymmetry is broken, this means that it can only be observed as a symmetry at high
energies: the degeneracy between bosons and fermions is lifted, their masses differ by a
quantity of order M , which may be ignored for energies much larger than M . If string
theory has anything to do with our universe (anthropically and observationally), it must
remain consistent when supersymmetry is broken at some scale M . But nothing in string
theory, at least as far as anyone knows, predicts the value of M . So even if string theory
predict supersymmetry, it still does not follow that it predicts low-energy supersymmetry.
In other words, the mass differences between the super-partners could be anything.
The weak scale
A related, and very important point is the weak scale, and in particular its smallness with
respect to the Planck scale: 246 GeV versus 1019 GeV. There is no doubt that this small
ratio has essential implications for our existence [8], given the rest of the Standard Model.
The smallness of the weak scale has long been regarded as a deep mystery that required
a solution in a fundamental theory, like the smallness of the cosmological constant. Both
quantities appear to be “fine-tuned”, which means that the natural size of all quantum
corrections is much larger than the quantity itself. For the weak scale quantum corrections
19But not everyone agrees with that, see e.g. [58]. However, a fair comparison of non-supersymmetric
and supersymmetric string vacua requires better theoretical control over the former, and a way of dealing
with relative measure factors.
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contribute to the square of the mass so that the observed value, (246 GeV)2, is a factor of
about 10−33 smaller than the “naive” quantum corrections from quantum gravity, of order
(MPlanck)
2. For the cosmological constant the natural size of the quantum corrections is
(MPlanck)
4, and the observed value is 120 orders of magnitude smaller. Decades of theoret-
ical and experimental efforts have been focused at understanding the fundamental physics
that determines the smallness of the weak scale, and many people expect the upcoming
LHC experiments to give us crucial information. There is no convincing theoretical and
non-anthropic argument that determines this scale, although it is possible that we will
eventually stumble one a mechanism similar to the one the “explains” the QCD scale: a
logarithmic modification of the measure. On the other hand, during all those years people
have wondered whether we should worry about the weak scale hierarchy problem, as long
as we had no clue about a much more serious one: the cosmological constant problem. If
we accept the string theory landscape and in particular the Bousso Polchinski mechanism
to neutralize the cosmological constant, this puts us in an interesting situation: there is
no mechanism that “explains” the smallness of the cosmological constant, other than the
fact that we would not exist if it were a few orders of magnitude larger. But if we accept
that solution for the most horrendous hierarchy problem, then why would we need any
special mechanisms for the lesser one? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the two
problems are not completely analogous: the weak scale is associated with a symmetry
breaking mechanism, and cannot be arbitrarily small, whereas the cosmological constant
is just a number without any implications except in a very far future. Furthermore, the
cosmological constant may just as well be zero, unlike the weak scale. The theoretical
physics community is very much divided on this issue, with some people still insisting on
the need for a fundamental mechanism, whereas others would agree with the point of view
expressed by Weinberg [16] “If the electroweak symmetry breaking scale is anthropically
fixed, then we can give up the decades long search for a natural solution of the hierarchy
problem.”.
The most popular physical idea associated with the weak scale is supersymmetry.
In supersymmetric theories, quantum correction due to bosons exactly cancel quantum
corrections due to fermions. As already mentioned above, the weak scale is determined
by a parameter m2 of dimension (mass)2, which acquires quantum corrections of order
M2Planck. The physical weak scale m
2 is an infinite sum of such corrections, but its observed
value should only be about (100 GeV)2. This is where supersymmetry comes in. It nicely
cancels all these large quantum corrections, so that it seems less bizarre that such a small
value comes out in the end. Supersymmetry does not, however, explain the actual value,
and it has a mass parameter, named µ, which in principle can take any value. The real
benefit lies in the fact that µ does not get Planckian corrections, unlike m. Nevertheless,
understanding why µ is much smaller than MPlanck has worried people so much that this
problem has been given a name, the “µ-problem”.
We have encountered supersymmetry before as a possible fundamental symmetry of
string theory, and also as a mechanism to provide extra particles that make the three
Standard Model coupling constants converge. However, the most common argument in
favor of supersymmetry is the one of the previous paragraph, the cancellation of correc-
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tions to m2. In order to do its job it does not have to be an exact symmetry. If the
mass differences between the superpartners is roughly equal to m, or a little larger, the
quantum corrections to m2 are themselves of order m2 and there is no fine-tuning. So
the absence of fine-tuning requires low energy supersymmetry, broken at a scale of about
1 TeV. Remarkably, this is precisely the mass the superpartners must have to make the
coupling constants converge. Could this be just a coincidence? In the last few years, as
experimental falsification of low energy supersymmetry might be approaching, there have
been remarkable shifts of opinion. The lack of confidence that some people have in the
fine-tuning arguments is perhaps best illustrated by an idea called “split supersymmetry”
[54], in which supersymmetry is mutilated in such a way that it only contributes to the
converge of the couplings, but does not solve the fine-tuning problem.
One could say that supersymmetry is a non-solution to a non-problem: the large weak
scale hierarchy is already understood anthropically, and supersymmetry by itself does not
even explain it.
If there is low energy supersymmetry is realized in nature, the upcoming LHC experi-
ments should find the superpartners. This is the favorite scenario of many theorists. Some
will say that they have correctly predicted supersymmetry, and they would be right. But
if it is found, we will have to ask why it is present in our universe. Surely the fine-tuning
argument is inadequate. Anyone with a basic knowledge of quantum mechanics should
have realized that this argument is not even correct: we can only measure the sum of
amplitudes, and it makes no sense to give significance to individual terms in the sum. If
supersymmetry is discovered, it was predicted for the wrong reason, and we will have to
find a better one. A large landscape may ultimately provide a rationale for the fine-tuning
argument. Perhaps supersymmetric vacua dominate the ensemble of Standard-Model-like
string vacua with small values for the weak scale, because it is “easier” to get a small value
in supersymmetric vacua? It is not as simple as that. One has to deal at the same time
with the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant. Low energy supersymmetry also helps
with that, so that one might think that it is even more beneficial to have it. But some
simple statistical models suggest that in fact supersymmetry breaking at a high scale may
dominate the statistics, simply because they are more numerous, allowing them to over-
come their disadvantage. It is not yet clear whether that is the correct conclusion for the
full string theory landscape. For a longer discussion of this issue and further references see
[55]. As these authors point out, if the correct conclusion is that a high supersymmetry
breaking scale is statistically favored, “the discovery of TeV scale supersymmetry would in
some sense be evidence against string theory”. It is noteworthy that many string theorists
see the discovery of TeV scale supersymmetry as evidence in favor of string theory.
With the start of the LHC just months away (at least, I hope so), this is more or less
the last moment to make a prediction. Will low energy supersymmetry be found or not?
I am convinced that without the strange coincidence of the gauge coupling convergence,
many people (including myself) would bet against it. It just seems to have been hiding
itself too well, and it creates the need for new fine-tunings that are not even anthropic
(and hence more serious than the one supersymmetry is supposed to solve).
But even if evidence for low energy supersymmetry emerges at the LHC, in the con-
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text of a landscape it will not be the explanation for the smallness of the weak scale.
The explanation will in any case be anthropic. The landscape will undoubtedly allow a
distribution of values for the weak scale, including values outside the anthropic window.
Features that are not observed
Most string phenomenologists seem to focus exclusively on one point: finding an (ap-
proximate) string vacuum that resembles the Standard Model as closely as possible. Of
course this is important: if the Standard Model is not present in the string landscape, the
string landscape is wrong. However, as I emphasized earlier, there is another important
question: why does some feature appear abundantly in some sample, whereas it is not
observed in out universe.
B-L
A good example is B−L. In many cases (namely if there are right-handed neutrinos),
it turns out to be possible to add an extra gauge boson to the Standard Model that cou-
ples to the difference between Baryon and Lepton number (for technical reasons, “chiral
anomalies”, it cannot be any other linear combination of B and L). In the Standard
Model one has the option to add such a gauge boson or omit it. In string theory, one
cannot choose: one gets such an additional massless vector boson, or one does not. Most
phenomenologists simply reject the cases with and extra massless B − L vector boson
without asking further questions. In a scan of part of the string theory landscape we
found that in only 3% of all the cases this massless boson was absent [51]. In such a
situation it seems natural to ask: why do we live in such a relatively rare universe?
In this particular case there is a plausible answer. An additional vector boson coupling
to B − L would change chemistry in a way that is hard to analyze. It would couple to
neutrinos, which already by itself would have drastic consequences for neutrino physics.
If neutrinos had such a coupling, this would forbid Majorana masses, and hence make
it unlikely that they are light, which in its turn has serious consequences for neutrino
processes. All of this makes it already clear that an additional massless B − L photon
would throw a spanner in the finely tuned works of our universe, but one could still ask
whether this would inhibit any kind of life. Perhaps the most convincing argument is that
B −L photons would produce an additional repulsive force in nuclei, between protons as
well as neutrons. In the string theory examples with a B − L photon the strength of its
coupling is comparable to that of the normal photon. This would therefore very seriously
affect the stability of heavier nuclei, including Carbon. It is unlikely that any interesting
chemistry would result.
Whereas in this case it is rather easy to find plausible anthropic arguments against a
Standard Model alternative, this is not always true. Of course one can always claim that
perhaps we just live in an unlikely universe, but if one has to appeal to such an argument
repeatedly it becomes harder and harder to believe that we really live in a point in the
string theory landscape.
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Exotics
By exotics we mean in general particles that occur in a given string spectrum, but not
in the Standard Model. It is convenient to exclude particles that do not couple to any of
the Standard Model vector bosons from the “exotics” category. Such particles (“Standard
Model singlets”) can only be observed through their gravitational interactions, and it is
quite likely that they exist in our universe in the form of “dark matter”. Furthermore,
most string spectra that have been computed so far are supersymmetric, and hence all
particles have a massless supersymmetric partner – a boson for each fermion and a fermion
for each boson. Since they always occur in supersymmetric spectra, it is not convenient
to label them as “exotics”.
If one imposes the requirement that the Standard Model with its three families is
contained in a spectrum, one finds essentially always, in addition to the quarks and
leptons, large numbers of exotics. We may distinguish two kinds of exotics, chiral and
non-chiral exotics. Roughly speaking, non-chiral exotics are particles that can acquire
a mass without violating any gauge symmetries, whereas chiral ones can only become
massive after a gauge symmetry has been broken. Since exotics, by definition, have not
(yet) been seen, we must assume that when we move from the supersymmetric plane to
our valley of the landscape, these particles become sufficiently massive. Clearly, chiral
exotics are then a bigger worry than non-chiral ones.
The word “chiral” comes from the Greek word for “hand”, and refers to the projection
of the spin of a half-integer spin fermion on its direction of motion: a particle is left-handed
if its spin points in the direction of motion, and right-handed if it points in the opposite
direction. If a particle is massive we can overtake it by boosting ourselves to a velocity
that exceeds the velocity of the particle. Then the relative velocity of the particle reverses,
while the spin continues to point in the same direction: it flips from left-handed to right-
handed, or vice versa. Since we merely changed the Lorentz frame, it follows that there
cannot be an essential difference between the left- and right-handed particle: in particular,
they must have the same couplings to all vector bosons. No such requirement exists for
massless particles, because we cannot overtake them. Hence the left- and right-handed
components may have distinct interactions; indeed, it is not even necessary that both
exist.
Since we compute exact string spectra for massless particles, we can invert the ar-
gument: particles which exist both in left- and right-handed varieties can, in principle,
acquire a mass. These particles are called non-chiral, because they have no preferred
handedness. On the other hand, particles whose putative left- and right-handed compo-
nents couple in different ways to vector bosons cannot become massive, unless we remove
the offending vector boson from the low energy spectrum by giving it a mass. These
particles are called chiral. The process of giving a mass to a vector boson amounts to
breaking the gauge symmetry corresponding to that vector boson.
It is usually assumed that non-chiral exotics appear in massless string spectra only by
accident. They could become massive if we just move around in the supersymmetric plane
by changing the moduli. However, when we compute string spectra we do not land on a
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generic point in the moduli space, but in special points that are computationally accessible.
This accessibility is related to the existence of symmetries in the string description, and
it is believed that these symmetries are responsible for the extra, non-chiral massless
states. So the idea is that the explicit computations we are able to do are too special to
correctly represent the generic situation. There is some evidence for this point of view,
but there is also counter-evidence in certain examples: particles that remain massless
even if one changes the moduli. The latter phenomena are sometimes referred to as
“string miracles”, because these are particles that one would not expect to be exactly
massless outside the context of string theory. If non-chiral exotics are generically massive
outside special points, then they are only a minor problem. The fact that we encounter
them so frequently would merely be an artifact of the computational techniques at our
disposal. But if this turns out to be false, we have to ask ourselves why the Standard
Model spectrum as we observe it is so much cleaner (i.e. completely free of exotics that
do not fit in one of he three families) as what we typically get out of string theory. Again
the word “generic” appears here, and the same remarks apply as I made earlier regarding
neutrino masses: if everything in string theory is generic, there is little left to recognize
its specific features.
Chiral exotics are a more serious problem. They are usually avoided by simply re-
jecting spectra that contain them, since it is not very likely that such particles exist.
Phenomenologically that is reasonable. All quarks and leptons we have observed so far
are chiral with respect to the SU(2) and U(1) groups of the Standard Model. If there
were any other matter that is chiral with respect to the Standard Model gauge group, it
seems reasonable that we should have seen it already. If such matter can become massive,
it needs the Higgs mechanism to do so, and then the mass would be of the same order
as the quark and lepton masses. The top quark mass (174 GeV) is just about the max-
imum acceptable value for such matter. If nature is holding additional chiral matter up
its sleeve, then the entire exercise of computing string spectra and comparing their chiral
matter with observations becomes essentially pointless.
If the entire gauge group is just the Standard Model group SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1)
then there are not that many possibilities for additional chiral matter. One may add a
fourth family, but that is essentially ruled out experimentally. But if the gauge group
of nature contains additional components, there are numerous possibilities. This is true
for open string realizations of the Standard Model, but it may be true for the closed
string realizations as well. If we insist on getting the observed three families of quarks
and leptons, but do not restrict the spectrum in other ways, the results are dominated by
spectra that contain extra chiral exotics. This extra matter couples to Standard Model
vector bosons, in particular the photon, and often has half-integer charge. In addition it
is charged under some additional gauge symmetry that is not part of the Standard Model.
Sometimes people admit spectra with chiral exotics out of desperation: without enough
statistics this is often the only way to get something reasonably close to the Standard
Model. People who do have a large enough sample can afford themselves the luxury to
simply eliminate spectra with chiral exotics from their database. There will still be plenty
of others left. But, once again, nobody asks the question why we do not see any evidence
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for these particles in nature if they occur so abundantly in string theory.
There are a few possible answers. It could be that this problem occurs mainly in
open string realizations (which is what my own experience is based on). Perhaps open
string realizations are simply sub-dominant in the full string theory landscape. Perhaps
the statistics in the supersymmetric cases that have been studied is not representative
for the actual landscape. In some specific cases one can invent dynamical mechanisms
that break the gauge symmetries that prohibit a mass. Perhaps these particles then
simply become massive after all, or occur only in massive bound states. The trouble is
that, unlike the case of non-chiral exotics, this does not work “generically”, but only in
special cases. Chiral exotics that do not get a mass at all would certainly have anthropic
implications: since they couple to Standard Model forces, they would get involved in
chemical and nuclear bound states. But it would be hard to argue that this would make
life impossible; it simply adds extra uncontrollable complications. At this moment I do
not have a plausible argument why we do not see such exotics in nature. The best thing
that could happen is that the LHC provides experimental evidence for such particles,
having acquired just enough mass to have escaped detection so far.
6.5 Misguiding principles?
For the last thirty years, attempts to understand what might exist beyond the Standard
Model have been guided by four basic principles:
• Consistency of the theory
• Agreement with experiment
• Naturalness
• Beauty, elegance, simplicity
The first two guiding principles are unquestionable, but the last two may well turn
out to be misguiding principles.
The issue of “naturalness” arises in cases where dimensionless numbers are small. The
principle of naturalness says that one would not simply expect such a number to come
out of a fundamental theory as number of order one that just “happens” to be small, but
that there should exist some underlying mechanism that explains its smallness. The most
serious naturalness problem is the smallness of the cosmological constant by 120 orders
of magnitude. In the string theory landscape this is solved by having a distribution of
values over a wide range, including the anthropic window. This brutally violates the idea
of naturalness, and one should be prepared for more examples whenever naturalness meets
the anthropic principle. The next frontier is the hierarchy between the weak scale of 100
GeV and the Planck scale of 1019 GeV, as discussed above.
The fourth guiding principle is also of dubious value. In the string theory landscape,
there is not much reason the expect the point in the Gauge Theory Plane where we live
to be especially beautiful or simple if there are 10500 other competitors in the beauty
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contest. Perhaps string theory itself can be called beautiful, or perhaps a truly elegant
description will be found in the future, but that has nothing to do with beauty of its ground
states. Nevertheless, within the string community it is standard practice to distinguish
string vacua on the basic of esthetic criteria. Perhaps arguments can be found to justify
that, but it would have to involve some knowledge about the distribution of vacua in the
landscape. Perhaps certain “esthetic” features are simply more common.
It is also imaginable that in typical string vacua most matter acquires large masses,
and that the Standard Model, with many light particles is very atypical. In that case,
one would expect that the only those particles are light that are required for our exis-
tence. Having any additional light particles would simply lower the statistics without any
benefits. This would indeed imply a certain degree of simplicity. Of course the Standard
model seems to contain lots of inessential particles, but one can only remove an entire
family at once.
6.6 Natural selection?
If there is a huge landscape, did we end up in our place just be chance after a humongous
number of tries, or is there a better way? An interesting idea put forward by Lee Smolin
[56] makes an analogy with the theory of evolution. An essential feature of the multiverse
is some process of eternal creation of new universes. The currently most popular process
is eternal inflation, in which bubbles of new universes are formed by quantum tunneling.
Smolin considered the possibility that new universes are created in the interior of black
holes. This idea has been criticized, but let us not focus on a concrete mechanism, but
on the idea of natural selection itself. Regardless of the precise mechanism, one could
contemplate the possibility that a child universe inherits some property from its parent.
If that property furthermore enhances the number of child universes, then it is to be
expected that in the total sample universes with that property will dominate. This would
be the analog of natural selection in evolution. In evolution, there is also an analog of the
landscape of possible universes. It is the entire set of all possible biochemical molecules
and combinations thereof, including all possible forms of life. It is clear that in that
biological landscape natural selection is absolutely essential in order to understand how
we managed to reach the complexity of life on our planet in a few billion years.
All though I have some sympathy for this idea, Smolin proposed it as a remedy against
the anthropic principle. Perhaps that is correct for some forms of that principle, but
certainly not for the point of view I have been advocating in this article: the likely
existence of a huge landscape. Clearly natural selection can only work if such a landscape
exists in the first place, just as biological evolution can only work if there is a biological
landscape. None of the arguments I gave in chapter (3) are invalidated if there is a natural
selection process that guides us to our valley exponentially faster than a random process.
Another objection is that creation of universes is necessarily a process on a cosmic
scale, and it seems preposterous that such a process should care about the minor chemical
accident we call life. In the concrete case of Smolin’s proposal, there is one important
ingredient for our kind of life that plays an important roˆle, namely the formation of stars
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and the collapse of some of them into black holes. But these are mainly nuclear processes,
and therefore I would expect universes to exist where black holes are formed, but the
chemistry for life is just not available. In that case we would still have to appeal to the
anthropic principle to explain why we live in this particular universe, within the set of
those with abundant stars or black holes. In other words, cosmic natural selection, if it
can be realized at all, might produce a large peak in the distribution somewhere in a large
neighbourhood around the anthropic region, but it would be miracle if it were to coincide
with it. It just might guide us a little faster to the right region, but it can never pinpoint
the right spot.
An essential ingredient of such a process is that small changes in parameter values take
place at the birth of a new universe. Exactly as in the case of evolution, large changes
don’t work; they would randomize the process. However, in the string theory landscape,
an extremely small change in a Standard Model parameter implies a huge change in the
cosmological constant. This may be compensated by a discrete change of the Bousso-
Polchinski fluxes, but that would put us in an entirely different part of the landscape. In
other words, points in the Gauge Theory Plane that are close to each other are generally
very far from each other in the full string theory landscape. Therefore natural selection
by small “mutations” of universes seems impossible in the string theory landscape.
There is another important, and somewhat disturbing, difference with biological evo-
lution, namely the absence of an obvious time interval required to reach our universe.
The adjective of “eternal inflation” says it all. What is worrisome about this is that
“eternal” implies an infinity, and infinities can have nasty consequences. In this case they
convert any option, no matter how improbable, to a real possibility. This even tends to
undermine the argument that biological natural selection is needed to explain how the
complexity of live could emerge in such a short time. With enough universes to try, in
one of them it may have worked all in one step! This raises the question why had to pass
through the complicated process of evolution if it could have happened so much more
easily? The answer to questions like these requires a proper understanding of the thorny
issue of probabilities, and may well be beyond the edge of our current knowledge.
7 Conclusions
One of my main points is nicely summarized by the following version of Hans Christian
Andersen’s fairy tale:
Many years ago, there lived some physicists who cared much about the uniqueness of
their theories. One day they heard from about a beautiful theory, which was absolutely
unique. They were told that only people stupid enough to be open-minded about the an-
thropic principle would not be able to see that.
Of course, everyone wildly praised the magnificent unique theory, afraid to admit that
it had “anthropic principle” written all over it, until Susskind shouted:
“String Theory has an anthropic landscape”
Then some people claimed to have observed this already.
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7.1 Will we ever know?
As I have emphasized repeatedly, the use of anthropic reasoning here is not the simple
statement that some property of our universe could be different, but involves a fundamen-
tal theory that specifies precisely how it could be different. Although those differences
are presumably realized in some other part of a multiverse, it is not likely that we can
check that. Perhaps it might be possible to do that in principle; it has been suggested
that information about ancestors of our own universe might be encoded in the microwave
background radiation, in the same way as black hole radiation is now believed to contain
the information that went in it; it has also been suggested that signals of other parts of the
multiverse might be visible in the future (which of course is measured in billions of years)
when our horizon has expanded sufficiently; there might even be a dramatic confirmation
when our universe tunnels to another minimum in the landscape. But in all these cases
in principle really means in principle.
This is not an acceptable state of affairs, if indeed it is the final word. But it is a
completely acceptable outcome if we can establish the correctness of string theory (or some
other fundamental theory) beyond any reasonable doubt. During the last two decades
there was some reason to hope that we might be able to do that my means of some
prediction of a Standard Model feature. That hope is fading now. I am not saying that
this will never happen, but I have seen too much wishful thinking to make an optimistic
statement about this. Essentially, we came to that conclusion already in 1986 [4]. We are
dealing with a theory of gravity. Getting information about it through the back door of
particle physics is a luxury that we once had good reasons to hope for, but that may not
exist. Rejecting a theory of gravity that makes no particle physics prediction may be like
rejecting the theory of continental drift because it does not predict the shape of Mount
Everest.
One cannot count on any direct experimental check of a theory of quantum gravity,
since any observable consequences it might have are extremely small, unless we are ex-
tremely lucky. Indeed, when ’t Hooft en Veltman tackled Quantum Gravity in 1974 [59]
they wrote about their motivation: “One may ask why one would be interested in quan-
tum gravity. The foremost reason is that gravitation undeniable exists. [ ....] Mainly,
we consider the present work as a kind of finger exercise without really any further un-
derlying motive”. The problem of quantizing gravity is a problem of consistency, which
can be checked by theoretical reasoning. Perhaps that is indeed the only way. As I have
indicated in chapter (5), in string theory there is still a long way to go before success can
be claimed on that point. The best imaginable outcome would be a proof that quantum
gravity requires string theory; on the other hand, it is possible that we end up with a
huge ensemble of unrelated theories of quantum gravity, each with its own landscape, and
without any way of distinguishing between them.
Although the Standard Model may not provide us with a verification of string theory,
it might easily have falsified string theory in many ways. It might have been impossible
to get chiral fermions, the Standard Model gauge group, quarks and leptons, the right
number of families or non-trivial couplings. All of these could have easily gone wrong, but
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did not. For comparison, if instead of the Standard Model we would have tried to get the
Periodic System directly out of string theory (treating nuclei as fundamental particles),
we would have failed convincingly (see appendix A). A failure to stabilize the moduli, or
to obtain a small, but non-zero cosmological constant would also eventually have led to
abandoning the whole idea. It is not hard to imagine future experimental results that
would cast serious doubts on the entire landscape idea. If the upcoming LHC results
point towards new strong interactions around the TeV scale, we have to revise the entire
extrapolation of the Standard Model to the Planck scale; the same is true if the Higgs
boson weighs more than 180 GeV. If there is no fundamental Higgs scalar at all, we might
feel less confident about the roˆle of fundamental scalars as moduli, and we certainly have
to rethink the Standard Model itself, before even attempting to embed it in string theory.
New particles with unusual charges or representations could make such an embedding
essentially impossible.
There is yet another, extremely optimistic possibility for the LHC, namely that it
might find direct evidence for string theory. This could happen if our naive estimates for
the Planck scale are wrong. It could in fact be directly accessible for LHC experiments if
there are extra dimensions that are large [60] [61] or warped [62]. In the first of these ideas
the weakness of gravity (or in other words the smallness of the weak scale) is explained
because at short distances of order .1 mm or smaller (but much larger than the Planck
length) space-time has more than four dimensions, allowing the field lines of gravity to
get rapidly diluted. If we are really lucky, we might observe excited states of string theory
and even produce black holes. However, although the idea of large extra dimensions found
its origin in string theory, it is not clear if it is a really a dominant feature of the string
theory landscape, or at least that part of the landscape that can accommodate a small
weak scale. Studies of different classes of string theories have led to opposite conclusions
on this issue [63] [64].
There is an impressive experimental effort going on in the area of astro-physics, which
could modify our current ideas about gravity and the cosmos. If any deviations from
General Relativity are observed, this would have profound repercussions on our current
understanding of string theory. A very important constraint is the possible variation
of constants of nature. If it is found that some of them are different in some part of
the visible universe, this would imply that this part of the universe should have a very
different vacuum energy, and hence should have collapsed or rapidly expanded [65]. If
we observe such a variation experimentally, then either its contribution to the vacuum
energy is compensated by another, unobservable variation, or our entire understanding of
vacuum energy and its relation with the cosmological constant is wrong. In the former
case, the landscape has a valley along which physics can change without a change in
vacuum energy, which would imply the existence of a (nearly) massless scalar field with
significant couplings to observable quantities. In the latter case, a basic principle behind
of the string landscape idea would have been falsified. This may already be the case:
in a recent paper [66] the observation of a small time variation of the proton/electron
mass ratio (of order 10−5 over 12 billion years) is claimed. If correct, this would be very
hard to reconcile with the idea that the cosmological constant is fine-tuned with 120 digit
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precision, and therefore extremely sensitive to even the smallest imaginable variations.
Most of these results would wreak havoc in other areas than just string theory, and
one cannot rule out the possibility that some reformulation or renewed understanding of
string theory might revive it. But in any case it underscores the fact that string theory
is not immune to falsification, and that it is in fact a small miracle that it has not been
falsified already. Indeed, it is truly remarkable that something like the Bousso-Polchinski
mechanism exists to avoid a falsification by the cosmological constant. In string theory,
this is not something one can engineer: it is either already there, or it is not. I find it
difficult to believe that a wrong theory would produce such spectacularly correct results.
The foregoing is just a small selection of observations that would change our point
of view completely and that might occur in the near future. On longer timescales, it is
clearly ridiculous to pretend that what we currently know will be the state of the art
forever. When Darwin formulated his theory of evolution he was unaware of Mendel’s
results on inheritance, and could not even have imagined DNA. It may well be that these
are the kind of time-scales we have to think about, but I am convinced that eventually
mankind will gather enough information to arrive at a definitive conclusion.
7.2 Final remarks
Finally, after 15 years the debate has started that should have started around the mid-
eighties of last century, but was stifled by irrational opposition against the notion that
our observation of the Standard Model could be biased by our own existence. To me
at least one thing seems absolutely obvious: the idea that the Standard Model is (even
approximately) unique will eventually find its place in history next to Kepler’s attempt
to compute the orbits in the solar system: understandable at its time, but terribly an-
thropocentric when properly thought about.
Far from “giving up”, within the context of string theory and its landscape our new
mission is exactly the opposite. We have to understand the landscape, find our place in
it, and determine if it is really plausible that we find ourselves in that particular place
and not elsewhere. Despite the huge size of the landscape, it is not guaranteed that the
Standard Model is in it. Because of the huge size, there is a risk that within the ensemble
of universes that allow life, ours is incomprehensibly rare.
Every theory of quantum gravity has a landscape: the matter it can couple to. There
are other ideas for quantizing gravity, but the reason I called string theory the “only
candidate” earlier in the article is that it is the only approach that is sufficiently advanced
to provide us some insight into its landscape. It would be interesting to know what
alternatives other approaches have to offer. I think that a unique solution cannot be
expected in any approach, and that a continuous infinity distributed over the Gauge
Theory Plane would not be the right answer.
I have presented string theory here as concept that is still very much under construc-
tion, but which makes a very clear suggestion about what a “final theory” might look
like. To me, what is emerging looks very appealing. It fulfills and even exceeds the hopes
I expressed in 1998. It is has been amazing to see this theory leading us in the right
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direction, sometimes even against the initial expectations of most of the people working
on it. We should continue to follow its lead, and do everything in our power to strengthen
its theoretical underpinnings. The emergence of a huge “landscape” makes this more
worthwhile then ever before.
String was expected to answer some of the big questions in science. Indeed it does.
What bigger questions can a scientist dream of than those concerning our own existence?
We got an answer to one such question, but unfortunately not everyone is ready for it.
One can easily justify the past two and a half decades of research in string theory by the
theoretical and mathematical spin-offs alone, but I think we are on our way to something
much bigger than that.
But will this road really lead us to the “final theory”? Was this the last time we were
mesmerized by misguided ideas about our special place in the multiverse? Was this the
last time the emperor turned out to have no clothes? Could string theory just turn out
to be the first item in a huge ensemble of theories with similar properties? I have no
answers to these questions. History does tend to repeat itself, but unfortunately not in a
predictable way.
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A The Standard Model versus the Periodic System
I have presented the Standard Model as a high precision theory with clearly defined
parameters, a property not shared by the old theories of nuclear and hadronic physics.
Based on this fact, and on the apparent anthropic coincidences in the Gauge Theory
Plane, I have argued that it is plausible that a Landscape of possibilities should survive
in any more fundamental theory. Such an argument would clearly be meaningless when
applied to the space of nuclear or hadronic theories, which we cannot even define. There
is, however, one predecessor of the Standard Model that might qualify as an alternative,
namely the Periodic System of Elements.
One often hears the statement that physics would never have progressed if people
had surrendered to the anthropic principle too soon. So let us do a historic thought
experiment. Let us imagine that string theory and gauge theory had reached its current
state many decades earlier, as a mathematical theory. Is it conceivable that someone
would have tried to apply it to understand the Periodic System, the Standard Model of
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their time, and arrive at incorrect anthropic conclusions?
By “Periodic System” I mean here concretely a theory with nuclei treated as point-like
elementary particles, with an electron, and with only electromagnetic interactions. This
is a gauge theory, so it is in fact a point in the Gauge Theory Plane.
In order to do this though experiment we have to assume that the physicists of that
time were foolish enough to overlook some obvious problems, such as the fact that the
nuclei are not stable, that we need to understand their abundances, and that this purely
electromagnetic theory does not explain how the sun works. This alone would be enough
to answer my rhetorical question. Perhaps there are problems today that I am foolishly
overlooking as well, something that so obviously requires entirely new physics that it is
premature to even consider a fundamental theory. I am taking that risk.
So what can be varied in the Periodic System, treated as a point in the Gauge Theory
plane? Obviously this includes the electron mass, the strength of the electromagnetic
coupling and the overall mass scale of all the nuclei. These are less strongly anthropically
constrained than in the case of the Standard Model, because we decided not to consider
abundances, and because there is no competition between the strong and electromagnetic
interactions. But anyway, any anthropic considerations for these parameters are contained
in those of the Standard Model, and hence would not be premature, if the latter are
correct.
This leaves us with the charges and the nuclear mass ratios. The charges are sometimes
mentioned as a candidate for anthropic consideration: if the electron charge is not equal
to the proton charge with enormous precision, atoms would have a net charge and we
would not exist. This is an excellent example of misuse of the anthropic principle for at
least three reasons.
First of all, it is not natural to assume that these charges are variables. It is true
that the nuclear charges can be treated as true variables in the description of the Periodic
System. However, anyone would immediately have noticed two facts: that the charges are
integers within experimental precision, and that atomic physics does not change smoothly
if the charges are allowed to vary over the real numbers: one cannot interpolate smoothly
between a hydrogen and a helium atom, for example. Hence the most natural assumption
would be that they belong to the set of integers, not to the set of real numbers. Indeed, it
is unimaginable that someone would propose a dense landscape of Periodic Systems with
arbitrary real charges for the nuclei, just to explain why all their observed charges are
indistinguishable from integers.
The second fallacy is the “anthropocentric trap”. Whether we would exist if the
charges were non-integer is irrelevant. One would have to show that nothing of comparable
intellect can exist. It is beyond our knowledge of atomic and molecular physics to conclude
that nothing of equal complexity could exist if we change some of the charges.
The third argument can only be made with current insights, and is relevant because
the integer charge anthropic argument is still heard from time to time. In the Standard
Model we already know that the proton charge is the exact opposite of the electron
charge with absolute precision, because the consistency of the theory demands that. I am
referring to “chiral anomalies”, which are cubic sums of charges that must vanish exactly.
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Although there are several ways of satisfying them, changing for example the electron
charge while keeping everything else fixed is not an option. These anomaly constraints
are only relevant if left- and right-handed fermions have different couplings, as is the case
for the weak interactions. Hence this idea would not have occurred to a physicist studying
only the periodic system. However, I was assuming that String Theory and gauge theory
had already been developed theoretically, and anyone with knowledge of these theories
would have understood that a fundamental theory explaining charge quantization was
entirely feasible.
The other parameters to be considered are the nuclear masses. With enough experi-
mental precision these would have been distinguishable from integers, because of binding
energies and isotope averaging. But even if they would have been treated as free pa-
rameters, they have little anthropic relevance. Again, what matters is not whether we
would exist, but if anything of comparable complexity would exist. The complexity of
atomic and molecular physics is determined almost entirely by the charges. Indeed, even
if we multiply the mass of the hydrogen by two, we get heavy water, a substance with
physical and chemical properties very similar to normal water. So it seems plausible that
chemistry of comparable complexity will exist over a wide range of the Periodic System
plane, if we vary the masses. So no incorrect anthropic conclusions are possible here.
The imaginary string theorists in the Periodic System epoch would encounter serious
problems if they tried to do what present-day string theorists are attempting: obtaining
their low-energy theory from string theory. The first problem is that it is in fact not
true that the Periodic System extrapolates to the Planck scale. The reason is that the
Landau pole of electrodynamics in such a theory occurs at energies well below the Planck
scale. The coefficient b0 in eqn (2) receives contributions from all elementary particles,
and these contributions are proportional to the square of the charge. The assumption
we were making about the Periodic System is that all nuclei (i.e. all those observed) are
elementary. But then they will all make separate contributions to the quantum corrections
that make the gauge coupling increase. The contribution of Hydrogen en Helium alone is
already equal to that of all three quarks of charges 2
3
and three of charge 1
3
; by the time
we have included all nuclei up to Carbon the Landau pole has already moved below the
Planck scale.
Even if one ignores that, it would be practically impossible to obtain a set of particles
from string theory with charges ranging from 1 to, for example, 20, in sharp contrast to
getting the gross features of the Standard Model, which come out easily.
B Grand Unification, little uniqueness
Grand Unification is the unification of the three known non-gravitational forces into one
a gauge theory based on a single gauge group. It is sometimes mentioned as a sign of
uniqueness of the Standard Model, or at least as the origin of a misguided expectation of
uniqueness.
Grand Unification is based on two miraculous facts. The Standard Model group and
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representations fit nicely in a larger group, and the three Standard Model couplings,
when extrapolated to higher energies, seem to meet at a common point at an energy just
below the Planck scale. The last miracle requires another speculation: supersymmetry.
The couplings only merge if we assume that every Standard Model boson/fermion has a
hitherto unobserved fermionic/bosonic counterpart.20, contributing to the coefficients b0
in (2). These “super-partners” must have a mass of at least a few hundred times the
proton mass to have escaped detection up to now. Furthermore, the normalization of the
U(1) coupling constant must be modified by a (theoretically motivated) factor
√
3/5 in
order for this to work.
The merging of coupling constants may just be a coincidence. The chance that it is,
based on current experimental errors, is about one percent. In other words, if we assume
that the value of the weak coupling varies over the multiverse and has no anthropic
relevance, the inhabitants of about one in a hundred universes would be puzzled by this
coincidence. Fortunately we will not be puzzled forever. If the necessary superpartners
exist they must be found at the LHC. If the apparent merging of the couplings survives
the LHC results and becomes even more accurate, it will be hard to argue that it is a
coincidence.
The second grand unification miracle is that the group SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1) fits
exactly in the group SU(5), in such a way that one family (see Eqn.(1)) fits precisely
in the representation (5¯) + (10) of SU(5). One can go one step further and embed
SU(5) into SO(10). Then one family (including a right-handed neutrino) fits into a single
representation (16) of SO(10).
Even readers who are not familiar with the group-theoretical details will understand
the (16) looks a lot simpler than Eqn. (1). In fact, there is something mathematically
unique about the (16) of SO(10): it is the smallest complex irreducible cubic-anomaly-free
representation of any Lie group (please ignore the precise meaning of this mathematical
jargon). Doesn’t this point towards uniqueness of the Standard Model? Not really. First
of all, families are repeated three times, so that we really have a representation 3× (16).
This ruins both the “irreducible” and the smallest in the statement. Secondly, there are
other particles in these models: Higgs particles needed to break symmetries. They must in
strange representations like (45), (54) or (126). There is nothing mathematically unique
about these. In string theory, the symmetries may sometimes be broken in a different
way, but certainly not more uniquely.
But there is a more serious problem with the concept of uniqueness here. The groups
SU(5) and SO(10) also have other subgroups beside SU(3) × SU(2) × U(1). In other
words, after climbing out of our own valley and reaching the hilltop of SU(5), we discover
another road leading down into a different valley (which may or may not be inhabitable).
When I was confronted with this around 1977, it started my doubts about the uniqueness
of the Standard Model. I studied the parameters that determine the valleys, and tried
to find values such that ours was the lowest one. This was possible, but I understood
that I was just fooling myself: this just shifted the problem into the choice of parameter
20Plus an additional Higgs scalar and the fermionic partners of the two Higgs scalars.
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values. The thought also occurred to me that not only the choice of gauge group, but
also the Standard Model parameters might be fixed at the start of the universe as a sort
of boundary condition, and could not be computed from first principles. I am not sure if
I attached any anthropic implications to that at the time, but I remember being deeply
troubled by this.
In other words, people who associate Grand Unification with the idea of uniqueness
are simply confusing the two concepts.
The story continues. Even if there is something conceptually nice about the fact
one family of the Standard Model fits into the (16) of SO(10), it still is a choice out
of many possibilities. Is there a natural way of realizing this in a fundamental theory
of physics? Indeed, there is a fundamental theory that naturally realizes this: string
theory, more precisely the heterotic string. This theory has a gauge group E8 × E8 in
ten dimensions. The group E8 contains SO(16) as a maximal subgroup (the other E8
is not used), and SO(16) has a natural decomposition into SO(6) × SO(10). There is
also a natural reason to split it in precisely this way: The SO(6) is the rotation group in
the six extra dimensions.21 In this way we do indeed get SO(10), but not necessarily with
three families. The number of families depends on the topology of the compactification
manifold, and there is a huge number of possibilities.
However, even though the appearance of SO(10) and the family structure is rather
natural in Heterotic string theory, it is by no means unique, and this gets worse if one
considers further breaking of SO(10) to the Standard Model. In landscape terminology: if
we continue climbing from the SU(5) hill to SO(10) and finally reach the summit, E8×E8
Heterotic string theory, we find that there is a humongous number of other trails leading
to other valleys than the one we came from. And higher up, partly in the clouds, we see
the outline of a still higher and rather mysterious summit, called M-theory, from which
even more paths descend down into even more different valleys.
C Dimensional transmutation and the measure
The Standard Model has two mass scales: The QCD scale and the weak scale. The exis-
tence of two small scales implies two problems: why is the QCD scale about twenty orders
of magnitude smaller than the Planck scale, and why is the weak scale seventeen order
of magnitude smaller than the Planck scale? Both of these small ratios have anthropic
implications.
The second of these problems is often referred to as the gauge hierarchy problem, and
there is a huge number of papers addressing it. The first problem, on the other hand,
is often regarded as “solved”, and this is used as a counter argument against anthropic
reasoning.
The argument goes as follows [67]. Dirac already knew that the ratio of the proton mass
and the Planck mass could be regarded as anthropic, but to his credit – the opponents of
21This can be made precise most easily in the supersymmetric case: E8 decomposes to SU(3) × E6,
and SU(3) is the holonomy group of a Calabi-Yau manifold. The group E(6) contains SO(10).
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anthropic reasoning say – he did not use that argument to explain it. Instead he proposed
that this ratio could be time dependent, and become smaller and smaller as time goes by.
The large lifetime of the universe would then supply the large number needed to explain
the small ratio. While this was a nice idea at the time, it was of course wrong, but
according to opponents of anthropic arguments even a wrong idea is better than invoking
the anthropic principle. In my opinion, it would have been equally reasonable for Dirac to
have said: “maybe in a more fundamental theory we will understand that the proton mass
has many possible values, and we see a proton with a small mass because otherwise we
would not exist to observe it”. The words “in a more fundamental theory” are crucial. As
I have already emphasized many times, one cannot simply assume that some parameter
can take many values. There must exist a theory that tells us what the allowed variations
are. This is of course what the string theory landscape provides us with.
Meanwhile we understand the proton mass in terms of the QCD scale, and asymptotic
freedom of QCD seems to give a convincing, non-anthropic answer:
Mproton
MPlanck
= e
− c
αs(MPlanck) (9)
This relation is obtained by inverting Eqn. (2). The proton mass is of the same order as
the QCD scale, which is the mass scale where (2) has a pole. We can use (2) to express
the position of the pole in terms of the value of the coupling constant at any scale,
and we choose the Planck scale. This relation is sometimes referred to as “dimensional
transmutation”, since it seems to generate a dimensionful parameter (the QCD scale) out
of a dimensionless number, αs. Here αs is the strong coupling constant, the analog of the
fine structure constant of QED. It is a function of energy, which is evaluated here at the
Planck energy (which is how the mass dimension enters into the equation). The coefficient
c is a positive numerical constant of order 1. The ratio on the left hand side is small if
the value of αs(MPlanck) is small, which of course it is. But that, by itself, cannot yet be
called an explanation of the smallness of the ratio unless we can compute αs(MPlanck).
What the equation actually does is turn a major miracle into a minor miracle: instead
of having to understand why in our universe we measure a number as small as 10−19, we
now only have to understand why it is of order 10−1.
Of course this does take the urgency out of the problem, but unless someone actually
computes αs(MPlanck) from first principles, it is not the end of the story. If we end up
with a fundamental theory that has a landscape, what one would expect to find is a
distribution of possible values of αs(MPlanck). This distribution will undoubtedly have
values outside the anthropic window, in which case we will once again have to resort to
anthropic arguments to understand why we find ourselves within that window. Eqn. (9)
does tell us something very important, namely that before we worry about the smallness
of a parameter, we should worry first about the measure on the parameter space. But in
a landscape picture it only changes the measure, it does not provide us with the definitive
measure on the space of couplings. This we will only know once we know the actual
distribution of the values of αs(MPlanck) in the landscape.
There might exist a way to improve this argument. Perhaps the smallness of αs(MPlanck)
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could be related to the smallness of the fine structure constant α, which is also a function
of energy. This is indeed true in Grand Unified Theories (see appendix B), which at this
moment is still a theoretical speculation awaiting experimental evidence. In those theo-
ries both functions are actually equal at some GUT mass scale MGUT, below which the
strong coupling increases and the QED coupling decreases with decreasing energy. This
would indeed look like a counter indication to anthropic reasoning, because it relates two
quantities with anthropic implications.22 However, note that the two quantities are deter-
mined in terms of two other parameters, the GUT mass scale and the value of the unified
coupling at that scale. Mathematically speaking this does not imply a relation at all. In
reality, it does imply a limitation of the allowed values, if one imposes the condition that
MGUT should be smaller than MPlanck. This would be a reasonable assumption if MPlanck
is the largest possible mass scale in physics.
If the GUT picture survives future experiments, it is undeniably true that there is
something remarkable about the fact that MGUT is close to MPlanck. Had it been equal
to MPlanck, one could claim a direct relation between the QCD scale and fine-structure
constant. But it is not equal, and hence MGUT is just a free parameter with a value that
is remarkably close to the Planck scale.
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